University of Wollongong

Research Online
University of Wollongong Thesis Collection
1954-2016

University of Wollongong Thesis Collections

1997

Social democracy and the contemporary problems of lesser developed
countries in Europe: Spain and Turkiye (Turkey)
Ihsan Kamalak
University of Wollongong
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/theses
University of Wollongong
Copyright Warning
You may print or download ONE copy of this document for the purpose of your own research or study. The University
does not authorise you to copy, communicate or otherwise make available electronically to any other person any
copyright material contained on this site.
You are reminded of the following: This work is copyright. Apart from any use permitted under the Copyright Act
1968, no part of this work may be reproduced by any process, nor may any other exclusive right be exercised,
without the permission of the author. Copyright owners are entitled to take legal action against persons who infringe
their copyright. A reproduction of material that is protected by copyright may be a copyright infringement. A court
may impose penalties and award damages in relation to offences and infringements relating to copyright material.
Higher penalties may apply, and higher damages may be awarded, for offences and infringements involving the
conversion of material into digital or electronic form.
Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not necessarily
represent the views of the University of Wollongong.

Recommended Citation
Kamalak, Ihsan, Social democracy and the contemporary problems of lesser developed countries in
Europe: Spain and Turkiye (Turkey), Master of Arts (Hons.) thesis, Faculty of Arts, University of
Wollongong, 1997. https://ro.uow.edu.au/theses/2243

Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au

1

"Social Democracy and the Contemporary Problems of
Lesser Developed Countries in Europe:
Spain and Turkiye (Turkey)"

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the
award of the degree
MASTER OF ARTS (HONOURS) in POLITICS

from
UNIVERSITY OF WOLLONGONG

by
IHSAN KAMALAK

PROGRAM in HISTORY and POLITICS

1997

11

CONTENT
Abbreviations
List of Graphs
List of Maps
List of Tables
Acknowledgments
Synopsis

Pages
IV
VI
VI
VH
IX
X

INTRODUCTION

1

SOCIAL DEMOCRACY
Bernstein and the Revisionist Controversy
Revisionism and the Rise of Mass Social Democratic Parties
Crosland's Social Democracy
Holland's Critique
From Crosland to Holland
Social Democracy in Transition
Social Democracy in a Neo Liberal Era
The Components of Social Democracy
Organisational Questions of Social Democracy and the Labour
M ovement
Social Democracy and New Social Movements
Social Democracy and Human Rights
Conclusion
CONTEMPORARY POLITICS in TURKIYE and SPAIN
Political Institutions in Spain and Turkiye
Head of State
Electoral System
Party System
The Military and Politics
Trade Unions
The Strength of Major Political Parties
Spain
The 1996 General Election
Turkiye
The Refah Partisi (Welfare Party)
The Sosyal Demokrat Halkci Parti (SHP/CHP)
The 1995 General Election
Conclusion

11
13
15
18
33
43
46
48
56
62
66
72
75
81
82
84
86
- 90
92
98
102
103
109
135
138
143
148
162

Ill

SOCIAL JUSTICE and ECONOMIC and SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
in TURKIYE and SPAIN
169
Levels of Economic Development of Spain and Turkiye
170
Contribution of Sectors to GDP and Civilian Employment 171
Income
173
Employment
176
REGIONS: Formation and Inequality
180
The Formation of the Regions
181
Economic Development Process of Regions
190
The Economic Structure of the Regions
199
Levels of Social Development of Spain and Turkiye
208
Demography
208
Health Care
209
Education
213
Female Participation in Employment
216
Human Development Index
218
Gender Related Development Index
220
Conclusion
221
IN SEARCH OF SOCIAL JUSTICE: THE POLITICAL TASKS
FOR SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN TURKIYE and SPAIN
Gender Issues and Social Justice
Human Rights and Social Justice
Social Justice and Nationalities questions
Islamist Fundamentalism in Turkiye
Conclusion

225
227
235
237
239
241

CONCLUSION

243

APPENDIX

263

REFERENCES

276

IV

ABBREVIATIONS

Turkiye: Turkey
CHP : Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (The Republican People's Party)
DP
: Demokrat Parti (The Democratic Party)
AP
: Adalet Partisi (The Justice Party)
MSP : Milli Selamet Partisi (The Nationalist Salvation Party)
RP
: Refah Partisi (The Welfare Party)
.
DYP : Dogru Yol Partisi (The True Path Party)
TIP
: Turkiye Isci Partisi (The Labour Party of Turkiye)
ODP : Ozgurluk ve Democracy Partisi (The Solidarity and Liberty Party)
DSP : Demokratik Sol Parti (The Democratic Left Party)
HP
: Halkci Parti (The Populist Party)
MDP : Milliyetci Demokrat Parti (The Nationalist Democratic Party)
ANAP : Anavatan Partisi (The Motherland Party)
SODEP : Sosyal Demokrat Parti (The Social Democratic Party)
SHP : Sosyal Demokrat Halkci Parti (The Social Democratic Populist
Party)
MHP : Milliyetci Hareket Partisi (The Nationalist Movement Party)
HADEP : Halkin Demokrasi Partisi (The Democratic Party of People)
PKK : Partiye Kerkaran Kurdistan (The Kurdish Worker's Party)
PSOE : Partido Socialista Obrera Espanol (The Spanish Socialist Worker's
Party)
PCE : Partido Communista de España (The Spanish Communist Party)
IU
: Izguiera Unida (The United Left)
PP
: Partido Popular (The People's Party)
CC
: The Canarian Coalition
CiU : Convergencia I Union (The Convergence and Union)
PNV : Partido Nacionalista Vasco (The Basque Nationalist Party)
HB
: The Herri Batasuna
ERC : Esquerra Republicana de Cataluna (The Catalan Republican Party)
EA
: The Eusko Alkartasuna
VU
: The Valencian Union
UCD : Union Centro Democratica (Union of the Democratic Centre Party)
PAR : The Aragon Party
UGT : Union General de Trabajadora (The General Workers' Union)
CCOO: Comisiones Obreras (Workers Commissions)
USO : The Workers' Syndical Union
DISK : Devrimci Isci Sendikalari Konfederasyonu (The Revolutionary
Workers Syndicate Confederation)
TURK-IS : Turkiye Isci Sendikalari Konfederasyonu (The Confederation of
Workers Union of Turkiye)
HAK-IS : The Confederation of Right Union
TR : The Republic of Turkiye
RP : President of Republic

V

MGK : Milli Guvenlik Konseyi (The Council of National Security)
TBMM : Turkiye Buyuk Millet Meclisi (Turkish Grand National Assembly)
PPP : Purchasing Power Parity
AIR : Amnesty International Report
GDP : Gross Domestic Product
GNP : Gross National Product
EC
: European Community
OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
UN : The United Nations
IMF : International Monetary Fund

VI

GRAPHS
Chapter Two
Graph 11/1 Andalucía, the performance of Parties in Comparison with
.
their country wide performance in 1993 and 1996 General Elections
Graph n/2 Extremadura, the performance of Parties in Comparison with
their country wide performance in 1993 and 1996 General Elections
Graph 11/3 Galicia, the performance of Parties in Comparison with their
country wide performance in 1993 and 1996 General Elections
Graph n/4 Castilla Y Leon, the performance of Parties in Comparison with
their country wide performance in 1993 and 1996 General Elections
Graph II /5 Aragon, the performance of Parties in Comparison with
their country wide performance in 1993 and 1996 General Elections
Graph 11/6 Asturias, the performance of Parties in Comparison with their
country wide performance in 1993 and 1996 General Elections
Graph II /7 Castilla La Mancha, the performance of Parties in Comparison with
their country wide performance in 1993 and 1996 General Elections
Graph n/8 Madrid, the performance of Parties in Comparison with their
country wide performance in 1993 and 1996 General Elections
Graph n/9 C. Valencia, the performance of Parties in Comparison with
their country wide performance in 1993 and 1996 General Elections
Graph n/10 The Basque Country, the performance of Parties in Comparison
with their country wide performance in 1993 and 1996 General Elections
Graph 11/11 Catalonia, the performance of Parties in Comparison with
their country wide performance in 1993 and 1996 General Elections
Graph 11/12 Canarias, the performance of Parties in Comparison with their
country wide performance in 1993 and 1996 General Elections
Graph 11/13 The Strength of Parties in Turkiye since 1983
Graph 11/14 Metropolitan Areas and Turkiye, the Performance of Parties
in the 1995 General Election
Graph 11/15 East, South East and Turkiye, the Performance of Parties in the
1995 General Election

112
114
116
.
117
119
120
122
123
125
128
130
131
136
152
160

Chapter Three
Graph IH/1 Spain, Contribution of Sectors to GDP of Regions, 1980-1991
201
Graph III/2 Spain, GDP Per Capita in Regions 1985-1990
202
Graph IE/3 Marmara, East, Sectors' Contribution to the GDPs of Regions, 1978 203
Graph III/4 The East, Marmara and Turkiye, the Distribution of GNP of Turkiye 204
Graph 1H/5 Istanbul, the East and Turkiye, GDP Per Capita, 1965-1985
(Turkiye= 100)
205
MAPS
Map-1 The Strength of Major Political Parties, Spain, 1993 General Elections
-In terms of Taking First Place in Each Constituency
Map-2 The Strength of Major Political Parties, Spain, 1996 General Elections
-In terms of Taking First Place in Each Constituency
Map-3 The Strength of Major Political Parties, Spain, 1995 Regional Elections
Map-4 The Strength of Major Political Parties in the 1995 general Election In terms of taking First Place in Each Constituency
Map-5 The Electorate Map of RP 1995 General Election
Map-6 The Electorate Map of CUP 1995 General Election
Map-7 The Electorate Map of DSP 1995 General Election
Map-8 The Electorate Map of HADEP 1995 General Election

107
107
108
151
153
156
157
161

vn

Appendix
Map- 9 The Electorate Map of ANAP 1995 General Election
Map-10 The Electorate Map of DYP 1995 General Election

274
275

TABLES
Chapter Two
Table-II/1 Parties in Government, aftermath of authoritarian regimes.
Table-n/2 Total Poll of Left and Right Wing Political Parties, Spain
Table-II/3 Spain, General Elections, 1977-1996
Table-II/4 The Total Votes of Major Parties, 1989-1996
Table-n/5 Balearic Islands, the performance of Parties in Comparison with
their country wide performance in 1993 and 1996 General Elections
Table-II/6 La Rioja, Cantabria and Murcia, the performance of Parties in
Comparison with their country wide performance in 1993 and 1996
General Elections
Table-n/7 Navarra, the performance of Parties in Comparison with their
country wide performance in 1993 and 1996 General Elections
Table-n/8 Ceuta and Melilla, the performance of Parties in Comparison with
their country wide performance in 1993 and 1996 General Elections
Table 11/9 The Parties in Meclis with their Places, Turkiye.
Table-II/10 December 24th, 1995 Turkish general Election Result

134
135
148

Chapter Three
Table HI /1 Sectoral Contributions
Table IH/2 Current GNP Per Capita
Table m/3 Real GDP Per Capita
Table HI/4 Real GDP Growth Rate
Table m/5 Unemployment rate
Table HI/6 Labour Force Participation Rate
Table III/7 Real Rates of Growth in GDP of Regions, Spain
Table m/8 Relative GDP Per Capita of Regions Comparing With EC, 1960-1989
Table III/9 East Anatolia and Agricultural Population
Table El/10 State Investment and the East
Table HI/11 Distribution of Foreign Firms to Regions, Turkiye 1972
Table HI/12 Regional Areas, Population and Income, Spain 1990
Table III/13 Comparison of Per Capita Istanbul and Eastern Anatolia
Table HI/14 Demography
Table Id /15 Life Expectancy
Table HI/16 Infant Mortality and Life Expectancy at Birth and Sex
Table HI/17 Population per Physician and Nursing Persons
Table HI/18 Per 1,000 of Population Doctor and Bed
Table IH/19 Health Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP
Table III/20 Expenditure on Public Education as Percentage of GNP
Table III/21 Youth Population and Participation in Education, 1991
Table 311/22 Adult Literacy Rate
Table IH/23 Labour Force Female
Table in/24 Human Development Index (HDI), 1992
Table HI/25 Gender Related Development Index (GDI), 1992

172
174
175
176
177
178
194
195
197
198
199
200
204
209
209
210
211
211
212
214
215
216
217
220
221

89
91
105
106
124
132
133

vm

Chapter Four
Table IH/1 Changes to the Social Situation of Women in Spain
Table IQ/2 Women in Parliament - Congress of Deputies
Table IH/3 Estimated Distribution of Vote According to Gender and Party
Table HI/4 Labour Force Participation of Women, 1950 -1970 in percentage
Table III/5 Distribution of Population by Last School Graduation from
and Sex, 1975
Table DI/6 Women in Parliament, 1935-1980, Turkiye

228
229
231
233
234
234

APPENDIX
The Distribution in Congress of Deputies, Spain
263
Turkish National Assembly Election Results, 1961-1977
263
General Elections, Turkiye, 1983-1995
264
Local Elections, Turkiye, 1984-1989
264
Average Annual Rates of Growth in Regional GDP and Each Sector, 1983-1987 264
Evolution of the Inter-regional Compensation Fund, Per inhabitant
265
1984-1989 Public Investment and the East, Turkiye
265
Employment Percentage Changes from Previous Period
265
Total Civilian Employment
266
Purchasing Power Parity Index
266
Profile of Unemployment
267
HDI 1990
267
HDI Ranking, comparing 1990 with 1992
267
Lower Average wage for Women
267
Population by Literacy, education level and sex in Turkiye
268
Percentage of female at all Levels of Education
268
Income Distribution
268
Income Distribution (monthly) by Decile in Turkiye, 1987
269
Central Government Current Revenue
269
Total Tax Revenue as Percentage of GDP
269
Public Sector Borrowing Requirement of Turkiye
269
Total External Debt of Turkiye
269
State Borrowing Requirement Spain
270
Budget Deficit by Government levels, Spain
270
Regional Structure of Employment
271
Regional Structure of GDP, %, Spain
271
Regional Relative Per Income Levels, Spain
272
Number and Average Size of Farm Holding, Turkiye
272
Labour Force Unionised, 1989-1990 %
273

IX

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am very grateful to many people without whose assistance I would
not have completed this work.
supervisor, Dr Steve Reglar.

In particular, I want to thank my

His enthusiasm and energy were greatly

appreciated, as was his unfailing ability to shed light on the problems of
research, and administrative problems relating my scholarship.
I would also like to thank Ted Wolfers, Professor of Politics, for his
assistance in handling the many financial and administrative problems
that I have had from the beginning of my degree. Without his assistance
and support I would not have been able to finish my degree. I also received
invaluable assistance from Norma Vettoretto and Rosemary Klein of the
History and Politics program in producing this thesis.

I would like to

thank David Shaw of the Faculty of Arts for his valuable assistance with
computer technology.
I would also like to thank to Elizabeth Sandeman-Gay and Dr Jan
Skillen

from

The

Learning

Development

Centre

of

Wollongong

University, Linda Vanderwey and Nazan Sengul for their assistance with
developing my writing skills for this thesis. And of course, without the
assistance of many nameless Library staff of the University of Wollongong
and of other libraries this thesis would not have been completed. I owe a
special debt of gratitude to Agustin Santos from the Spanish Embassy for
the use of many important documents and materials.
To my family and my friends goes my deepest appreciation for their
constant support and understanding.

X

Synopsis
This thesis examines the response of social democracy to the
problems of two lesser developed countries in Europe: Spain and Turkiye.
First, the development of social democratic ideas and practice is
examined. I argue that social democracy is best understood as a pragmatic,
broad based movement for social justice, not as a rigid program or set of
dogmas.

Thus social democracy has not ceased to have contemporary

relevance, but has entered a new era where it uses new methods to achieve
its goal. In this new era social democracy differs from the 1960s due to the
changing nature of the parties, the electorate and their relationship with
trade unions.

All of these changes have forced a revision of commitment

to 1960s social democratic practices and policies.
Secondly, the political systems of these countries are analysed in
terms of whether the level of development of their political systems is
adequate for social democracy to work. Despite a common background of
authoritarian governments, these countries, especially Spain, now have
increasingly secure parliamentary systems. Regular elections, 'true political
parties', a competitive party system and relatively autonomous trade union
movements exist in these countries, although they are often still relatively
weak.
However, both countries still have problems, such as national
separatist movements, and no full guarantee of civil/political rights.
Turkiye also faces problems brought about by religious fundamentalism.
These problems are all signs of an under developed democracy.

XI

Thirdly, the underlying socio-economic problems of these countries
are analysed, using a social democratic perspective.

In examining their

socio-economic development, crucial indicators of human development in
Spain and Turkiye are compared with three developed social democratic
countries in Europe: Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands. I argue that
Spain and Turkiye, in certain indicators, compare well with the developed
countries Such indicators include educational participation in Spain and
labour force participation for women in Turkiye.
Fourthly, I examine the main political tasks for social democrats in
trying to achieve social justice in Turkiye and Spain. I argue that social
democracy is best placed to achieve these goals because it has a broad and
inclusive conception and approach to problems of human rights.

INTRODUCTION

The argument of this thesis is that during the 1990s social
democracy entered a new era. The social democracy of the 1990s is very
different to that of the 1960s. A variety of changes have occurred in all
its main

components.

The formal

relationship

between social

democratic parties and the trade union movement has been broken
because of the changing structure of employment. The ratio of the
service sector contribution to total civilian employment, especially in
the private sector, has increased and in turn the traditional social
democratic electorate has declined. This has resulted in a decline in the
strength of trade unions and correspondingly their political influence;
consequently social democratic parties have moved to the right to gain
support from other classes. Moreover, since the early 1980s both the
domestic

and international

political climate

has

changed, social

democratic parties have explicitly loosened their strong commitment to
Neo-Keynesian economics which has in turn led to a diminished
emphasis on full employment and the welfare state.

During the period

from the early 1980s to the later half of the 1990s social democratic
parties in a number of northern European countries have little success in
winning

elections.

Because of these changes conservatives and some

Marxists have argued that social democracy has ceased to be a force in the
modern world.
Such an argument is too simplistic.

It is unable to explain the

nature of social democracy throughout the course of its history. Social
democracy is a range of policies and more importantly it interacts with
the class structure and social movements of a given society.

In other

words, it has affected changes in the class structure of society as well as
been affected by them.

As the proportion of traditional working-class

people has declined, social democratic parties have changed their

programs to gain support among supplementary classes, such as agrarian
and middle-classes.

This has been necessary, because the traditional

working-class no longer constitutes the majority in many electorates. In
addition, by moving
progressiveness

"sideways', social democracy has proved its

by addressing

gender

and

environment

issues.

Although delayed for far too long, such concerns have become part of
most programs of social democratic parties.

Apart from social

democracy's progressive character, the class basis of today's centre-left
social democratic parties can be differentiated from centre-right parties,
especially in developed countries like Australia and the UK. Therefore,
it cannot be argued that social democracy no longer has relevance in the
1990s.
In the case of Spain and Turkiye (Turkey), two of Europe's less
developed countries, social democracy has a different role than in the
more developed countries of Northern and Western Europe.

The class

structure of Spain and Turkiye (especially Turkiye) do not resemble the
class structure of Europe's more developed countries. For one thing the
service sector does not dominate the employment structure in the lesser
developed countries. In Turkiye it is agriculture rather than the service
sector which constitutes the major part of the employment structure.
Moreover, unlike the trend towards an increasing private service sector
in northern European countries, the private service sector is not
dominant in Turkiye. In other words, the employment structure which
gave rise to social democracy in northern European countries is still
predominant in both countries. Furthermore, in both countries labor
intensive sectors, such as tourism in Spain and textiles in Turkiye,
strengthen the class structure in which social democracy would usually
work well. These points raise considerable difficulties for those who
would argue that social democracy would not work in developing

countries such as Spain and Turkiye and those who discount the
activities of social democrats in the lesser developed parts of Europe.
While there are still many areas which need reform, the political
forces in Spain and Turkiye have developed well enough to carry social
democracy to office through parliamentary processes. The development
of constitutional protection of essential political freedoms and a pluralist
political system in conjunction

with

a viable parliamentary

(or

legislative) assembly are necessary conditions for social democracy to be
able to come to power without a revolutionary process.
The above is not meant to imply that the political structures of
Spain and Turkiye do not have flaws. Good enough suggests that the
minimal basic political conditions exist, not that all is as it ought to be.
There are doubts among political scientists about the functioning of
parliamentary democracy in Spain and more especially Turkiye, because
in their recent history both countries have had authoritarian regimes.
Spain was governed by the dictator Franco who occupied power after the
Civil War of the 1930s until his death in 1975. The transformation of
Spain into a democratic country occurred smoothly through the mid1970s.

Turkiye, on the other hand, has experienced three coup d'états

since the establishment of the Republic of Turkiye. The last coup was in
1980 and lasted three years. After the last takeover of office by civilian
-politicians

in

both

countries,

the

development

of

democratic

institutions, such as interest groups, political parties and election
process, has developed smoothly.

It can be argued that today their

constitutional systems function more democratically than before and the
parliamentary system works well enough to make revolutionary means
unattractive. Both countries, of course, still have some problems which
deny the full establishment of democracy.

These are nationalities

questions, human rights abuses and religious fundamentalism.

Such

problems require urgent solutions.

However, it can still be argued that

the political development of both countries is sufficient for social
democracy to work. It should be remembered that the constitutional
and political conditions which exist in Spain and Turkiye today are in
many respects similar to the conditions which existed in Northern
Europe before the decades of transformation which accompanied the
long boom of post World War Two development, during the period of
Social Democratic ascendancy.

The thesis is divided into four chapters. In the first chapter the
changing nature of social democracy is analysed. To understand today's
social democracy, it is necessary to analyse social democracy from its
birth.

First, an overview is given of the development

of social

democracy as a background to understanding its transformation since
the early 1980s.

Three key theorists of social democracy are closely

studied: Bernstein, Crosland and Holland.

Bernstein and Crosland

reflect the characteristics of social democracy in the 1900s and 1960s
respectively. Holland, on the other hand, represents the radical policies
of the early 1970s' British Labour programme which emphasised
selective

nationalisation

and 'hard'

planning

in

Britain.

The

characteristic components of social democracy or social democratic
parties, such as the relationship with the trade union movement, social
justice and full employment are also studied. The changes which have
occurred in social democracy since the early 1980s are closely examined.
In this chapter, I also analyse the current state of social democracy and
discuss whether it continues to have contemporary political relevance
after entering a new era. By examining social democracy in the 1990s
with an historical perspective, it is possible to understand the social
democratic perspective of the new era.

The second chapter describes contemporary politics in Spain and
Turkiye. The role and power of democratic institutions, such as interest
groups, the head of state and political parties are examined.

As they

have had authoritarian regimes, the role and power of the Army is also
studied. Special attention is given to political parties, particularly to
social democratic parties, because of their crucial role in a democratic
society. By looking at the last general elections, the strength of major
parties in terms of regions, social strata and rural and urban areas, and in
turn the factors in both countries determining voting behaviour are
examined.

Through the study of democratic institutions, special

problems of Spain

and Turkiye,

such

as human

right

abuses,

nationalities question and religious fundamentalism are also examined.
These issues are directly related to the democratic development of a
society, especially human

rights

abuses.

The

rise of

Islamist

fundamentalism in Turkiye and its possible effects on democracy in the
future will be studied. As the Refah Partisi (RP- Welfare Party) is the
representative of the Islamist movement, it will be analysed in the
section on Parties.

By examining these institutions, the question of

whether social democracy will be able to carry out its programme in
office through a parliamentary process can be addressed.
After studying both the political development of Spain and
Turkiye and social democracy in the 1990s, the study of economic and
social development of Spain and Turkiye from a social democratic
perspective can be attempted. Successful social democratic programmes
require a given level of socio-economic development in a country,
especially the development

of a substantial

level

of industrial

infrastructure. The examination of economic and social development of
Spain and Turkiye is, therefore, the theme of chapter three.
examination is made in comparison with

The

three developed countries

in Europe: Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark. The examination
highlights

a number

of social democratic j concerns.

First,

the

contribution of major sectors, such as industry, agriculture and service, to
total civilian employment is examined because they give a general
indication of the level of development of a country and to ascertain the
strength of the traditional social democratic electorate, the industrial
working-class. Supplementary to the nature of the sectoral division of
their economies, issues of labour market and employment structure are
analysed through labor force participation and unemployment level
measurements.

The examination of the wealth of Spain and Turkiye

through GDP per capita and GNP per capita and Human Development
Indicators gives further information on their social development.

The

last section of the chapter gives special attention to the development of
regions.

Through studying regional differentiation, the nationalities

questions which are the most serious problems before both countries are
clarified.
The crucial indicators of human development such as health care and
education are comparatively examined.
related to social democracy.

These indicators are directly

In research on the achievement of social

democracy, these two indicators are the most frequently used.

Thus,

indicators of health such as life expectancy, infant mortality and the
number of health personnel, and education such as the adult literacy rate
and school retention ratio, are closely examined.
Chapter three also examines the role of women in Turkiye and
Spain. Gender issues, as demonstrated in chapter one have become an
increasingly important component of social democracy since the early
1980s, reflecting the pioneering emphasis social democrats placed on
gender issues in the formative period of mass social democratic parties
in the later decades of the nineteenth century. The role of women is

also a crucial indicator of social/human development.

Therefore, the

role of women in various aspects of life, such as education, politics, and
labour force, is examined in both Chapter^three and four.

Before

concluding, a brief overview of two indexes of development constructed
by United

Nations

is given:

Human

Development

and Gender

Development Indexes. These indexes combine the wealth of countries
with human development, thus making them very useful indicators of
the broader aspects of social justice critical to social democratic politics.
In Chapter four I shall analyse issues of social justice in Turkiye
and Spain. I shall argue that any consideration of social justice has to
take account of human rights. Social democracy has a broader approach
to human rights than most other ideologies.

Liberalism gives most

attention to civil rights while communism

emphasises social and

economic rights with an almost exclusive concentration on economic
rights.

Civil/political

and

social/economic

rights

have

equal

importance for social democracy. If the classical goal of life is taken as
the goal of politics social democracy is in the best position to contribute
to the politics of lesser developed countries.

Hence, I shall argue that

not only does social democracy have considerable relevance in the 1990s
perhaps even more so than in the 1890s or the "golden years" of the
1960s, but also that social democracy has particular importance beyond
the

developed

post-industrial

countries

of

north

Europe

and

Australasia. I shall therefore demonstrate that social democracy has in
particular a continuing relevance for lesser developed countries of
Europe, such Spain and Turkiye.
Unfortunately, as analysed in Chapter four, human right abuses,
especially of dvil/political rights, still disgrace the politics of these
countries, especially of Turkiye. Social democracy, because of its broad
approach to human rights is best placed to bring a potentially long term

resolution. In particular a social democratic approach to human rights
has a greater probability of resolving nationalities problems, which
along with Gender issues constitute the main social and economic
human rights issues facing Spain and Turkiye. I shall argue, moreover,
that developing a broader approach to human rights will not only
contribute to the development of democratic institutions but also to
economic development.
It needs to be stressed that my argument is based on the
conception that social democracy is best conceived as a movement for
social justice not a rigid set of dogmas or as

a static program.

The

success of social democracy depends on feasible programs, which are
programatic in orientation

and design.

Political and economic

development are not contradictory in combination and both are
mutually reinforcing parts of a viable social democracy. It is clear that in
Turkiye freedom of thought, as it is usually viewed in western
democracies, does not exist because of the ban on communist parties and
the existence of prisoners of conscience and other political prisoners.
Although Spain is in considerably better position, significant violation of
human rights is still associated with nationalities separatism.
In Chapter four I shall argue that Islamist fundamentalism in
Turkiye presents a potential obstacle to social democracy, because it poses
a challenge to secularism.

Although the pro-Islamist movement has

gained momentum since the 1980s the overthrow of secularism would
be resisted by significant forces. The Army is potentially the strongest
counter-force

against Islamist

fundamentalism,

as it is strongly

committed to the secular state. The followers of Alevi sect are another
force. Alevis are separated from the pro-Islamist movement because it
is Sunni dominated, while Alevi is influenced by Shia teaching. The

strong liberal wings within the conservative parties, the DYP and ANAP
comprise a significant opposition to anti-secular policies.
Liberal secularism is one of the main planks of the centre-left
parties (The CHP and DSP). The Kurdish nationalist movement is also
another force against fundamentalism,

because it has a socialist

orientation. It always takes part in all broad Left movements in Turkiye.
The westernisation of Turkiye has its origins in the 18th century. The
Republic was founded on both westernisation and secularism which had
already developed strong foundation in Turkiye.

Thus westernisation

in Turkiye established for over a century without
Moreover,

Turkiye's

growing

relationships

with

interruption.

the

European

Community underlines my argument that pro-Islamist movements can
best be considered as a potential treat, but not yet a force that can
overthrow secularism in Turkiye.
In many ways the lengthy period of PSOE government in Spain
has brought changes to society and politics which demonstrate the
benefits of social democratic policies for lesser developed countries.
Many, but certainly not all of the social indicators show how such social
democratic policies are beneficial to the achievement of social justice.
Indeed a comparison of such indicators between Spain and Turkiye
demonstrates significant gaps in achievements which are not explicable
by merely their difference in economic development. Hence, for all the
consideration outlined above, I shall argue that social democracy has
considerable relevance for lesser developed countries in Europe in
creating conditions for social justice and a decent quality of life.

CHAPTER ONE

SOCIAL DEMOCRACY

SOCIAL DEMOCRACY
INTRODUCTION

In arguing that Social Democracy has a strong future potential
role in the political, economic and social development of Spain and
Turkiye it is necessary to examine what social democracy means in the
contemporary world. I shall argue that Bernstein was correct in arguing
that social democracy is a movement not a commitment to a rigid "final
goal of socialism". This chapter will show that the common stereotype
which equates socialism with nationalisation, command planning and a
strong central bureaucracy has with only a few exceptions, been entirely
inappropriate as a description of social democratic politics for over 100
years. Much of the material which talks about a crisis of socialism is
therefore misplaced when applied to contemporary social democracy.
My argument is made by critically analysing the principal works of three
theorists, Bernstein, Crosland and Holland within the context of the
development of social democratic thought and practice. To understand
social democracy in the 1990s' the approach of social democratic parties
to the characteristics of the long boom post war needs discussion.
Issues such as social justice, the relationship between social
democratic parties and trade union movement and full employment are
analysed. By examining these issues, those arguments which state that
social democracy no longer has relevance for public policy in the 1990s
are called into question.

Social democratic politics continues to have

relevance not only for wage earners, trade unionists and human right
activists - its traditional power base- but also for the new social
movements
environm ent.

concerned

with

issues

of gender, culture

and the

Bernstein and the Revisionist Controversy

In the late 19th century early social democrats, such as Bernstein,
Kautsky and Luxemburg regarded themselves as Marxists (Beilharz
1992:110).

Bernstein was the typical example of such an early social

democrat.

While he called himself a Marxist, he began to question

many aspects of 'orthodox Marxism' and became a 'reformist' (Beilharz
1992:110). Bernstein's reformism (or revisionism according to 'orthodox
Marxism') was to play a very significant role in the development of
social democracy in the 20th century. Many aspects of his program were
to adopted by all the major social democratic parties of Europe.
According to Beilharz, by 1898, Bernstein began to question the
viability and desirability of the so-called 'final goal' of socialism.
regarded the concept as "the utopia of windbags".

He

To Bernstein, the

socialist movement, and the process of socialism were more important.
Bernstein’s message was encapsulated in the epithet "the movement is
everything, the goal is nothing".

He argued that socialism was "not a

goal but a principle"- a way of doing things rather than an end point.
(Beilharz 1992:112).
Moreover, Bernstein not only feared revolution but counselled
strongly against it because of the chaos which he regarded would
inevitably follow. Unlike his contemporary Parvus, Bernstein accepted
the need for a strong state and the maintenance of state power by
arguing that socialists could not reject capitalism as soon as socialism
emerged unless they wanted the economy to collapse, which would
thereby set the stage for reaction. Like Gramsci and Kautsky, Bernstein
viewed socialism as a new form of order. As socialism was the product
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of order, not a chaotic collapse of the old order Bernstein rejected
theories of the ’inevitable collapse of capitalism4(Beilharz 1992:113).
Bernstein had the temerity to question many of the central
dogmas of classical Marxism especially the belief that capital would
become more concentrated while the proletariat would expand.
rejected

the

’orthodox’

theories

of capitalist collapse

and

He
class

bipolarisation. Furthermore, peasants would not disappear; nor would
the middle class; nor would crises grow ever larger; misery and reform
would not increase. On the other hand, 'insecurity, dependence, social
distance, the social character of production, the functional superfluity of
property owners' would become more deep seated. In short: ’crisis was
not the motor of socialism’ and ’capitalist collapse was not inevitable’.
To Bernstein, socialism was best conceived as the movement
towards an order based on the principle of association. Politics could not
be reduced to primarily a matter of class but the actions of citizens. In
Beilharz’

view,

Bernstein's

ideas

of

democracy

include

many

contemporary conceptions, especially in his notion of justice as 'an
equality of rights for all members of the community'.
moreover,

Democracy,

entailed ’the suppression of class government’, not a

continuation and extension into proletarian state. As the aim of social
democracy, for Bernstein, socialism was best understood as ’the heir of
liberalism’. Civil liberties and political freedom were always to be given
a higher place than the fulfilment of a grandiose economic program
(Beilharz 1992:113-140).
Bernstein elevated democracy to the pre eminent principle of a
socialist movement and regarded the formation of the political and
social organs of democracy as ’the indispensable precondition’ for the
construction of the new order.

Hence, Bernstein reversed the usual

causal linkage of his time, it is democracy which is the prerequisite of

socialism and not the other way around.

Democracy is not merely an

instrument of the socialist state but the substance of socialism (Beilharz
1992:115).

While Bernstein considered himself to be a Marxist he began the
separation of social democracy from 'orthodox Marxism'. He insisted on
the social side of socialism, such as 'security of civil freedom' and
democracy. The relevance of his arguments became obvious after the
October Revolution in Russia. The separation of social democracy from
Marxism continued until World War Two.
Bernstein's rejection of Marxist "orthodoxy" lead him to propose
a program built on redistributing wealth within a largely capitalist
market

system

revolutionary
production.

rather

than

transformation

a

fundamental

of the

entire

concentration
system

of

on

capitalist

In line with the substance of programs which had been

adopted by the German Social Democratic Party at Gotha and Erfurt he
advocated concentration on achieving equality by state taxation and
welfare programs.

Revisionism and the rise of mass Social Democratic Parties
Social democracy, like Marxism, is the product of the capitalist
system. The emergence of the labour movement demonstrated the need
for political representation for labour movements.

Radical anti

capitalist trade union action gave way to the emergence of social
democratic parties and Laborist parties.

While, by the late 19th century

the separation between mass social democratic parties and revolutionary
Marxist communist parties had begun to develop, until World War
One, however, it was difficult to distinguish which party was social
democratic and which was communist.

Social democrats mainly

differed from communists in the way they sought to achieve socialism.

Social democrats rejected revolutionary means and the primacy of
struggle in the economic sphere and argued that socialism could be
achieved best through parliamentary democracy.

The extension of

universal suffrage to the working-class was the main basis of this
argument (Lichtheim 1970, Berki 1975).

Moreover, the oft assumed

claim that Marx had predicted that proletarian revolution would occur
in the most developed capitalist societies of his time was disproved.
Shortly after Marx's death, many early social democrats, including
Bernstein, observed that capital had not accumulated in a few hands,
nor had the size of the proletariat increased. Furthermore, there were
changes in the goals of social democracy. While Bernstein argued that
'the movement is everything, the goal is nothing' (Beilharz 1992), the
movement as characterised by mass social democratic parties became
more diffuse and less class oriented.
Until the 1950s it, might also have been possible to define
social democracy with reference to a distinctive pattern of
party organisation and social composition... The social
democratic parties were cohesive mass membership parties,
characterised by relative social homogeneity (predominantly
working class) and combining the principle of internal
democracy with the practice of leader autonomy (Padget &
Paterson 1991: 2).

The differentiation between social democracy and Marxism
became clearer after the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia.
October revolution
revolutionary

means

social democrats began explicitly
to achieve

socialism, particularly

After the
to

oppose

after the

formation of the Third International, Communist League. The Third
International was formed under Soviet leadership and was 'dominated
by Russian power-political interests' (Berki 1975: 93). In the inter-war era,
significant changes occurred in the social-economic structure of capitalist
societies. During the worst crisis in capitalist history, interventionist

policies were put into practice in the USA and Sweden, particularly to
fight unemployment. These policies were theorised by J. M. Keynes. It
was during this time social democrats came to office in Sweden with
interventionist policies which continued until 1976.

Such changes

opened a way for social democracy to take power in almost all northern
European

countries,

especially in

Scandinavian

countries

(Berki

1975:94). As Lichtheim argues
in these areas the half century from 1914 to 1964 did in fact
witness a gradual transition from liberal to social
democratic predominance in politics and from economic
laissez-faire to the mixed economy and the welfare state
(Lichtheim 1970: 259).

After World-War-Two the 'golden years' of social democracy
started.

With

the marriage of social democracy and Keynesian

economics, and the conditions created by the war, social democrats
finally found a way of securing socialist aims without abolishing
capitalism. With Keynesian economic policies, they thought they could
not only remedy the ills of capitalism but could avoid the ills of
authoritarian socialism which were evident in

Soviet Union

(Padget and Paterson 1991). Padget and Paterson explain this marriage
clearly:
Keynes had outlined the political economy of modern,
managed capitalism which was attractive to social
democrats for a number of reasons. Firstly because it
appeared to bring the economy under political control. Tt
held out the prospect that the state could reconcile the
private ownership of the means of production with
democratic management of the economy. Democratic
control over the level of unemployment and the
distribution of income became the terms of the compromise
that made democratic capitalism possible' (Przeworski
1980:207) (Padget and Paterson 1991:22-23).

The social democratic ideology with this marriage was defined as
Keynesian economics plus welfare state plus full employment.

The

most prominent theorist of this stage of social democracy was C.A.R.
Crosland, whose ideas are examined below.
Social democracy once separated from Marxism quickly developed
a rejection of Marxism rather than capitalism.

The process was

completed in the 1950s. The one time British Labour Cabinet Minister C.
A R. Crosland was one of the most prominent figures in reorienting the
social democracy of the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s towards Neo Keynesian
welfare and redistributive measures. Before examining the evolution of
social democracy through its history, I shall analyse the contrasting ideas
of the two prominent figures of the golden years of social democracy,
Crosland and Stuart Holland. Through such examination, the relevance
of social democracy for the two lesser developed countries, Spain and
Turkiye, in Europe can be analysed. Furthermore, the overall relevance
of social democracy in the 1990s can be discussed.

Crosland's social democracy
C. A. R. Crosland had a profound influence on social democracy
in the Anglo-saxon world of the 1950s, 60s and 70s through his role as a
social democratic thinker.

As his major work is The

Future

of

Socialism , my discussion will concentrate on examining this work. In
understanding Crosland's ideas it is necessary to reflect on the changes
to the social and economic structure that occurred from the 'New Deal'
in the USA in the 1930s and the adoption of a variety of Neo-Keynesian
policies in the UK following the election
government at the end of WWII.

of the Attlee Labour

The nature of the capitalist system

had been transformed and social democratic ideology had changed as a
consequence. Hence, I will first give an overview of the conditions

which affected his ideas then a critique of his arguments about socialism,
the capitalist system and social democratic policies.

When Crosland wrote The Future o f Socialism, today's developed
countries were experiencing the impact of the many changes in their
economies wrought by war-time planning, rationing and the welfare
reforms of the Beveridge Report.

In Britain a national health service

was introduced along with a comprehensive government education
system. Such changes showed how the intervention of the State in the
economy may improve the economic efficiency through low inflation,
full employment and a higher economic growth rate.

Successful

experiences were seen in the UK, USA and Sweden. Since the later half
of the 1930s many of the ideas J. M. Keynes proposed about the
intervention of the State in the economy were put into practice.

In

contrast to the dominant characterisation of the beliefs of Neo-classical
economists, Keynes argued that without state intervention the economy
could not produce adequate growth rates and full employment.

This

was because, in the absence of state measures to promote investment or
significant transfers to the lower paid, the level of aggregate effective
demand would always lag behind the level of aggregate supply. These
phenomena rested on the fact that higher paid members of the
community had a lower marginal propensity to spend any increment to
their income and to allocate a greater proportion of any increment to
savings. Hence overall effective
aggregate investment

demand would reduce. And in turn

would decrease as businesses

investment in the light of shrinking

reduce their

demand for their products.

Therefore, to increase effective demand and thereby in turn to increase
the level of investment and supply there has to be another power
outside the economy, because the invisible hand

can not carry the

economy to full employment (Reglar 1983:416-417).

In other words,

Keynes rejected Say’s Law, which argues that supply creates its own
demand (Reglar 1983:411).
Moreover, in both world wars the State had taken a strong part in
the economy.

For example, the State regulated housing, industrial

production, food and clothing supply and the level of services during
WWH in Britain. Such intervention had yielded, not only an economy
capable of meeting the demands of total war, but had also substantially
improved the nutritional levels and standards of health of the lower
strata of society (Richardson and Travers 1993:81-116).
Besides these developments, full employment made Crosland
optimistic. In the Future o f Socialism full-employment and its results
on social justice are considered very important achievements.

In

addition, he argued, that as the right to vote spread to lower income
earners support for reducing inequality and poverty in capitalist society
increased. Between the two World Wars and after World War Two
social democratic political parties came to power, in previously
unanticipated strength.

This made social democrats more optimistic

about putting their policies into practice through the parliamentary
system. There were also signs of a reduction in the inequality between
the rich and poor and injustice in society as a result of war-time
rationing, the British national health scheme and the effects of
Beveridge's welfare program. In the 1950s the rise of the welfare state
and Keynesian economics had transformed capitalism in northern
European countries to an unprecedented degree.

All these changes led

Crosland to argue that the capitalism of his time was radically
transformed from that of old. Capitalism was no longer the enemy of
social justice it once had been. After World War Two social democrats
accepted the rule of capitalism in its interventionist guise of the 1950s.

In other words, social democrats no longer wanted to transform the
capitalist system gradually to a socialist system.
Although at times Crosland distinguished the Marxist perspective
of socialism from other versions of socialism, his usual stereotype of
socialism as a generic entity is greatly at odds with the Marxist concept.
At times he uses his generic concept to criticise the Marxist concept of
socialism.

This is one of Crosland's main confusions.

It is not clear

what Crosland regards as socialism, because his definition at times
appears to be a form of Marxism, but at other times it appears to comply
with what Marx called, a "utopian" perspective.
Thus if, for example, socialism is defined as the
nationalisation of the means of production, distribution
and exchange, we produce conclusions which are
impossible to reconcile with what the early socialists had in
mind when they used the word: such as, that Soviet Russia
is a completely socialist country (much more so, for
instance, than Sweden)- even though it denies almost all
the values which Western socialists have normally read
into the word (Crosland 1980:66).

From a Marxist perspective, however, socialism is not only "the
nationalisation of the means of production, distribution and exchange".
Marx did not call for widespread nationalisation

he

called for

"ownership by associated producers" (Marx 1974:820) in the first phase of
transition from capitalism to be superseded by ownership losing all its
meaning

under

fully

developed

communism.

Marx

thought

nationalisation could only be effective for a short period of time and for
industries which affected the whole nation such as railways, electrical
power generation and supply and telecommunications (Marx and Engels
1969:104).
Later varieties of Leninism and "Orthodox Marxism", especially
Stalinism,

(Stalin

1943:561) regarded ownership

by the

state, or

ownership by the proletariat as a means to achieve the goal of
communist

society

in which people will work according to their

abilities and will receive according to their need. But even this view of
socialism involves more than Crosland allows. For in Leninist ideology
creating a socialist country involves; apart from the ownership by the
proletariat, all decision-making belonging to the proletariat, or to their
representatives. Furthermore, for Leninism, nationalisation or control
of the economy by the state is not an end but a means to achieve a
communist society. Therefore, defining socialism in terms of merely
ownership is invalid.
Crosland, by confusing nationalisation and centralisation with
socialism alleged that Nazi Germany was a negative example of a
socialist country. This argument is not persuasive.
Similarly, if socialism is defined as economic collectivism or
state control of economic life, then Nazi Germany would
correctly have been called a socialist country (Crosland
1980:66).

To socialists the aim of controlling the economy is to lead the economy
for the benefit of all citizens, not just for the benefit of a few people.
With this point in mind, it can be seen that a country cannot be called a
socialist country when the control of the economy is used for the benefit
of the rich, or the capitalist class, or for one race. If for example, due to
state control, the share of profit in the GNP were to increase a
proportion of that increase should be redistributed to the less well off. In
a socialist country state control must be used for the benefits of the
proletariat, peasants, other working people and their representatives.
Therefore, it is impossible to argue that Nazi Germany is a socialist
country, not least because of its anti-humanitarian applications of state
control.

Many of the features of the economic system of Nazi Germany
were in fact examples of a grossly distorted kind of Keynesian planning
and state intervention accompanied by corporate capitalism (Linder
1973:248-254). The corporate structure of Nazism was of course oriented
to goals which were anathemas to Crosland and Keynes. The problem is
that just because a set of planning principles can be distorted and
perverted to serve inhuman goals, this does not necessarily reflect on
the

original

propositions

and principles.

Almost

institutions and human initiatives can be distorted.

all valuable

Crosland would

have to demonstrate a necessary connection between socialism and
Nazism or Soviet state socialism to justify his position.
Crosland

realised

that

class-antagonism

in

the

developed

countries had changed in nature as people were now more socially
mobile. Today in developed countries a significant number of people do
not vote according to their class orientation.

However, arguing that

some electorates do not consider at least their

subjective

class-

orientation may not be of great consequence, because most electorates
still vote according to their class orientation.

The effects of class

orientation is reflected by the class basis of political parties.

Social

democratic political parties can be differentiated from liberal political
parties because of the class orientation of their supporters. In a sense
universal electoral politics can be a democratic translation of the "Class
Struggle" as Lipset claimed (Lipset 1976: 220).
A number of important points for this thesis follow from
analysing aspects of Crosland’s key points.

He raises a significant

problems for comparing conditions between systems and estimating the
viability of a political program.

Crosland's critique of the (former)

Soviet Union, and conditions in which workers live in the socialist

countries in comparison with the developed capitalist countries are well
taken.
In Soviet Russia, just as much as in the United States, the
employer and the labourer confront each other as buyer and
seller; the control centre is separated from the workers; and
the possibility of exploitation, and of all the other features
of capitalism’ is present (Crosland 1980:37).

While the range of income inequalities in the USSR was markedly less
than in the USA and there was a significant difference in the pattern of
rewards to different categories of worker (Lane 1992:168-170) there were
many areas of similarity between the conditions of workers, especially in
the workers' lack of control in the production process. The workers in
the former (state) socialist countries had to struggle in the improvement
of their living standard as much as workers in the capitalist countries.
Workers in the USSR had to confront a degree of privilege, lack of
meaningful political participation, corruption, black markets and scarcity
of essential consumer goods which is unparalleled in developed western
countries,

especially northern

European social democracies (Lane

1992:173-176; Christian 1994:341-343, 362, 378).
To make a useful comparison between the conditions for workers
in state socialist countries and those in capitalist countries, for example
in terms of living standards, the level of development of the countries
has to be taken into account.

The level of development has to be

comparable to make meaningful comparisons.

If for example, in the

USA per capita income is $22,560, compared with less than $9,500 in
Russia the viability of the socio-political systems of these countries
cannot be usefully judged, because of the extent of difference in their
level of development expressed as GDP per capita.

A more useful

comparison might be to compare living standards in the former USSR

with those of Spain or another country at a comparable level of
development over time.
Second, in analysing the success of countries a static figure for a
given moment in time is less useful than examining changes in key
statistics over an extended period of time.

If we compare the state of

workers in developed capitalist countries with those in

socialist

countries

at

in

the

present

conditions

without

looking

the

improvement of the conditions of workers over time, the comparison
will be inappropriate, if the aim of comparison is to find which system is
successful.

Therefore, instead of comparing present conditions, the

period between 1917 to 1990 must be compared. This is because in 1917
in Russia conditions were very much poorer than in the USA and a
worker was not only subject to degrading and poorly paid work but
denied most political rights. The US worker was considerably better off
in 1917 because the USA was more highly developed, politically and
economically.

The rate of improvement in conditions of workers

between 1917 and 1990 is much higher for the USSR than for the USA
(even if we neglect the savage impact which the Nazi invasion had on
Soviet life) (Lane 1992:171).
Hence

Crosland's

arguments

were

at

times

somewhat

disingenuous. He needed to make comparisons between societies which
were comparable and he needed to analyse data over time, such as the
rate of increase in wages or life expectancy etc. to draw valid conclusions.
Nevertheless,

Crosland is important because his

emphasise the social-side of socialism (social democracy).

arguments
Crosland

argued that the social side of socialism and quality of life are significant
goals of social democracy:
"the degree to which management is autocratic or
democratic, the extent of joint consultation
and

participation, and the freedom of the worker to strike or
leave his(/her) job*' are also important for social democracy
(Crosland 1980:40-1).

Political freedom and parliamentary democracy' are important as much
as eliminating 'exploitation', because exploitation is not a problem
which exists by itself. If we were able to destroy poverty and inequality,
that would not mean all problems are solved. Class exploitation is not
the only cause of injustice. There are other causes of injustices, such as
religious, racial and gender.

Therefore, not only workers, or the

bourgeoisie, or one race, or one religion but all people should have the
same opportunity to affect the decision making process in national or
local government level, or corporations.
Crosland's arguments regarding the structure of capitalism are
also significant. Surely there was a big difference between the capitalism
of the 1850s and that of the 1950s.

Income distribution in his time

became, as he mentioned not 'more equ al', but less unequal (Crosland
1980:31). The level of poverty reduced. The participation of low income
earners in decision-making-processes occurred. Also the power of trade
unions increased.

It can be argued that the developed capitalist

countries became less unequal and less undemocratic.
Despite the changes that occurred in the capitalist system, listed
above, it still contained the major defining social relations of the
capitalist mode of production.

It is, therefore, difficult to agree with

Crosland when he argued that "Is this (meaning Britain in the 1950s)
still capitalism? I would answer ’No’"

(Crosland 1980:42), because

despite the changes that occurred in the British capitalist system until
the 1950s, the country was still capitalist. It was, of course, not the 'wild
capitalism' of the 19th century.
undemocratic.

'The

ownership

It was just 'less unequal' and less
of production,

distribution,

and

exchange’, the central features of capitalism, were there.

Exploitation,

like classes and class-antagonism, existed and so in turn

its

consequences: inequality and poverty.
Equally important is the fact of capitalism’s potential to increase
inequality and poverty.

The potential is an inseparable part of

capitalism. Although the 'invisible hand' may increase the welfare of a
nation as a whole, if the economy is allowed to work according to
capitalist economic rules of ’laissez-faire’, welfare is not distributed
fairly, because of the constraints accompanying the ownership of
production, distribution and exchange, unless a visible hand intervenes.
The welfare state capitalism of Crosland's time had many contradictory
features which were to bring about its downfall. Enough of capitalism
remained for there to be the potential to turn back the clock on many
reforms. Thus, his claim that Britain's system was not capitalist is not
persuasive.
Crosland argued strongly that the State can reduce inequality and
poverty by using Keynesian economic policies.

However, even Left

governments have to make accommodations with the capitalist class or
they can provoke a ’run on capital’. Hence, such governments do not
have adequate latitude to abolish inequality and poverty. Another fact is
that if Left governments accept the main characteristics of capitalism,
such as ownership and the sale of workers' labouring capacity for wages,
the prime cause of basic inequalities remains.

They can only reduce

inequality, but not destroy it. If we look at the world we can see the huge
and growing inequalities between the rich and poor in almost all
developed countries, and between the developed and developing
countries (The Guardian W eekly: August 3 1997 p 19 ). The increase in
inequality, even under social democratic political parties, is evidence of

the inability of Left governments to tackle the basic contradictions of
capitalism.
In the Future o f Socialism, Crosland invokes a direct link between
profit and economic growth and taxation.

But his logic is not fully

convincing. There may be some linkage effect between high profit and
faster economic growth due to low taxation on profit. Profit, however, is
not saving. It is saving that is required for investment, and in turn for
economic growth, because individuals or companies do not invest all
their income or profit. Profits may be spent on a range of activities
rather than investments, such as luxury consumption, speculative
investments etc., which at best will distort the distribution of resources
toward items of conspicuous consumption and at worst may lead to a
squandering of capital in speculative ’bubbles’ as in the USA and
Australia in the 1980s (Thurow 1996:221-222).

Secondly, in terms of

growth rate the important factor is how much of the GNP is being
invested. For example, the experience of the "Asian Tiger Economies"
show that if the country invests a high percentage of its GDP (say twenty
per cent of its GDP) its growth rate can be very much higher than lower
investing nations. There is, however, a limit on how high a level of
investment should be as too much concentration on investment may
bring distortions and barriers to growth of its own. For example Soviet
type economies set investment levels too high and in the long run
brought about a lowering of growth (Brus & Laski 1991:157). And it does
not

matter whose

savings

are used whether

it be companies,

individuals, government or social organisations.

Therefore, if the

government has higher taxes on profits and then invests it, higher taxes
may not negatively affect economic growth rate, because the country as a
result would spend a high percentage of its GDP an investment.

There is, however, a fact that should not be forgotten, taxes on
profit would affect future investments. All profit, of course, cannot be
taxed, because we have accepted a capitalist system and capitalist way of
economic growth.

A balance between high taxation and future

investments of private enterprise has to be found. However, properly
targeted high taxation can be used by the state to lead companies to work
more efficiently.

In the developing countries low taxation on profit

often leads capitalists not to work efficiently, because such capitalists
become satisfied with lower rates of profit as the mass of their profit is
high.

In such situations technological modernisation can also be

negatively affected.

.

Crosland's arguments

concerning

'full-employment'

and its

results requires criticism. Undoubtedly full employment can improve
the condition of workers, because they can easily find work. Crosland,
however, exaggerated the effects of full-employment by arguing that
full-employment

gives power to workers.

There

can be full-

employment with huge inequality and poverty, because if workers do
not act together, despite full-employment, their standard of living can
still be very low. For example in both the USA and the UK employment
has been bought by the creation of a large number of working poor (The
Guardian W eekly: August 3 1997 p 19 ). If workers join together under
trade unions, they1 will become powerful against the capitalist class.
Thus, it can be argued that workers' power is not due to fullemployment but due to the existence of trade unions and their votes in
a parliamentary democracy.1

1 In wage bargain all workers of a company should be considered as one part instead of
each worker, just as capital. In other words, work-force and capital constitute two parts
of wage bargain.

Crosland exaggerated the role and power of top-management and
its ability to withstand the drive for profit:
"And top management to-day is independent not only of
the firm’s own shareholders, but increasingly of the
capitalist or property-owning class as a whole, including the
financial institutions’ (Crosland 1980:15).

The

question arises, whether there

are differences between the

management of a company by capitalists, or by their managers that will
be positive for the state of workers. Are managers more positive in their
approach to the conditions of workers? It is difficult to agree with his
argument, because either capitalists or their managers run the company to
maximise their long term profit. Managers run companies on behalf of
capitalists. In terms of workers conditions there is no difference between
the operation of companies by manager or by owners.

Moreover, if

managers are better profit maximisers than their bosses, the operation of
companies by managers can increase inequality and poverty.

It can be

argued in the light of the rash of down-sizing in most major corporations
during the 1980s and 1990s that the new top- management does not
make a positive contribution to the condition of workers (Thurow 1996:26
27)
The state of workers in terms of their liberal rights and standard
of living was much better in the 1950s than it was in the 1930s. Crosland
argues that
Many liberal minded people, who were instinctively
'socialist' in the 1930s as a humanitarian protest against
poverty and unemployment have now concluded that
'Keynes- plus- modified- capitalism- plus-Welfare- State'
works perfectly well; and they would be content to see the
Labour Party become (if the Tories do not filch the role)
essentially a Party for defence of the present position, with
occasional minor reforms thrown is to sweeten the temper
of the local activities (Crosland 1980:79).

Crosland considers that today social democrats in the

developed

countries should defend the present system because it is considerably
better than that of the 1930s.

However, I do not agree with this

conclusion, because the goal of social democracy should be to promote
social justice and the reduction of inequality and poverty. Secondly, as
mentioned before, capitalism has the potential to increase inequality and
poverty, and if the present state is defended, inequality and poverty may
continue to exist. Therefore, the aim of social democracy should not be
the defence of the present developmental level of capitalism, but should
be the improvement of the peoples’ overall welfare.
Crosland saw Keynesian policies as a complete guide for the
economic policies of social democracy. Holland argues that
... in Britain in the 1950s, Anthony Crosland, stayed firmly
within both the scope and limits of Keynesian theory. This
shows not only in his explicit endorsement of Keynes'
économies in a technical sense, but also in his endorsement
of Keynes' conclusion that, provided the state exercises
central controls, there is no more reason to socialise
economic life now than there was earlier (Holland 1975:23).

As mentioned above, and can be understood from the above quotation,
Neo Keynesian economics are significant for Crosland's understanding
of social democracy.

Keynes' contribution to the social democratic

economic policies is significant, especially his arguments concerning the
role of the state in a market economy.

Keynes' arguments for state

intervention went much further than Crosland allows. Keynes called
for the socialisation of investment and a far more thoroughgoing
program of income redistribution than that offered by the policies
advocated by Crosland (Reglar 1983:417,420). It can be argued, however,
that the aim of Keynes and of social democracy are different. The aim of

Keynes was essentially social liberal; to make the market economy work
more efficiently, while the aim of social democracy is to promote social
justice and to reduce both inequality and poverty. Another important
fact is that since the 1950s inequality and poverty have increased.
Therefore, it can be argued that (Neo) Keynesian economics are not in
themselves adequate for social democratic purposes and cannot be a
complete guide for social democrats to remedy the negative effects of
capitalism.
The 1960s can be defined as the politically dominant era of social
democracy with its policies such as the welfare state, Keynesian
economics and full employment

(Lichtheim

1970:259). Padget and

Paterson argue that:
Social democrats had found a resolution to the historical
conundrum of how to reconcile socialism and the market,
opening the door to a 'third way' between communism and
capitalism. Secondly, Keynesianism legitimised the doctrine
of equality, since it demonstrated that economic expansion
depended on broadening the base of consumption through
a more diffuse distribution of income and wealth. Thirdly,
it provided a formula for a high-performance economy in
which the claims of capital and labour could be reconciled...
Fourthly, Keynesianism was the economic foundation for
'welfare capitalism'. Without adversely affecting the
economic equilibrium, the surplus from performance
economy could be diverted into social security and welfare
programs (Padget & Paterson 1991:22-23).

Until the mid-1970s, social democratic redistribution had worked very
well, especially in Sweden. While, the Swedish social democrats came
to government with these policies in 1932, it was not until the 1960s that
this style of social democracy became generalised in Europe and
Australia. Full employment could be pursued. The social democratic
style

welfare

state

(Esping-Anderson

established. It should be noted, however,

1990)

had

gradually been

that in this era there were

continuing debates among social democrats on the means to achieve
socialism.

Nationalisation was at the core of the debate, especially in

Britain. In Europe social democrats gradually discarded nationalisation
policy as a means to achieve socialism, except in Britain.

Holland's critique
The 1973 program of the British Labour Party was illustrative of
the Party's radical shift to the Left and thereby an attack on Crosland's
position.

The Program stressed nationalisation as essential for the

success of economic plans which would be less inclusive than the
Soviet's but more bold than Yugoslavia’s. The Party would nationalise
the top twenty five manufacturing companies. The leading theorist of
this radical shift was Stuart Holland.

His main work, The Socialist

C hallenge, was an enthusiastic endorsement of Labour's 1973 program.
In The Socialist Challenge , Holland's willingness to learn from Marx
makes him different from many social democrats.

He differed from

Crosland in that he did not just try to disprove Marx, but to go beyond
him. Holland's criticisms of Neo Keynesian economics were based on
Crosland's endorsement of Neo Keynesian policies rather than the
economics of Keynes himself.

Although there are many differences

between Holland and Crosland, their arguments are not necessarily
antagonistic.

Their arguments are based on the different ends which

they want to achieve. Their understanding of socialism is different, as is
the way they seek to achieve socialism.

Having different ends leads

them to conceive of different ways to achieve those ends.
For countries having democratic institutions such as Britain,
Holland, is against revolutionary transformation from capitalism to
socialism. Nevertheless, he argued that revolutionary transformation
can be appropriate for countries which do not have

democratic

institutions. He did not, however, consider how these countries would
build democratic institutions, or whether it is possible to build such
institutions after revolution or not. The significance of Holland is his
excellent understanding of the state of developing countries. He contends
that they are caught in a vicious circle which has been negatively affected
by multinational companies and the trading practices of developed
countries. I will first focus on his relationship to Marx and then discuss his
other arguments.
Holland’s analysis of Marx and Marxism made him different
from many modem social democrats. He argues that
To neglect Marx in analysing contemporary capitalism is as
short-sighted as neglecting Keynes would be: not only
because Marx was the main pioneer of a socialist analysis of
capitalism, but also because of the continuing relevance of
Marxism in British socialist thought and socialism outside
Britain (Holland 1975:15).

Holland gave credit to Marx, despite the disapproval of Marx by many
social democrats, including his Party’s leadership.

Social democrats

mostly emphasised those of Marx’s arguments which appeared to be
disproved by subsequent historical events. The first revolution occurred
not in the most advanced capitalist countries, such as Britain, as Marx
had often argued, but in a less developed country, ie. Russia. Another
oft-repeated argument is the irrelevance of the modem State being
conceived as merely the instrument of the capitalist class.

However,

anti Marxist social democrats have countered Marx's most significant
arguments, which are mentioned below.

Although some of his

arguments regarding the state and capitalism were later found lacking,
Marx was the first socialist political economist who attempted to explain
the capitalist system as a socio-political whole.

As Holland argued

"modem capitalism is still rent by many of the contradictions which
Marx identified" (Holland 1975:16).
The differences between Marx and many other socialists is that
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As seen from the history of capitalism, contradictions, such as

class conflict, have been, and will be present, so long as the capitalist mode
of production exists.
class

One of the most fundamental contradictions is

conflict between

proletariat

and

bourgeoisie,

although

this

contradiction has not led to capitalism being overthrown by the
proletariat. Due to the existence of the conflicts, the relevance of Marx's
analysis continues. However, as Holland argued, in terms of transition
from capitalism to socialism Marx "was notoriously more vague than
explicit" (Holland 1975:16).

Marx eschewed the promulgation of any

detailed transitional program and emphasised his critical analysis of
capitalism and the forces which sustained it, especially in his later
works. While Marx argued that the proletariat is the antithesis of the
capitalist class and he hoped it would be the class which could transform
capitalism

into

communism

his hopes were not borne out

by

subsequent developments (Reglar and Young 1983:278-279, 253, 259).
Holland also understood the cause of the failure of Marx's
analysis of the State:

.

Marx analysed British capitalism before the rise of the
modern State. In key respects his emphasis on the
organisation of production was correct and far-sighted. But,
in others, his foresight was to be qualified by the rise of the
capitalist state as spender, umpire, entrepreneur and
planner" (Holland 1975:15-16).

In Marx's era the State acted more closely to his depiction of it as an
instrument of the capitalist class than in contemporary times.

Armies

were used to suppress not only strikes, but any kind of actions against
the system, or the capitalist class.
It is, however, difficult to agree with Holland's argument that:
This trend to national and multinational
clearly
corroborates the main emphasis in Marx's analysis of
location of power in the organisation of production. It
supports the traditional socialist argument that without
public ownership and control of the dominant means of
production, distribution and exchange, the State will never
manage the strategic features of the economy in the public
interest (Holland 1975:15)

The validity of this argument is doubtful, because it is possible for the
modem State to lead the economy to work in the public interest without
’public ownership and control of the means of production, distribution
and exchange'.

As Francis Castles suggests, the Swedish example is

clear evidence of this fact (Castles 1978:57, 83). The State has adequate
means, such as taxation, spending, loans, and changing interest rates, to
control the economy in the public interest. For example, the State may
reduce taxes on new investment in less developed regions to increase
investments there.

It can also reduce taxes on expenses and increase

taxes on profits, so that it can indirectly protect low income earners. By
introducing free education, cheap housing and health care to low
income earners, it may reduce social injustice in society. When these
means are appropriately used, the State can significantly reduce
inequality.
... the State intervenes in the economy not to introduce a
limited form of socialism, but to permit a better functioning
of the capitalist system itself. In Keynes' view, state
intervention would not abolish the liberal capitalism of the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but rather
destabilise the conditions in which its principles could
come into their own (Holland 1975:22).

It can be understood

from the above quotation that

Holland's

understanding of the purposes of the Keynesian economy is stronger
than Crosland's, because Crosland saw the Keynesian economy as the
economy of social democracy and as a complete means to achieve an aim
of social democracy. In other words, by using Keynesian economic policies,
according to Crosland, social democracy would achieve its aims, such as
reducing inequality and leading economy through the public interest.
There is not, however, a contradiction in Crosland’s arguments, because
he did not argue for complete equality (what ever that might mean). He
accepted the capitalist mode of production and argued that the State had
sufficient means to direct the economy in the public interest without
further nationalisation.
Holland's critique of Keynesian economics, however, draws on
Crosland's understanding of (Neo) Keynesianism. Holland argues that:

.

It is striking that the main exponent of social democratic
theory in Britain in the 1950s, Anthony Crosland, stayed
firmly within both the scope and limits of Keynesian
theory. This shows not only in his explicit endorsement of
Keynes' conclusion that, provided the State exercises central
controls, there is no more reason to socialise economic life
now than there was earlier. In particular, in Crosland's
analysis, there was no more reason to continue with the
expansion of the public sector pioneered by the post-war
labour government (Holland 1975:23).

-

It can be understood from the above quotation that Holland criticised
Crosland's understanding of Neo Keynesian economics rather than the
economics of Keynes.

He disagreed with Crosland's understanding.

Holland asserted that unless the top key manufacturing companies were
nationalised the state would be unable to direct the economy in the
public interest. This is because of the power and reach of modem multi-

national or trans- national corporations. Such corporations had reached
a size which was now beyond the control of individual nation states.
Holland introduce the term meso economic structure to account for the
power of modem

trans -national corporations.

Meso economics

denoted a level of economic activity between the economics of the small
local or national firms - the micro level - and macro or national level
economic activity (Holland 1975:50). The success of economic planning
was therefore dependent on the nationalisation of the top twenty-five
manufacturing companies. Nationalisation was once again a significant
means to achieve socialism.

But it must be understood that Holland

argued for a mixed economy in terms of both ownership and methods of
integration. Holland rejected a simple minded statist program.
Such considerations underlay another difference with Crosland.
Holland endorsed detailed economic planning on a scale similar to
French dirigisme.
He (Crosland) was against 'too much detailed planning
within each sector'; and claimed that/ remaining severely
empirical, the government simply stand ready first to
intervene negatively to stop industry from acting manifestly
against the public interest; secondly, and of far greater
importance, to search out the weak spots, especially in the
basic industries, and concentrate on these with all the vigour
at its command (Holland 1975:25).

It can be understood from the above quotation that unlike Crosland,
Holland thought detailed economic planning necessary to achieve social
democratic goals of social justice and equality.

He argued,

"the

government... (should) ... intervene not where the productive structure
of the economy is weak, but precisely where it is strong and where
private strength is not harnessed effectively in the public interest" (Holland
1975:29). What is left for the private sector? Can the market forces work
in this situation? With this point in mind, we can ask whether there could

still be room left for the private sector to concentrate on profit seeking
activities?
According to Holland, in the developed world the transition from
capitalism to socialism would start by the selective nationalisation of the
top twenty five most profitable manufacturing companies. According to
Holland previous nationalisations in the UK have been forced by the near
bankruptcy or imminent collapse of a major employment sector.

They

have been nationalisations brought about for the wrong reasons.

He

argues that:
Essentially, no transformation will be possible unless a
critical minimum of leading firms in the meso-sector is
brought into public ownership and social control... One in
four - to one in five of these firms must be socialised
through ... public ownership and control if we are to begin
the critical transformation of private meso economic
power (Holland 1975:160).

Hence, Holland placed a priority on nationalising the top twenty
companies, if the economy were to be redirected in the public interest,
because without nationalisation the State cannot control the meso
economic sector. Moreover, considerations of the public interest made
economic planning essential. By nationalisation, planning the economy
would become possible. Accordingly, Holland claimed that the failure, of
the 1964 Labor government in Britain was due to the fact that the State did
not have enough public ownership to control the economy.
However, it is difficult to agree with his arguments regarding
nationalisation policy.

If we nationalise the 'critical minimum

of

leading firms', as mentioned above, where is the private sector to
pursue profit making activities.

The question arises, whether this

nationalisation is essential to control the economy?

According to

Holland nationalisation is made necessary by the meso economic

structure’s power to subvert state sponsored (or macro) goals of
monetary policy, progressive taxation and full employment. Regardless
of whether such policies might have worked twenty years ago it is
doubtful that they could in the fluid money and capital markets of today
(Thurow

1996:217).

Nationalisation,

or public ownership, is not

essential to control the economy and may even be harmful if the
experience of the first Mitterand government is any guide (Thurow
1996:217). The modern State has other means, such as taxation,
spending, loans and subsidy, to lead the economy through the public
interest. The existence of the means leads to questioning the necessity of
the economic plans Holland supported.
Plans in the capitalist system can not be as bold as he argued.
Viable plans need to bring suggestions to the private sector rather than
pressure them to follow strict plans.

Unless private companies act

against the public interest, they should be allowed to pursue their
activities, because it is difficult to argue that there is one way which is
the best for the economy, or the public interest. This question is not so
much an efficiency problem in the economy, as a political problem. The
plan makers, mostly politicians or bureaucrats, would decide on the
development of a sector, or location of factories. The private sector would
then be led according to these decisions. But businesses respond primarily
to the market not to the political or administrative con-siderations of
politicians and bureaucrats. Therefore, it is doubtful that, short of the use
of coercion or distortion inducing forms of corporatism that the private
sector would be led by a strong form of planning?
There is no doubt that Holland endorses selective national
isation.

The question arises concerning his attitude to the abolition

of the market economy. Holland drew strongly on the arguments
of Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy.

He advocates the expansion of

the public sector, but not the abolition of the market economy.

He

argued:
Neither the market economy nor planning are in
themselves central issues. They are secondary to the nature
of state power and the way in which it is exercised in terms
of production relations and social relations - including the.
extent to which working people are able to exercise control
over the conditions and results of their own activity. The
key question is who is served by state power, and whether it
helps or prevents workers from transforming the society in
which they live (Holland 1975:166-7).

If the above transformation happen there is no reason to abolish the
private sector.
Holland followed Bernstein and Crosland in arguing against
revolutionary transformation from capitalism to socialism in countries
having democratic institutions. It is difficult, however, to agree with his
argument

regarding revolutionary

transformation

in

developing

countries which do not have democratic institutions (Holland 1975:162
3). Revolutionary overthrow of capitalism should not be accepted as
'the only means of progress' to achieve socialism for any country. But
revolution may only be necessary in non democratic developing
countries.
Unlike Bernstein, Holland argued that in the absence of
democratic institutions, as in the former (state) socialist countries, the
revolutionary overthrow of capitalism might be an appropriate strategy.
In my view such a strategy may make the situation worse. After the
revolution the development of democratic institutions may not be
possible, or more difficult, because at that time all authority belongs to
revolutionary committees and there is no popular control over their
activities. As seen from the practice of the committees, they do not have
a commitment to democratic rules and traditions such as the rule of law.
Also some characteristics of the socialist state, such as central planning
of the economy, may in themselves lead to authoritarian governments.
The result will be an authoritarian regime which is completely against
the nature of social democracy. Hence, there are considerable dangers if
revolutionary

means are used to achieve socialism in developing countries. If we are
against the revolutionary transformation from capitalism to socialism,
how then can the transformation occur in countries which do not have
democratic institutions?
In The Socialist C hallenge, Holland examines the problem of
'Socialism
explains

and Underdevelopment'
the vicious

circle

(Holland

of poverty

in

1975:363-88) and he
developing

countries.

Developing countries do not have enough savings for a higher
economic growth rate. The technology they use is old and they cannot
produce new technology.

They

have few skilled and experienced

workers and poor levels of productivity, which lead to low wages and in
turn a further cycle of low savings, low skills and virtually no means of
remedying

the

situation.

dependent

on

developed

Developing
countries

for

countries
solving

are,

therefore,

their

problems.

However, as Holland argues, because of the power of m ultinational
companies and the dominance of the developed countries the current
workings of the international economy does not help developing
countries to break their vicious circle but aids their deterioration.
Holland correctly identifies multinational companies as a barrier
to further development in under or less developed countries.
The multinational division of technology by leading
companies gives less developed countries very little chance
to 'break into' the circuit of a multinational market in
developed technology products... In other words, the power
of multinational companies extends beyond the frontier of
the less developed countries which they dominate in
manufacturing and modem service industries respectively.
This fundamentally qualifies the power of less developed
countries to plan the development of their own economies
(Holland 1975:371).
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The investments of multinational companies in developing countries
have negative effects on the resolution of internal and international
inequality

(Holland

1975:371), because they pay lower

wages in

developing countries than they do in the developed countries.

The

income and living standards of workers in developing countries are,
therefore, much less than in developed countries.

Consequently,

inequality is not reduced, but reinforced, due to the dual problems of
internal and external barriers.
It is difficult for developing countries to use high levels of
protective taxes to support their developing sectors, because 'the United
States and now dominant world countries' put pressure on developing
countries to reduce tariffs. As a result tariff protection becomes useless
to break the vicious circle of less developed countries (Holland 1975:374
5).
Holland

also

questions

the

economics for developing countries.

appropriateness

of

Keynesian

The problem in less developed

countries is not the shortage of aggregate demand, but the shortage of
savings.

In other words, developing countries do not have enough

capital to employ the whole work-force.

From Crosland to Holland

In summary it can be. said that Crosland's significance lies not
in whether his arguments are appropriate for contemporary policies, but
he is strongly representative of the characteristics of the 'golden years
of post WWH social democracy.

He was affected by the social and

political conditions of his time. It is difficult to agree with his critique of
'orthodox'

socialism and portrayal of Nazi Germany as socialist.

However, I agree with him in emphasising the pro-active elements of
the democratic and liberating characteristics of socialism as well as the

re-active elements of combating exploitation, inequality and poverty.
Although his arguments concerning the changes in post W W II
capitalism have considerable validity, his position that Britain was no
longer a capitalist country is not persuasive. He exaggerated the power
of top-management in capitalism. Such managers have to remain loyal
to the ethos of capitalism and the interests of the capitalist class and are
hence unable to become a power by themselves. Furthermore, as there
is no direct link between profit and investment, a regime of higher taxes
can be taken on profit. The power of workers in the 1950s and 60s was
not merely due to full employment but because of cohesive trade union
organisations (Castles 1978:13,131; Padget and Paterson 1991:178).
Another disagreement with Crosland is that Crosland saw a
mixture of Keynesian policies with the welfare state as a complete guide
for social democracy.

Because their aims are so different social

democracy and Keynesianism

are an incoherent

mixture:

social

democracy's concern is the reduction of inequality, poverty and injustice
in society, Keynes' concern is the long term efficiency of the market
economy (Gough 1979:71; Beilharz, Considine and Watts 1992:33).
While Crosland’s understanding of social democracy rested on an
endorsement of Neo Keynesian economics,

Holland's was based on

endorsing the 1973 program of the British Labour Party. Holland was
the leading social democratic theorist of the 1970s, as Crosland was in the
1950s.

The Program and Holland's Socialist Challenge display the

radical shift of the Labor Party to the Left.

Holland's appreciation of

Marx gives him a special position among social democrats, because
many social democrats reject Marx in formulating their position.
Understanding Marxist concepts is essential in understanding how the

capitalist system works as it displays the contradictions which were
analysed by Marx.
Another disagreement between Holland and Crosland is the role of
Neo Keynesian economics in social democracy. While Crosland strongly
endorsed

Neo

Keynesianism,

Holland

was

critical

of

Crosland's

endorsement. However, while Neo Keynesian policies are not adequate
as a means to achieve socialism due to the power of multi national
corporations, Neo Keynesianism helped to promote the welfare state
and to 'permit a better functioning' of capitalism.

In the face of meso

economic or multi national corporate power, Holland argues Neo
Keynesianism is no longer viable in itself and must be accompanied by
limited selective nationalisation to achieve socialism.
Another significant argument of Holland is his concentration on
nationalising the top twenty five profitable manufacturing companies,
not the nationalisation of non profitable or bankrupt companies, as in
prior British Labour practice.

Holland was writing at a time when

manufacturing employment was in retreat and employment in the
service and information sectors w q j growing rapidly. Hence, his policy
prescription was outdated. To Holland the strength of the meso sector is
such that without nationalisation, the economy can not be directed in
the public interest and this explains the failure of earlier Labour
governments.

However, public ownership of the key manufacturing

companies is not essential in bringing about the public interest, because
the State can use such means as taxation enticements, spending and
loans. Moreover, such a focus on manufacturing is anachronistic and it
is doubtful that nationalisation

would work in the new highly

decentralised service and information sectors.
Holland is ambiguous in his attitude to

the abolition of the

market economy and its central profit making motive; advocating

prescriptive planning and selective nationalisation at one level and a
continuation

of market

activities

on another.

If capitalism

is

maintained, however, administrative plans are likely to harm the
remaining market forces and in turn the whole economy.
Holland's analysis of developing countries is a cogent response to
their problems.

Developing countries are in a vicious circle and

Keynesian policies are inappropriate because they are designed to combat
under-consumption, whereas the problems in developing countries are
mainly low productivity, low savings, skills and capital. Multinational
companies contribute little or nothing to the resolution of these
problems by seeking only to exploit low wage labour.

They have

reinforced internal and international inequality by creating a dual wage
structure between local and foreign dominated sectors.

Developing

countries have difficulty in protecting their new industries, due to
pressure from developed countries and international institutions such as
the OECD and World Bank. However, there are a few other solutions than
high protective tariffs which can allow developing countries to establish
new sectors and to protect them against multinationals.

Social Democracy in Transition
Holland's radical alternative emerged at a time when social
democracy was in transition. The British Labour program of 1973 was
never implemented.

Such nationalisations as were undertaken by

Wilson and Callaghan followed the old school of nationalising run
down non profitable enterprises to save jobs. The clearest case of such
policy was the nationalisation of British Leyland.
Throughout

the

mid-1970s

social

democratic

parties

were

negatively affected by changes in the social and economic structure.
First,

there

were

obvious

changes

in

the

social

structure

as

manufacturing lost importance as an employer.

These changes had

brought social democratic parties to office in most of the northern
European countries. The number of industrial working class people had
decreased, while the number of service sector employees, especially
private service sector, had increased.

The growth of white-collar

workers weakened trade unions, and in turn weakened the electoral
chances of social democratic parties (Pontusson 1992 & 1995, Lindstrom
1991 and Kitchelt 1994).
Secondly, the economic policies of social democracy failed to
resolve

fundamental

economic

problems.

Unemployment

and

inflation were rising. In Neo Keynesian economic theory these were
incompatible, but empirically they occurred at the same time. With the
failure of Neo Keynesian economic policies coinciding with the oil
shock in the 1970s, social democracy went into deep recession in the late
1970s and the 1980s. It has been argued that the failure of Neo Keynesian
economics meant the collapse of the social democratic economic model.
Social democrats did not appear to possess any other economic policies
to apply to a market economy. Thus the social democratic dominance in
the western world was, and is still being, undermined by the theories of
Friedman and the practice of M. Thatcher in Britain and R. Reagan in
the USA.

The components of social democracy came under fire.

Capitalist countries claimed that Keynesian economics (not only Neo
Keynesian economics) was dead and in turn so was social democracy.
These changes have led social democratic parties to programatic
renewal.
Since the early 1980s, the 'New World Order' has been dominated
by New Right ideology espoused by Margaret Thatcher in Britain
and Ronald Reagan in the USA.

In the 'New World Order' inequality,

both internal and international, and poverty have increased (Thurow

1996:2, 35, 253).

The total production level in the World has increased

more rapidly than the World's population, in contrast to R. Malthus'
argument which states that the increase of population will be faster
than the increase of production (Matthaei 1984:83). Despite these
improvements, inequality and poverty have increased in developed
and in developing countries.

As a result of this situation, there is still

more to be done by social democrats in both internal and international
politics.
While the ’Left' of the British Labour Party, stressed a selective
nationalisation

policy

in

the

mid-1970s,

this

policy

was

not

implemented despite a spirited defence and popularisation by Stuart
Holland.

And under Harold Wilson and more significantly James

Callaghan the British Labour Party endorsed first a conservative Neo
Keynesian strategy which then later degenerated into a full scale retreat
into an IMF inspired austerity program. The proportion of the British
GDP controlled by the state actually shrank more under Callaghan s
Labour Government

in

2 years than

it

did under

Thatcher s

Conservatives in a decade (Emy and Hughes 1990:156-164).

Social Democracy in a Neo Liberal Era?

Social democratic parties in the 1990s are different to those in the
1960s. Social democrats have discarded not only nationalisation, but
have accepted privatisation. As will be demonstrated below, none of the
contemporary social democratic parties promote the nationalisation of
any industry. In conformity with Crosland s thesis, most contemporary
social democrats would be happy discarding nationalisation, because
controlling the economy is sufficient to achieve socialist goals (Holland
1975:23). The class basis of social democratic parties has also changed.
They now try to win the votes of the higher

educated urban

professionals, or Alvin Gouldner's humanistic intelligentsia (Gouldner
1979:30,48-49). In addition, most of the old state centred redistributive
programs aimed at inequality, poverty and injustice in society have
almost disappeared.

An example of the new direction in social

democracy is shown by the preference for small government and market
based programs or social market policies that the Australian Labor Party
government used to reduce inequality and poverty in Australia during
their terms in office during the 80s and 90s.

Such policies are now

regarded as models for the 'New Labour' government of Tony Blair in
the UK.

Therefore, it can be argued that 1990s' social democracy is

different from that of the 19508'.
In the 'New World Order', however, social democrats still need to
find new policies to reduce inequality, poverty and injustice. Inequality
and poverty have worsened in many countries.

But targeted market

based or social market programs can achieve considerable successes. In
Australia, during the Hawke and Keating years income inequalities
before the effects of taxation policies and government transfer payments
have widened considerably; largely in-line

with developments in

comparable countries. However, when the effects of transfer payments,
targeted social security payments, universal health care and rent relief
policies are taken into account Australia ranked just below Sweden,
Norway and Denmark for egalitarianism at the end of the last Keating
government (Richardson and Travers 1993:217; Withers (EPAC Report)
1995:51; Saunders 1994:46-48, 170-171).

This ranking will have been

significantly worsened by conservative programs adopted since (Castles
and Shirley 1996:106).

Social democracy in Australia has broken away

from its Laborist past (Beilharz 1994:215-216) and now has considerable
similarities to that of northern European countries.

The ALP still has

close links with trade unions and its traditional commitment to a form
of targeted welfare for those who need a safety net.
The 1980s became a transitional era for social democratic parties,
principally due to consecutive election losses in many of the former
social democratic heartlands.

Social democratic parties began loosening

their commitments to the key components of the 1960s, such as full
employment, the welfare state and Keynesian economic policies (Padget
& Paterson 1991: 56)2.
Therefore, arguing that social democracy died in the 1990s is
disingenuous. Rather the nature of social democracy has changed over
three decades as have liberalism and conservatism.

Since Crosland’s

thesis became generally accepted, instead of combating market forces and
private capital, social democrats have used regulations and social market
policies to attempt to direct market capitalism to meet considerations of
social justice and equity.

The changes in the 1990s represent a

continuation of the policy directions initiated by Bernstein and Crosland
toward social market strategies-. In themselves social market policies
were not new. They were the product of post war reconstruction policies
in the Federal Republic of Germany and to a lesser degree a number of
policies adopted in Sweden.

Nonetheless, many of the lessons of

2 Padget and Paterson explain these changes: "following these setbacks, many of the
parties embarked upon a Programmatic reappraisal designed to find purposeful political
formulas for social democracy in a post-Keynesian age. A number of common themes can be
identified. Generally, the parties sought a 'middle way' between the 'socialist
alternative' and deflationary crisis management as practiced by conservative and
Christian democratic governments. New programs contained a residue of Keynesianism,
being geared to interventionist strategies for state-led economic recovery, with an urgent
priority on reducing unemployment. It was, however, recognised that there are financial
restraints cn state expenditure, and that its impact cm unemployment level would be
limited. Other common themes were industrial and economic democracy, the
safeguarding of acquired social citizenship rights and the even distribution of the
burdens imposed by economic recovery programs. Programmatic reappraisal also took
account of new issues -environment and personal fulfilment, nuclear energy and
disarmament -oriented around concern for the quality of life rather than purely
quantitative consideration of economic growth"(Padget & Paterson, 1991: 56).
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Germany's post war success were not absorbed into social democratic
practice until the 1980s.
Despite claims of a conservative or Neo-liberal ascendancy in the
1980s social democracy had a number of successes. First because of the
strong electoral performance of social democratic parties in Australia
and southern European countries, such as Spain, France, Greece, Italy
and Portugal.

The socialist president Francois Mitterand dominated

French politics for over a decade.

In Spain and Australia, social

democrats won many consecutive elections and stayed in office for
fourteen and thirteen years respectively. The literature clearly shows
that social democracy in Mediterranean countries varies in many ways
from that in northern European countries. It differs in the relationships
between labour movements and the commitment to social democratic
principles, such as full employment (Padget and Paterson 1991:3). For
many contemporary social democrats, modem social democracy should
focus on trying to find ways of containing the worst effects of capitalist
markets, while still relying on social market strategies.
One of the most important characteristics of social democracy in
the new era is the dissociation of organisational links between social
democratic parties and trade unions.

As discussed below, the

relationship between the parties and trade unions had a significant
impact on social democracy in many ways, ie. as a financial contributor
and in providing an electoral base. The alliance has been affected by
changes which have occurred over five decades since World War Two,
but especially by the changes that social democratic parties adopted
through the 1980s.

Social democratic parties in northern European

countries have broken their formal ties with trade unions.

As Tony

Blair recently announced the British Labour Party becomes everybody's
party.

The shortcomings of social democratic political parties in recent
years are due to changes in class structure, the failures of Neo Keynesian
economics, rapid internationalisation

of the World economy and

attempts to deal with newly emerging issues, such as gender and the
environment.

Traditionalist dominated social democratic parties often

failed to address these changes until they were confronted by crisis.
Changes have affected the class structure which gave rise to social
democracy. The proportion of the electorate from blue-collar workingclass backgrounds, the traditional electoral base of social democratic
parties has declined; while the proportion of white-collar-working-class
has increased. This change along with an increasing number of whitecollar-workers has negatively affected the trade union movement
(Mahon and Maidner 1994:66).
Pontusson argues that the decline of European social democracy is
because of 'the growth of private industrial employment* (Pontusson
1995:498). Private service employment is dependent on small units of
production and union density in small units of production is low. This
has resulted in the fragmentation of the labour movement, which was
the main contributor to the success of social democracy in the 1960s and
1970s . The growth of the welfare state was strengthened by solidarity of
the labour movement

and challenged

as that solidarity waned.

Employees in the service sector, especially in the private sector have
traditionally tended not to vote for social democratic parties (Pontusson
1995:498).

Thus as the traditional social democratic electorate has

eroded, this also has weakened its alliance with trade unions, which take
their strength from the same structure.
From the discussion above, it should be evident that because of
the constantly evolving nature of social democracy there is no simple
formula which can encapsulate its diversity.

Hence, the usual

conservative formula equating social democracy with statism, and
nationalisation is inappropriate. Padget and Paterson agree that social
democracy is characterised by diversity. They argue that:
ideologically social democracy has changed markedly over
the course of the hundred years or more of its history.
Moreover, the social democratic parties have exhibited quite
wide variations of ideology. It is, however, possible to
identify some common developments... social democracy is
a hybrid political tradition composed of socialism and
liberalism (Padget and Paterson 1991:1)3

Berki argues that social democracy (like socialism) is not a thing or a
unitary entity. While most social democrats agree on the primacy of
social justice, there are few other goals which are commonly accepted.
Furthermore, the movement has a broad range of positions*1at one end
of the spectrum many social democrats and Labour party members have
a liberal perspective; at the other end social democracy is virtually
indistinguishable from radical egalitarian socialism (Berki 1975: 95).

Padget and Paterson also suggest that
Defining social democracy in relation to a 'family' of social
democratic parties is problematical, since there is no
common nomenclature. The parties adopted titles
incorporating a variety of terms: labour, worker, social
democratic and socialist...However, social democratic and
socialist parties share a common tradition and common
characteristics, although there are differences of emphasis.
Moreover, in the last decade there has been a definite
convergence of social democratic and socialist parties with
the 'social démocratisation' of the latter (Padget & Paterson
1991:2-3).

3 They continue that "it is the product of a division in the socialist tradition between
those who seek to realise socialist ideals within the institutions of liberal cap italist
society (social democrats) and those who remain outside those institutions with th e
objective of superseding them through revolutionary force (communists). In particular,
social democrats are fully committed to participation in the electoral process and in
parliamentary democracy" (Padget and Paterson 1991:1).

It can be understood that social democracy is a complex and diverse set
of movements/ goals and ideals. Social democracy has always exhibited
such trends.

The preceding analysis of the development of social

democracy has created a basis on which we can now discuss its main
components. I have established that the main components include full
employment, state centred economic redistribution, the welfare state,
egalitarianism, social justice and the social democratic parties' ties with
trade unions. Such goals are inextricably linked to the social democratic
commitment to basic civil and political rights and to broader socialeconomic rights.

These political components are very significant in

southern European countries, which

have

experienced prolonged

periods of authoritarian government, especially Turkiye, Spain, Portugal
and Greece. Therefore, special attention will be given to social democracy's
approach to human right issues.
The most important and indeed fundamental goal of social
democracy is social justice. At one level it might be argued that because
the above components serve social justice, which social democracy
shares with socialism (Berki 1975), social justice does not deserve
separate attention. Social justice, viewed as a goal or telos, however, is a
concept which involves more than discrete attention to the above
mentioned concepts because it is essentially indivisible.

Concern for

social justice involves a whole set of ideas about human nature, human
understanding,

relations

between

genders,

cultural

identity,

relationships between human beings and the environment and inter
generational equity considered not as a ’shopping list’ with priority to
this or that concern but as a complex unity.

While gender and

environmental issues have become more prominent since the mid1970s, they have always been part of the social justice goals of social

democracy (Berki 1975:94). The breadth of the goal of social justice is
both a strength and a weakness for social democratic parties electorally.
Although the concerns of trade unions regarding employment
conditions are still critical, modem trade unions have gradually adopted
a broader social democratic ideology, instead of a laborist agenda
(Beilharz 1994:48, 127, 137).

This has at times weakened social

democratic parties in their traditional heartlands. Because the electoral
interests of social democratic parties are more sensitive to labour issues
than those of right-wing parties, such interests retain a high priority
which is sometimes in considerable tension with issues associated with
new social movements. But the rise of new social movements and their
newly emerged political parties, based on environmental issues, for
example, often threaten social democratic political parties more than
right-wing or conservative parties.
In summary, in this section I have analysed social democracy in
the course of its history, since the 1990s.

I have argued that the social

democracy of the 1960s has not died, but has been transformed into a
new phase in the 1990s of programmatic renewal.

It is not, however,

the same as social democracy in the 1960s. From this basis I am now able
to analyse organisational issues of contemporary social democracy, such
as the relationships of social democratic parties with trade unions and the
new social movements particularly those organised around questions of
gender and the environment.
democracy

include

their

Main issues of contemporary social

commitment

employment and social justice.

to

welfare

provision,

full

Two new issues, gender and the

environment, which began to develop in social democracy in the 1980s,
are also analysed. Special attention is given to human rights not only
because such issues are central to new social movement programs but

also due to continuing human rights abuses in Spain and Turkiye and
social democratic responses to them.

The Components of Social Democracy

The social justice principle, as mentioned earlier, is the most
important component of social democracy.

It is also a common

characteristic between social democracy and socialism (Berki 1975:94-95).
However, while socialism takes social justice as egalitarian distribution,
there is now a contemporary social democratic willingness to tolerate
inequality between individuals, if such is not biased on privilege.
Furthermore, Berki argues that
social justice is not -in the context- a revolutionary ideal,
but one which expresses (and strengthens) moderate
aspirations; it is here that the close connection between
social democracy and working-class organisations bears
immediate ideological fruits (Berki 1975:94).

Berki also argues that the content of social justice4 has changed not only
in time, but has a different meaning in differing cultures and social
democratic traditions: "by 'equality', for example, some socialists have
meant 'equality of opportunity' while others have meant 'equality of
remuneration' -the two are very different, of course" (Berki 1975:10).
The question that arises here is: how does social democracy secure
social justice within capitalism?

For the fulfilment of social justice,

4 Padget and Paterson argue that "Social democrats often conceived of the welfare state
in terms of a broad egalitarian philosophy, but it has been observed that the precise
meaning of equality in this context was rarely specified. The pursuit of equality would
have meant challenging the allocative or distributive mechanism of the market across a
wide area of social policy, and would have required a level of state penetration into the
economic and social order which most social democrats were unprepared to countenance.
Their efforts were therefore directed at the concept of equality of opportunity which i t
was possible to reconcile with market capitalism" (Padget and Paterson 1991:38).

public welfare provision, full employment and high levels of economic
growth are crucial. Padget and Paterson argue that
the third pillar of working-class socialism in the immediate
postwar years was the ideology of the welfare or social
citizenship state. It represented the extension of the liberal
doctrine of political equality into the social and economic
spheres (Padget & Paterson 1991:18).

Concern with social citizenship means that the political agenda of social
democracy has to be broader than a liberal or conservative agenda. But
social citizenship

does not necessarily mean

endorsement

of a

'Beveridge' style welfare state. In the literature, social democracy has
often been seen as synonymous with a welfare state, despite the fact that
in recent years Sweden has moved to a social insurance strategy, with
bodies such as trade unions managing contributors* funds. Hence:
research on 'social démocratisation' usually focuses on
welfare state characteristics (its size, egalitarianism,
comprehensiveness, and the quality of social rights), or on
economic performance (full employment and economic
growth) (Esping-Anderson 1992: 189).

While such research is extremely valuable in analysing many aspects of
public policy it is less valuable in analysing crucial aspects of social
justice such as 'quality of life' or 'living decently'.
Nevertheless, the success of social democratic parties has largely
been examined through analyses of cross-national comparisons as well
as time series performances. Francis Castles' research in these areas has
highlighted the positive effects of the welfare state services when combined
with the Keynesian policies, on social justice:
Social Democratic welfare reforms -in the field of health
provision, unemployment insurance, pensions, family
maintenance, etc.- have contributed to the alleviation of

the human misery that was once accepted as the inevitable
concomitant of life in a capitalist society. Full employment
policies combined with progressive taxation and the wage
leveling efforts of the trade unions have ensured that all
wage earners have a real share in economic prosperity.
Education is no longer the prerogative of a privileged
minority, but is available to all who can and will benefit
from it (Castles 1978:47-48).

Castles also argues that the education and health provisions of the
welfare state have positive effects on social justice, such that;

Educational financing may have a net impact on current
income distribution, but the extent of repressiveness must
partly depend on the rates of working-class enrolment in
various types of post-primary education. Finally, there are
reasons to believe that, although the expansion of
educational opportunity may have little impact on social
mobility, it may have long-term implication for income
equalisation between those are different levels in the class
hierarchy. If the increase in the supply of human capital
produced by education can lead to an equalisation of income
distribution, it becomes a crucial element in the democratic
social argument, since it implies that education is not merely
an increment to welfare, but also an instrument of egalitarian
transformation of the reward structure of capitalism (Castles
1978: 62).

Hence, using Castles’ empiricist methodology, it can be argued
that the welfare state, especially a social democratic one, has positive
effects on social justice. In addition, it may also affect economic growth
positively. In the debate over the effects of social democratic economic
policies, such as welfare provision,

on economic

growth, social

democrats argue against Neo liberal and conservative claims that the
effects are negative. Development is positively affected by policies such
as the welfare sate and public education (Esping-Anderson 1992: 200)5.
5 Esping-Anderson argues that "Both Korpi (1985) and Friedland & Sanders (1985) claim
that, if anything, welfare states have a positive effect cn growth rates. However, like
Jackman earlier, Saunders (1985, 1986) also casts some doubt cn the robustness of th is
finding and suggests that we need to desegregate expenditure categories. This is w h at
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In the 1980s, however, social democracy's commitment to the
welfare state has changed to a concentration on joint state and private
welfare schemes, Australian superannuation policies are an example,
and the use of public funding to private or community provided
programs, such as in child care or job training.

The failure of Neo

Keynesian economics contributed to this change.

Under Neo liberal

minimal state agendas it is argued that the State has to reduce its
expenditure, high state expenditure lead to high inflation and 'crowds
out' private sector investment. Despite the lack of empirical proof for
these claims (Trevithick 1994:78; Chan & Gustafson 1991:310) social
democratic political parties in office in the 1980s were forced to restrict
growth of the welfare state by financial markets and maintain very
strong budget discipline.
These changes resulted in social democratic parties paying
minimal attention to equality. Padget and Paterson6 argue that:
Just as public ownership played little part in the new
political economy of social democracy, the principle of
equality suffered a similar obscurity in the sphere of social
policy... Equality was now redefined in liberal humanist
terms. The parties' basic program generally omitted any
explicit reference to economic inequality (Padget & Paterson
1991:38).
makes the Friedland-Sanders study particularly interesting, because it differentiates
the growth impact by expenditure types, and suggests that social transfers have a
positive effect on growth (presumably the Keynesian demand effect), while collective
services and transfers to business have negative growth consciences. In later study,
Castles & Dowrick (1990) find no evidence of a negative relationship between social
expenditure and economic performance" (Esping-Anderson 1992:200).
6 Padget and Paterson also argue that "attacking the 'new individualism' of conservative
and Christian democratic parties, social democrats re-emphasised their traditional
values of collectivism and social solidarity. Their defence of the social or welfare state
was based on these principles, but it was combined with a recognition of the limits of
welfare finance in low-growth economies. Characteristically, social democrats h ave
amended the old orthodoxies of their political philosophy in piecemeal fashion. The
basic value system expressed in the liberal socialist trinity of principles -freedom,
justice, equality- has remained intact. However, in the new circumstances of the 1980s,
the parties have experienced some difficulty in giving Programmatic form to these
principles" (Padget & Paterson 1991:60).

The re-definition of equality has often taken the form of conceiving of
equality as synonymous with equity. Equity in this guise usually means
eliminating ’distortions' from markets, or creating a 'level playing field’
by introducing 'user pays' philosophies. Such policies have profoundly
inegalitarian results.

For example, government regulations are changed

so that pensioners, the poorly paid and job seekers are forced to
pay high relative bank charges on their deposits while the highly paid
are given generous concessions.

This type of policy supposedly is an

equity provision because there is no cross subsidisation for the service
provider to pay, even though it is manifestly in-egalitarian. Hence, the
commitment of social democracy to social justice has been loosened by
its weakening commitment to the characteristic components of social
justice, such as full employment and the welfare state.
Esping-Anderson argues that "welfare state and full employment
growth policies are unified in the social democratic model" (EspingAnderson 1992:195). In the fulfilment of social justice, or reduction of
inequality, full employment is as important as the welfare state. Glyn
argues that
the fundamental claim of social-democratic economics was
that economic inequality and insecurity in capitalist
economies could be radically reduced by government
intervention without impairing economic performance.
With unemployment a major source of economic
inequality and insecurity... the guarantee of full
employment represented 'the first marriage of equity and
efficiency' (Glyn 1995: 34).

It can be argued that from a social democratic perspective the pursuit of
full employment positively contributes to social justice and to economic
efficiency.

It is worthy of note that full employment and economic growth
are considered as inter-dependent by social democrats. They cannot be
separated in the social democratic theory, because, as Padget and
Paterson argue "for social democrats the elimination of poverty was
inextricably bound up with economic growth" (Padget & Paterson
1991:36)7. "In sum, it was assumed that a democratic economy would
evolve via a full employment growth strategy that was backed by an
egalitarian welfare state apparatus (Esping-Anderson 1992:196).
Because of the importance

of full

employment

to social

democracy, their approach to full employment requires examination. In
analysing full employment, Scharpf argues that
registered unemployment is a problematic indicator of the
success of the social democratic goal of full employment.
Unlike the rate of growth or the rate of inflation, official
unemployment figures do not measure a singledimensioned variable but reflect changes on the supply side
as well as on the demand side of the labor market...(T)he
best measures of the success of full employment programs
across countries are thus the labor force participation rates,
that is, the proportion of 15-to-64-year-olds that is gainfully
employed and the changes in that figure over time
(corrected, of course, for immigration and emigration by
foreigners) (Scharpf 1991:45-48).

Some countries, such as Germany, use early retirement, measures
discouraging women from employment, or sending back foreign workers
to their countries, to fight unemployment.

Thus, the unemployment

figures become meaningless, especially with low labour force participation.
For example, the unemployment rate in 1993 was 12.2 per cent in
Denmark, 8.9 percent in Germany and 6.5 per cent in the Netherlands.
However, labour force participation rates in 1993 in those countries are 81.3
7 They continue that "in short, growth was vital, not simply for its own sake, but for the
completion of the social citizenship state which was a central element in the new
conception of social democracy" (Padget & Paterson, 36).

per cent, 69.7 per cent and 60.4 per cent respectively (OECD Outlook 1996).
How then can we compare Denmark with the Netherlands? The difference
in their labour force participation is 20.9 per cent, while the difference in
unemployment is 5.7 per cent. Therefore, it cannot be argued that the
Netherlands is more successful in the fulfilment of social justice than
Denmark due to the high labour force participation in Denmark, which
means more people are able to work in Denmark than in the Netherlands.

Organisational Questions of Social Democracy and the Labour
M ovem en t

Social justice, the welfare state and full employment constitute
the

programatic goals of social democracy, the relationship between

social democratic political parties, new social movements and the trade
union movement constitute its organisational component.

The link

between social democratic parties and trade unions has been one of the
most important components of social democracy (Taylor 1993:133). They
both constitute the labour movement by representing the working-class
on different platforms. In northern Europe there has been a very close
relationship between trade unions and social democratic parties.

In

some countries, such as Britain, trade unions were represented at every
level of party organisation and as Padget and Paterson argue

"the

parliamentary leadership had less control over decision-making organs
than their continental counterparts with more rigidly centralised party
structures" (Padget and Paterson 1991:31).

In Sweden it was the

solidarity movement of trade unions that backed the Swedish Social
Democratic Party (SAP) in the creation of the 'social democratic welfare
state'. In other words, in Sweden the cohesive centralised organisation
of the labour movement, with its unique high membership ratio8, has
8 Padget and Paterson argue that "the organisational density of the Swedish trade unions
in the labour force is quite unique. With membership at around 90 percent of all manual

been one of the most important components of the SAP (Padget and
Paterson 1991:179)8.
It should be mentioned that the existence of trade unions is not in
itself sufficient for the success of social democracy.

In all northern

European countries trade unions have had their central organisations.
However, the strength of the trade union movement varies between
countries, and this often coincides with the comparative success of social
democratic political parties. In other words, the centralised structure of
trade unions, which can show solidarity, plays a significant role in the
success of social democracy (Castles9 1978:13). Where social democratic
parties succeeded in the establishment of the 'social democratic welfare
state' and the pursuit of full employment policies, as in Scandinavian
countries, the labour movement maintained significant solidarity. They
could act cohesively.

Furthermore, the trade union movement of

Austria is a similar kind of organisation to those of Scandinavian
countries, with similar long periods of electoral success. On the other

8 Padget and Paterson suggest that "many of its (LO-Sweden) constituent unions are
affiliated at branch level of the party, with affiliated members making up some 60 per
cent of total party membership. In addition, a large part of party finance comes from
union sources. At leadership level there is an overlap between party and unions, and most
union officials identify with the SAP. Amongst the membership, too, there is a
considerable overlap, and in the electorate at large between 60 and 75 percent of LO
members vote for the social democrats (Padget and Paterson 1991:179).
9 Another causes of the success of social democratic parties, as Castles argues, is the
weakness of the Right. In the Scandinavian countries, the right wing parties could not
present cohesiveness against social democratic parties. They have been fragmented. In
Castles' words,
the fragmentation of the opposition into at least three bourgeois parties
plus, on occasions, a number of even smaller parties of Right and Left, has
made it very difficult to find the necessary cohesion to offer credible
alternative to social democratic rule (Castles 1978:23).
This argument is valid for the success of the socialists in Spain in the 1980s and 1990s. In
Spain after the transformation to democracy the right-wing presented very fragmented
opposition against the PSOE. As the analysis in Chapter two reveals the number of votes
the PSOE garnered has not reduced in the consecutive elections. Only after the merge of
right-wing political parties under the PP, the right-wing was able to take first place a t
national elections and in turn office with support of regional parties. Therefore, it can be
argued that Castles' argument, the weakness of the right-wing, is valid for the
explanation of the success of social democracy (Share 1989:104).

hand, the British movement represents one of the more fragmented
labour movements in comparison with northern European countries
and has a relatively poor level of electoral success* for social democratic
parties.

Padget and Paterson argue that "the British trade union

movement is highly fragmented and politically diverse.

In order to

accommodate this diversity, its peak organisation is an exceedingly
loose-jointed

confederation"

(Padget

&

Paterson,

1991:182-183).

Therefore, the British labour movement has not become as successful as
the Swedish movement.
Labour movements in Mediterranean Europe are completely
different from those in northern Europe. The labour movements in
southern countries, such as Spain*10, France, Italy, Greece, Portugal and
Turkiye, have always been fragmented organisations.

Padget and

Paterson argue that
The regimentation of the northern labour movements was
alien to the individualistic and spontaneous outlook of
labour in these countries, and the merger between
socialism and labour, characteristic of northern Europe,
failed to take place. Lacking the ballast of organised labour,
socialism remained dominated by intellectuals and prone
to factionalism and fragmentation... Labour movements
here tended towards fragmentation along the lines of the
diverse strands in the socialist tradition. Social democracy
had to compete with anarcho-syndicalism, revolutionary
socialism, and after First World War, communism, gaining
only a weak foothold in the trade union movement.
Organisationally weak and politically divided, the labour
movement in these countries was headed by a multiplicity
of confederations each with its own social and ideological
characteristics (Padget and Paterson 1991:178).

* By ‘success’, I refer to either having majority in parliament or forming government.
10 Padget and Paterson argue that "The hesitant and uneven growth of industrial
capitalism in southern Europe deprived socialism of its driving force. The growth of the
industrial working-class was slow, and labour movements correspondingly small... The
Spanish labour movement was even smaller, and dominated by a form of anarchosyndicalism even more highly charged and virulent than in France, particularly so in the
Catalan region. The inability of Spanish socialism to penetrate the industrial heartland
of Catalonia crippled the movement from its infancy" (Padget & Paterson 1991:5).

It can be understood that mainly because of the lack of cohesion of the
trade union movement in Mediterranean Europe, the trade union
movement is far from being able to perform the role played by those in
Scandinavian countries.
The Spanish labour movement reflects typical characteristics of
the southern European labour movement.

The Spanish Socialist

Workers Party (1879) was established long before trade unions.

The

PSOE (Socialists) established the trade union called "the Union General
des Trabajo (UGT, 1888), to back itself..." (Padget and Paterson 1991:6).
Moreover, just as in the past the trade, union movement in Spain is
today factionalised and fragmented. Today there are three major union
confederations: the UGT, CCOO, and USO.

The CCOO has been

dominated by communists, the IU (United Left).

The UGT has been

close to the PSOE (socialists) but lately it supported the IU. In Turkiye11,
on the other hand, there are three major national union confederations:
Confederation

of Revolutionary

Workers

Syndicate

(DISK),

the

Confederation of Turkish Trade Unions (Turk-Is) and Hak-Is. The DISK
has close relationships with the Solidarity and Freedom Party (ODP),
communists, while the Turk-Is has had relationships with center-right
political parties instead of the political parties claiming to be social
democratic. The Hak-Is is a pro-Islamist trade union and is close to the
Refah Partisi (RP), pro-Islamist. As seen in those countries, the trade
union movement is fragmented and is not able to show a cohesive
movement. Therefore, it can be argued that trade union movements in
southern countries are far from able to perform the role played by the
trade union

movement

in Scandinavian

countries

through

the

establishment of the social democratic welfare state.1
11 It should be emphasised that in Turkiye formal relationship between political parties
and trade unions is banned. Trade unions cannot support parties in anyway.

In the 1990s the formal ties between trade unions and the social
democratic political parties were broken, even in the Scandinavian
countries.

The dissociation of social democratic parties from trade

unions, does not necessarily mean that the relationship is no longer a
component

of

social

democracy.

Rather,

social

change,

the

corresponding electoral priorities, and the rise of new social movements
have meant that organisational ties have been replaced by looser
relationships based on programs instead of organisational structures.
Moreover, in southern European countries, such as Spain, Greece
and Portugal socialists (social democrats) have secured office without the
backing of a cohesive trade union movement

(Share 1989:110-111).

Because of the decline in the proportion of blue-collar workers, trade
unions cannot be expected to mobilise a huge number of the working
class in the electorate. Therefore, it can be argued that the absence of a
relationship between the social democratic political parties and trade
unions has not negatively affect the success of the political parties.

Social Democracy and New Social Movements
In the 1980s, social democracy moved 'sideways' in electoral
appeal throughout its Programmatic renewal.

Through

moving

'sideways' two issues, gender and the environment which were always
part of social democratic ideology have come to the foreground.

The

new priority given to gender and environmental issues has not been
without difficulty for social democrats.

In the past, while social

democratic (and socialist) recognition of these issues was considerably in
advance of other political movements,

full scale commitment

to

problems of gender and the environment was often lacking. Labourist
agendas of full

employment, modernising working conditions and economic growth
often meant that gender and environmental issues were considered
’soft’. The labour, issues were the 'real' or ’strong' issues and protection
of male workers meant broader commitments were not taken seriously
(Beilharz 1994:36-37)
In social democratic literature it is relatively difficult to find
extensive debates on gender issues, despite as Taylor says, the fact that
the "labour movement has long established structures for women, and
the enhancement of women's rights is a central objective of trade
unionism and social democracy" (Taylor 1993:146).

There is also a

relative paucity of feminist literature which debates the organisational
and theoretical issues raised by social democracy and gender.

Many

feminist writings are devoted to liberal politics, radical feminism,
Marxian feminism and eco-feminism and general questions about
relations between gender and the modern state. The approach of social
democracy to the gender issue has been relatively neglected both
theoretically and empirically. The writings of social democrats on the
gender issue, on the other hand, focus on the implications of welfare
policies on women, such as maternity leave and child care. As these are
significant for the emancipation of women (Beneria 1989:328), the very
extension of these services should be added to the success side of social
democracy. Beneria argues that
it might be very difficult to implement long-lasting changes
toward equality between the sexes without structural
changes to build a more egalitarian society... emphasis on
the ideological only is likely to be ineffective unless it is
accompanied by economic change. Campaigns challenging
the traditional division of labour within the household are
not likely to be very effective unless women have
opportunity for employment in the paid labor market...
Similarly campaigns against male violence are likely to be
more effective if accompanied by policies that increase

women's economic autonomy and self-esteem (Beneria
1989:328-329).

As understood from the above quotation, changing social structure is
essential for the emancipation of women.

In other words, as seen in

Sweden, the resolution of many significant public policy gender issues
lies in the improvement of welfare policies and increasing the number of
women in education and the labour force (Cass 1983:XI). In all of these
areas social democratic countries have had a strong record

(Castles

1990:21; Esping-Anderson 1990:50-52).
The implications of welfare policies for women are clearly
demonstrated by the Swedish social democratic welfare state.

In

Sweden, social democrats have been relatively successful in the
emancipation of women, especially by opening the work place to both
genders. The proportion of women in the labour force has increased
greatly during the SAP's term in office. Between 1973 and 1979, the labor
participation of Swedish women increased 11 per cent (Scharpf 1991:51).
The main factor in increasing labour force participation of Swedish
women is its social democratic welfare state. The extension of child care
and maternity benefits is necessary to "increase women's labour force
participation" (Beneria 1989: 328).

It can be argued that the 'social

democratic welfare state' provides a wide range of services for women,
and in turn contributes to the emancipation of women.
There has also been some effort by social democratic parties to
encourage women further into the decision-making process, which is
important for the elimination of inequality that exists between sexes. A
number of social democratic parties, such as the SAP and the SDP, have
regulations allocating quotas to women to overcome organisational bias.
Such might include a requirement for 40 per cent representation to
women in the Party's apparatus. It is worth noting, on the other hand,

that the approach of the labour movement is still in considerable flux.
First, as discussed above, while

the

extension

of labour

force

participation by women requires maternity benefits and child care, the
commitment of social democracy to the welfare state has been loosened.
It is not clear how social democrats will settle this conflict (Taylor
1993:147).

Taylor argues that "the desire for more flexible working

practices to enable women to combine family and career excited
the suspicion of male trade unionists who feared that flexibility would
worsen their pay and working conditions" (Taylor 1993:147).

Despite

these debates, it should be noted that "there is within Western European
social democracy and trade unionism a general tendency towards
organisational and policy changes favourable to women"

(Taylor

1993:147).
The issue of the environment, like gender issues, has become part
of the social democratic agenda. From the early 1980s it has become a
critical part of the programmatic renewal and provided important
organisational and electoral support. Social democratic parties have not
been able to incorporate the environmental movement into their
system of party organisation.

In part this is due to the diverse

ideological range of the various environmental groups and the potential
conflict between employment and the conservation of the environment.
Social democratic parties have often lagged behind the environmental
movement in promoting conservation and environmental policies. In
a number of countries, such as Germany, environmental groups formed
their own parties, ie. Die Grünen. In Germany these Green Parties have
enjoyed

some

electoral success in their

own right

and gained

representation at every level of government, federal, state and local.
Throughout the 1970s social democrats regarded change in the
socio-economic structure as the long-term solution to the environment

issue.

Hugh Stretton argued that "... a program of environmental

reform has to be part of a program of more general social change"
(Stretton 1976:4), because he continued "... conflicts about inequality
and scarce resources are parts of one central problem of demo
cratic distribution" (Stretton 1976:1).

Foster agrees with Stretton's

argument.
Behind every environmental struggle of today there is a
struggle over expansion of the global treadmill -a case of
landless workers or villagers who are compelled to destroy
nature in order to survive, or of large corporations that seek
to expand profits with little concern for the natural and social
devastation that leaves in their wake. Ecological
development is possible, but only if the economic as well as
environmental injustice associated with the treadmill are
addressed (Foster 1995:8).

It can be seen that the long term resolution of environment issues is
only possible with a change iri the current socio-economic structure,
because the cause of the environmental problems are structural. The
conservation of the environment may have considerable implications
for the current inequalities between classes, those between developed
and developing countries and those between generations. The question
that arises is how will the costs of the conservation of the environment
be financed?

Social democrats argue that the costs of conservation

should be distributed equally. Similarly, in distributing the benefits of
environment conservation the equality principle should be pursued
(Stretton 1976:10). With the equality principle of conservation of the
environment in mind, Foster argues that:
given the nature of the society in which we live, one must
therefore be w ary of solutions to environmental problems
that place too much emphasis on the role of individuals, or
too little emphasis on the treadmill of production and
higher immorality that it engenders. To be sure, it is

necessary for individuals to struggle to organise their lives
so that in their consumption they live more simply and
ecologically. But to lay too much stress on this alone is to
place too much onus on the individual, while ignoring
institutional facts... It also ignores the fact that the treadmill
of production is rooted not in consumption but in
production. Within the context of this system it is therefore
economically naive to think that the problem can be solved
simply by getting consumers to refrain from consumption
and instead to save and invest their income (Foster 1995:6).

It can be understood from Foster's argument that in the conservation of
the environment the regulation of production is more important than
that of consumption.
The employment consequences of environmental policies cause
the greatest problems for social democrats, especially between trade
unions

and green movements.

For example,

in

Sweden

"LO

representatives insisted that the maintenance of full employment be
accorded equal status with environmentalism" (Taylor 1993:144).

In

Norway LO warned the Labour Party that 'environmentalism should
not be pursued at the expense of employment' (Taylor 1993:145).

The

same concerns caused disquiet in 'Germany between the SDP and the
trade unions, especially the Chemical Workers' (Taylor 1993:145), while
in

'Denmark

environmental

issues have

caused relatively

few

problems' for social democrats (Taylor 1993:146).
Social democrats have had to revise their economic and social
policies, such as high economic growth targets due to the criticisms from
environmental groups.

Padget and Paterson argue that

... the SPD (Germany) developed the concept of 'qualitative
growth' in which humanist and ideological concerns
counterbalanced a purely quantitative appraisal of
economic performance.
The conception involved the
stimulation of research and the direction of investment
into a new technology of environmental protection. The
'ecological modernisation
of the economy' would
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simultaneously create a dynamic growth sector with a job
creating potential, and serve social and environmental
needs (Padget and Paterson 1991:59).

Qualitative economic growth encapsulates much of the approach of
northern

European

social

democratic

parties

to

resolving

environmental issues, an approach incorporated in the Programatic
renewal of the 1980s.
Lastly, it should be emphasised that the relationship between
environmental groups and social democratic political parties have been
better than that with Right-wing parties.

In Australia, for example,

environmental groups mostly give their second preferences to the
Australian Labour Party at Federal and State elections (Warhurst
1988:40-41; Christoff 1994:132; McAllister 1994:36). In the late 1980s in
Germany a 'Red-Green7 coalition was established between the SDP and
Die Grünen (Johnstone 1989:12).

Social Democracy and Human Rights
The approach of social democracy to human rights issues, as
mentioned above, requires examination.

The concept of human rights

which is accepted by social democracy is very broad, in that it includes
social, economic and cultural rights as well as political and civil rights.
In other words, social democracy's approach13 to human rights is
different from that of liberal's and of collectivists . In Stammer s words

^ H oward argues that ""the only social system that can actually protect the full range of
human rights is social democracy. Social Democracy takes both civil /political, and
economic rights seriously. It promotes the economic rights of underprivileged groups
while protecting universality: it does not undermine civil and political rights in the
interests of making compensatory amends to previously subordinated groups... It does not
mean "equality of condition", the socialist alternative to equality of opportunity: it does
mean government policies designed to provide basic material security for all citizens.
Such a system can exist only where there is a societal ethic of equal concern and respect
(as proposed by Dworkin, 1978) by all citizens for all citizens"" (Howard 1995:1-2).

... the social democratic approach broadly accepts the
validity of what has been usually termed civil and political
rights. This contrasts sharply with the liberal approach
which tends either to deny the validity of economic and
social rights or else gives clear primacy to civil and political
rights. It also contrasts with those 'collectivist' traditions
which tend to emphasise collective rather than individual
rights and to see human rights in terms of benefits granted
by the state, prioritising economic and social rights if
necessary, at the expense of civil and political rights
(Stammer 1995: 490-491).

This is the result of social democracy's background, which, in terms of
equality, is traced to socialism and its acceptance of liberal democracy,
which in turn prioritises civil and political rights. For social democracy,
giving primacy to civil and political while maintaining a commitment
to social and economic rights is not compatible.

Rights have to be

understood broadly because civil and political rights in the absence of
social, economic and cultural rights is likely to result in the nullification
of the former.
The approach of social democracy to human rights also differs in
terms of the source of human rights. "The source of human rights is
'man's moral nature' and rights themselves 'are a special class of rights,
the rights one has simply because one is a human being. They are thus
moral rights of the highest order" (Stammer 1995:492). The approach of
social democracy to the individual is also different.

Stammer argues

that
Instead of seeing individuals as having rights that are
'natural' or that originate from the strength of an abstract
sovereignty that predates the institutionalisation of any
particular social order, social democratic approaches premise
the idea of rights on the vulnerability of individuals in the
social world. In other words, people require human rights to
protect them from potential violation arising from social
contexts in which they find themselves (Stammer 1995:491).

It can be argued that the understanding of human rights in social
democracy is more accountable than those of the other major ideologies,
because social democracy takes both political and economic rights into
account. In other words, the protection of individual is more realistic
through the social democratic approach to human rights, which insists
on both social, economic and cultural rights and civil and political
rights.
The social democratic approach to human rights issues is more
necessary in some countries, such as Turkiye.

At the moment in

Turkiye, as will be analysed in the last chapter, even the existence of
civil and political rights is not fully guaranteed. As understood from the
latest worldwide campaign of Amnesty International regarding human
rights abuses in Turkiye, basic human rights, such as freedom of speech,
freedom of thought and fair trial, are still not fully guaranteed. There
are many prisoners of conscience, torture and deaths while under
custody. Between 1990 and 1996 there have been 376 'disappearances of
political activists' while under custody (Conference notes,

1996).

Specifically, there are bans, such as on the formation of political parties
that might be considered threatening to the status quo, which seriously
damage the freedom of thought.

These bans show that civil and

political rights are not fully guaranteed in Turkiye. These bans seriously
damage not only the democratic structure of the party system, but also
freedom of thought and action. The establishment of communist and
Islamist13 political parties14 is prohibited. Another critique of human
rights abuses in Turkiye can be made from the point of the nationalities
question or issues of cultural rights.

Until the 1990s not only was

Kurdish identity denied but the public usage of Kurdish and Kurdish
13 The Islamist social system is called Seri'a, which is based on the Quran and the
Prophet's behaviour.
14 The pro-Islamist political parties, such as the RP, do not openly argue for the Ser i
order. If they claim they will overthrow secularism, they will be banned.

language, such as the prohibition of Kurdish in broadcasting and
education.

From a social democratic perspective, as Howard would

agree, to establish peace in Turkiye, a 'full range of human rights' should
be first guaranteed. In his words "the more a society respects the full
range of all citizens' human rights, the more likely that its social ethic
will also pertain to non-nationals, so that war becomes more and more
unthinkable as a means of solving interstate disputes" (Howard 1995:7).
Since basic civil and political rights are not fully guaranteed, it is
often very difficult for social democrats to focus on social and economic
rights. Nevertheless, a social democratic view of human rights requires
a commitment to both forms over time.

Such a commitment is

reflected in the programs and election promises of the Left wing
political parties in Turkiye and Spain.

However, in Turkiye for the

immediate term, the social democratic political parties emphasise civil and
political rights rather than social and economic rights.

This is

understandable because of the abuse of civil and political rights in
Turkiye. As understood from the approach of social democracy to human
rights, however, it is imperative that both forms of rights should be
emphasised together.

In other words, Turkish social democrats should

focus on both civil and political rights and social, cultural and economic
rights.

-

Conclusion

I have argued that social democracy has been subject to constant
change and programmatic renewal both in theory and as a movement
throughout the course of its history. I have rejected simplistic formulas
which associated social democracy with statism, bureaucracy and
widespread nationalisation. This sort of view of social democracy has
been criticised since the last decade of the 19th century. Nevertheless,

there have been considerable changes during this century. The social
democracy of the 1990s is quite distinct from that of the 1960s and 1950s,
just as 1960s social democracy differed strongly from that of the 1900s. In
the 1900s social democracy abandoned its revolutionary character by
adopting a parliamentary road to socialism.
heritage social democracy also

Despite their common

differentiated

itself from

Marxist

movements. With the changes that took place in the capitalist system
between the two world wars, social democracy adapted itself to
overcoming the worst injustices of capitalism rather than more
ambitious change.
After World War Two social democracy became identified with
the welfare state, Neo Keynesian economics and full employment. The
1980s witnessed the loosening of the commitments of social democratic
political parties to the characteristic components of social democracy in
the 1960s. Social justice was refocussed from class based concerns to
individual concerns and those of the New Social Movements.

Such

reorientation meant not only discarding the further development of
welfare state services, but also accepting tight budgetary restraints on
welfare policies and loosening commitment to full employment.
In the course of its history, social democracy has also witnessed a
change in its electorate: from "working class to the working class cum
the middle class to the working-class cum public employees and clients"
(Lindstrom 1991: 165). During the first of these transitions its relations
with the trade union movement did not change.

In the early 1990s,

however, the organisational relationship between these two parts of the
labour movement

was broken

and organised

labour s

privileged

representation in social democratic parties was challenged. Hence, social
democratic political parties now claim that they represent broader interests
than ever before.

77
The

changing nature of social democracy, brought by its

commitment to progressiveness, makes any precise definition difficult.
Bernstein was correct in his identification of social democracy as a
movement not a commitment to fixed "final goals". As a movement
social democracy is fluid. It is more about orientations and convictions
than a specific policy objective. Hence, it has always been difficult to
define social democracy. This problem has become more complicated in
the 1990s, because far reaching changes have changed the face of most
social democratic parties and particularly the electorally successful ones.
Due to its progressiveness and fluidity, it cannot be argued that social
democracy has ceased.

Instead, it has entered a new era and the

relevance of social democracy continues with new challenges and in part
a new constituency.
In the new era, the existence of social democracy can be seen by
comparing social democratic political parties with right-wing16 parties.
Numerous traditional elements still remain, however.

Wage earners

still constitute a higher proportion of the electorate of the social
democratic

parties although

their

electorate basis has

widened.

Furthermore, although formal ties between trade unions and social
democratic political parties have been broken, trade unions are generally
closer to social democratic political parties than to right-wing political
parties. In other words, trade unions still make a considerable impact on
social democratic parties. Nevertheless, an organisational tie with trade
unions is not necessarily a prerequisite for electoral success.

Social

democratic movements in southern Europe, especially the Spanish
social democrats, are examples of electoral success without relying on a
Scandinavian style trade union movement.

Therefore, despite the

claims of some post-industrialists, it cannot be argued that social

16 By Right-wing I refer to all right-wing political parties, including centre-right-wing
political parties.

democracy has ceased to have relevance. But it has moved to embrace
new political prospects. In the new era the social democratic ideology
has widened to become more inclusive than ever before.
In the 1990s, by moving sideways, social democracy has broadened
its scope. It now covers cultural, gender and environmental issues. It
cannot be claimed, however, that the adoption of these issues is un
problematic. All of such issues raise potential conflicts with long standing
concerns for full employment and budgetary restraints on welfare state
services. Despite the continuation of debates on these issues, there were
attempts to face them in the programmatic renewals starting in the 1980s.
Such issues have become important components of social democracy in
the 1990s. Because it has adopted itself to the new issues of the time, it
can be argued that social democracy has considerable relevance for the
1990s.
The superiority of social democracy to the other political positions
can be seen in its approach to human rights. The approach of social
democracy to human rights is wider than that of '’liberals” and
"collectivists”.

It protects both civil and political rights and social,

cultural and economic rights.

Such an approach is particularly

significant in developing countries, including Turkiye and Spain,
because both ranges of human rights need protection and development.
In these countries social democrats currently fight for civil and political
rights as an immediate goal. However, because the social democratic
conception of social justice is inclusive and inter-dependent, social
democrats in developing countries need to struggle for the whole range
of human rights.
The three theorists of social democracy studied represent the
social democracy of their time.
considerably.

Bernstein,

Their arguments and concerns differ

the most influential

theorist

of social

democracy in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, focused on updating
the socialist programmes influenced by Marx and Marxism. While still
considering himself as a Marxist, Bernstein approached social democracy
as a movement rather than as a final goal. Bernstein’s "post-Marxism"
was critical in reorienting social democracy toward redistributive
reformist rather than revolutionary policies. Crosland, the prominent
theorist of the golden years of social democracy, took redistribution a
stage further by arguing for the welfare state, Neo- Keynesian economics
and full employment.

He also questioned whether further national

isation would contribute to realising social democratic goals.

Holland,

on the other hand, reflected on the limitations of Neo Keynesianism in
a world dominated by giant multi -national corporations.

He stressed

limited nationalisation and economic planning as ways to resolve
the situation.

Holland's programme is implausible in a world domi

nated by powerful and volatile financial markets which can ruin a
currency of a major country in a few days and by fluid capital
transfers wrought by new technologies.

While Holland's program is

not able to be implemented against the forces of Globalism his analysis
of the basic problems of developing countries is still valuable.

The

problems identified by Holland are particularly apposite for Turkiye and
Spain.
However,

Esping-Anderson's

argument

that

"the

issue

of

whether social democracy will produce a transition from capitalism to
socialism may soon lose its relevance" (Esping-Anderson 1992: 204)
needs to be taken seriously. Social democracy now finds itself in the
position of at best defending the current level of the welfare state or in
some countries finding alternatives rather than achieving socialism.
It cannot be argued, however, that social democracy has ceased to
have relevance. It can be argued that it has entered a new era in the
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1990s. In the new era the key components of the social democracy of the
1960s have been replaced by concerns which are broader and more diffuse
in the affluent countries of Scandinavia, northern Europe and Australia.
These developments reflect the influence of New Social Movements,
new technologies and the pressures of globalism.

The relevance of

social democracy in the 1990s, for less developed countries, such as Spain
and Turkiye, is perhaps more significant, because these countries have a
social division of labour, electoral constituencies and an economic basis
in older manufacturing industries which are similar to the conditions of
the 1950s and 1960s in other parts of Europe. In its approach to human
rights,

social

democracy focuses on

both

social

and

economic

developments of these countries. However, to achieve a parliamentary
road to reforming the social and economic structure of a country, there
needs to be a democratic political system which is developed to a degree
which is "good en ou g h " to allow for comprehensive reform.

In other

words, Spain and Turkiye should have a democratic state which will
allow social democracy to come to power through the parliamentary
process. My analysis of the parliamentary systems of Spain and Turkiye
is the theme of the next chapter.

81

CHAPTER TWO

CONTEMPORARY POLITICS IN SPAIN AND TURKIYE
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Introduction

Spain and Turkiye have experienced authoritarian regimes in
their recent history.

Their parliamentary systems may, therefore, be

questioned as to whether they have developed well enough for social
democracy to work.

In this chapter, I argue that the parliamentary

systems in both countries have developed since the last takeover of
office by civilian politicians to a level which can sustain social
democratic politics. The role and power of important institutions, such
as head of state, trade unions, elections and armed forces are analysed.
Special attention is also given to the nature of political parties, especially
social democratic parties, and the structure of the party system. I shall
argue that social democratic parties are crucial components of democratic
regimes, no less so in Spain and Turkiye than in northern or western
Europe.

Political Institutions in Spain and Turkiye

Politics in Spain and Turkiye, two of the lesser developed
countries in Europe, has changed rapidly in recent years. In the last two
decades, they have experienced and rejected authoritarian governments
and made new constitutions to defend representative democracy. In the
aftermath of the authoritarian regimes in both countries, Spain's
constitution appears to be stable, while Turkiye has not yet developed a
level of constitutionalism and constitution which can provide a fully
convincing framework for democracy. In Turkiye basic disputes remain
over the essential characteristics of the State, such as its constitutional
guarantees of political and civil rights, the meaning of secularism, the
electoral system and role of the President of Republic.
The Spanish head of the State is the King who performs the role
of the head of state in the Spanish parliamentary system. The role and
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power of the Turkish President suits many of the requirements of the
parliamentary system, even though (s)he has more power than many
counterparts, but less than the French President. The Turkish head of
state, the President of Republic (Cum hurbaskani), is empowered by the
1982 Constitution.
The Turkish electoral system is subject to constant change and
almost always changes before every national election1 and I shall discuss
below whether electoral systems have effects on the nature of the Party
system. It is a salient fact, however, that the party systems in Spain and
Turkiye are unstable to some degree.

While both countries have a

multi-party system, the party system of Turkiye is more fragmented than
that of Spain, which often means that a governing coalition has to be
formed. In Turkiye all the major parties attract around 20 per cent of
votes cast in general elections at the national level. In contrast, in Spain
two major political parties dominate national elections.

I shall argue

that the party system of Turkiye is a typical example of a multi-party
system, with no party , able to win majority in the TBMM. In contrast
the Spanish system is basically a two party system in the way it functions.
One of the successes of civilian politics in both countries has been
the containment and the stability in the role and power of the army in
the everyday government and politics of these countries. In Spain the
army was controlled

by the

1981 demonstrations

against army

intervention. While in Turkiye the army has a presence in the political
arena by means of Milli Guvenlik Kurulu (MGK/ National Security
Council), the army has avoided peremptory action. On the other hand,
trade unions in both countries do not have as much power as the
respective armies, although they have gained strength in recent years.
1 After I wrote this chapter, the Turkish electoral system changed again before the
December 1995 General elections. Changes have been added to the essay.

84

In terms of organisation and financial support, trade unions in both
countries are weak. And there have been restrictions on trade union
activities, some of which still remain.

Head of State

The Spanish State, as indicated in the Constitution Article 1.3, is
described as a parliamentary monarchy' (Donaghy & Newton 1987:27).
As Newton and Donaghy argue, however, "it is not correct to talk of a
monarchical state". This is because "national sovereignty resides in the
Spanish people from whom all powers of the State derive

(A.1.2)"

(Donaghy & Newton 1987: 27). Therefore, the Spanish state is "a social
and democratic state based on the rule of law (A. 1.1)" (Donaghy &
Newton 1987:27).
If it is not "correct" to regard Spain as a monarchical state, the
question arises as to 'what is the role and functions of the monarch, ...(at
present) ... the King?' The role and power of the Spanish King is largely
symbolic, like those of other parliamentary monarchies, because "the
monarch has no power outside the Constitution" (Donaghy & Newton
1987:28; Arango 1985:126). The Constitution grants the monarch no
functions which confer any independent

decision-making powers

within the judicial, executive or legislative institutions of the State. A
significant constitutional device which limits the monarchy is "the use
of endorsement

(refrendo)."

Under this mechanism

"no official

document is issued solely with the signature of the King."

All

documents need to be countersigned either by the Prime Minister or a
relevant minister

Recommending and appointing the premier or the

dissolution of the Cortes, requires "an endorsement by the president of
the Cortes" (A. 64a). Hence:
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.. In a sense it is the King who is countersigning or endorsing
the document and the others referred to who exercise the real
power... In fact the referendum is a kind of monarchical
privilege as well as a limitation on his power. Since the
Constitution states that 'those who endorse the acts of the King
are responsible for them' the King is absolved of all
responsibility for them (Donaghy & Newton 1987:31-32).

As indicated in the first article of the 1982 Constitution, Turkiye is
a Republic. The head of state and the nation is the Cum hurbaskani2 (the
President of the Republic). The Cumhurbaskani is elected by the Turkiye
Buyuk Millet Meclisi (TBMM/ the Turkish Grand National Assembly)
for a seven year term. He is the "representative of the Turkish Republic
and of the unity of Turkish nation (A.104)" (Ozbudun 1988:37). When
the role and power of the executive was increased, "the Constitution
transformed the Presidency from a largely symbolic and ceremonial
office, as it was under the 1961 Constitution, into an active and powerful
one, with important political and appointive functions" (Ozbudun
1988:37).
If we compare the Cumhurbaskani
Cumhurbaskani

with the Spanish King, the

is more powerful than the monarch.

The Turkish

President has legislative power to summon a session of the TBMM if he
considers it necessary and can "return laws to the Assembly for
reconsideration."

The President is empowered to submit prospective

constitutional amendments "to popular referenda".
seek the "annulment

Moreover, he can

of laws, law-amending ordinances, and the

Standing Orders of the Assembly" by appeal to the Constitutional Court
on "grounds of unconstitutionally".
As executive functions, the Cum hurbaskani can call the
meeting of the MGK and preside over it, can proclaim martial
2 In Turkish 'Cumhur' is shortened of 'Cumhuriyet' which means republic; T>askan
means president.
" c
•' .
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law or a state of emergency in collaboration with the Council
of Ministers, can appoint the chairman and the members of
the State Supervisory Council and instruct it to carry out
investigations and inspections, can appoint the members of
the Board of Higher Education and can appoint university
rectors. As judicial functions, the Cumhurbaskani can appoint
the members of the Constitutional Court and the other high
courts (Ozbudun 1988:39).

As Ozbudun has argued, while such powers seem formidable they are
really "more formal than substantive".

The Cumhurbaskani may use

them only after they have been proposed or another body has taken
"prior action". A significant number of such powers require the Prime
Minister and concerned ministers to act. The ministers thereby assume
political responsibility for such actions. In some areas, as mentioned above,
however, the Cumhurbaskani is able to act independently, with-out
concurrence from the PM or cabinet ministers (Ozbudun 1988:39-40).
As a cardinal principle of the parliamentary system of
government, the Cumhurbaskani is not, as a rule, authorised
to act alone in executive matters (A.105) (Ozbudun 1988:38).

Hence, all presidential decrees require countersigning by the PM and
concerned ministers , who therefore take political responsibility for their
actions.

The President is thus constrained by considerations of

legitimacy as the Cum hurbaskani bears no political responsibility for
actions connected with his office (Ozbudun 1988:40).

Electoral System

Although the election systems in Spain and especially Turkiye
have changed frequently, their systems contain the basic characteristics
of a representative democratic electoral system.

As with other

democratic countries, changes in the elections system have been made to
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favour major parties. There are no restrictions to universal suffrage in
both countries. The value of votes is equal.
In Spain between 300 and 400 deputies are envisaged by the
Constitution.

They are elected by "universal, free, equal* , direct and

secret suffrage" or the "traditional principles" of a democratic system.
The Spanish system maintains an electoral system based on corrected
proportional voting. The system favours the party with the most votes
in each constituency.

Constituencies are based on administrative

provincec (Gunther, Sani and Shabad 1986:44-53). Thus:
It is a system of closed, blocked lists which in practice
contradicts the intention of free suffrage, although doctrine
also presents arguments against open lists. In order to
prevent political atomisation and favour parliamentary
rationalisation, parties or coalitions which do not reach the
threshold of 3 % of the votes lack parliamentary
representation. (Powel 1991:132-3).

There are two types of senators who represent regional and
provincial constituencies. Regional Senators are elected by an Assembly
of each region "on the basis of one per region and one per million
inhabitants or fraction over 500,000". Provincial Senators are elected on
the basis of four per province" (Powel 1991:133)

-

In Turkiye after the 1982 Constitution, the electoral system
changed to favour major parties by reducing the number of parties and
thereby prevent coalition governments.

The number

of parties,

however, has not reduced, on the contrary it has increased. In addition
to proportional representation, country-wide and electoral district quotas
have been added to the system. The national quota is 10 per cent of the
total valid votes cast in general elections.

To win seats in the

parliament, a party needs to garner at least 10 per cent of the country

* By I equal vote I meant that each citizen has one vote at every election.
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wide votes cast. If a party is unable to gain 10 per cent of the national
vote, even if it were to gain 100 per cent of votes cast in a constituency, it
could be disqualified.
The second quota was the constituency quota. It required at least
20 per cent of the votes cast in the constituency.

The second quota

(found by dividing the total votes by the total number of seats plus one)
was applied in each constituency. The quota never dropped under 20 per
cent. To win seats in a constituency, a party had first to pass the country
wide quota and then the constituency quota. If only one party passed the
constituency quota, it automatically won all seats in that constituency.
Independent candidates must also pass the constituency quota (Finkel
1990). The constituency quota was abrogated before the December 1995
general elections. There is now only the country-wide quota in Turkiye
Each electoral constituency in Turkiye is based on the administrative
provinces. Before the changes of 1995, if a constituency contained more
than seven seats, it was divided into appropriate constituencies.

For

example,

the

Istanbul

was

divided

into

7 constituencies.

In

constituencies which contain 7 seats, one seat was made a 'contingent
member' which was won by the party which garnered the most votes in
that constituency. Now each administrative province is also an electoral
constituency, except Ankara, Istanbul and Izmir. They are divided into
2, 3 and 2 electoral constituencies respectively.
Regular elections have been held both in Spain and Turkiye, since
the takeover of power by civilian politicians. More importantly, as a
result of these elections a change of office has occurred in both countries.
In Spain, the 1977 and 1979 general elections were won by Union de
Centro Democratico (UCD/ Union of the Democratic Centre Party)
which originated from the Franco regime.

The winner of the 1982

general elections was Partido Socialista Obraro Espanol (PSOE/ Spanish
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Socialist Workers'

Party) the social democrats, and they formed

government after the elections.
Table-II/1
Parties in government, aftermath of authoritarian regimes
Spain
Turkiye
elections
parties
elections
parties
1977
UCD
1983
ANAP
1979
UCD
1987
ANAP
1982
PSOE
1991
SHP/CHP +
DYP
1986
PSOE
1995
DYP + RP
1989
PSOE
1993
PSOE
1996
PP
The social democrats then won four consecutive elections, 1986, 1989
and 1989 and remained in government until the March 1996 general
election. In 1996 Partido Popular (PP/ Popular Party or People's Party),
the right-wing, formed a coalition government with Catalan and Basque
nationalists after taking first place in the 1996 general elections.
Regular elections have been held in Turkiye as well. After the
Coup d'etat of 1980, the first general election was held in 1983. Anavatan
Partisi (ANAP/ Motherland Party), the conservative party, won a
majority, despite the Army3/s explicit endorsement of the Milliyetci
Demokrat Partisi (MDP/ Nationalist Democratic Party), which was
headed by a retired-general, Turgut Sunalp.

The ANAP also won a

majority in the next general elections held in 1987. No party could win a
majority in the 1991 general election, thus the era of coalition
governments returned to Turkiye despite the efforts made to stop this
from happening.

Such efforts were based on the argument that

coalitions cause instability in the decision making process. In 19913

3 Despite the open support of the high ranking generals for the MDP, the loss of the
MDP at the 1983 general election can be considered as the refusal of the Army.
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Dogru Yol Partisi (DYP/ True Path Party), conservative party, and Sosyal
Demokrat

Halkci

Parti/Cumhuriyet

Halk

Partisi

(SHP/

Social

Democratic Populist Party; CHP4/ Republican People's Party), centre-Left,
formed a coalition government.

In 1995 again no party could win a

majority and a coalition government5 was formed by Refah Partisi (RP/
Welfare Party/ WP), pro-Islamists, and the DYP. It is now evident that
since the last military regime the operation of electoral system works
well. The change of governments occurs according to election results, as
regular elections have been held according to the constitution. The
success of the electoral system has broader implications

for the

development of the parliamentary system and electoral politics.

Party System
The Spanish Party system has a unique feature in that regional
parties are important and influential in determining which one of the
national parties will govern Spain. The Spanish party system is a multi
party system, even though two parties, PSOE and PP, can gain the
majority or become the first party. Graphs from the latest election show
that minor parties are in the position to exercise considerable power in
the Cortes by holding 58 of 350 seats.

In the future Spain may be

governed by coalition governments which will be dominated by regional
parties, such as Convergencia i Union (CiU/ the Convergence and
Union Party) and Partido Nacionalista Vasca (PNV/ Basque Nationalist
Party) (Camera, 1991:138). After the March 1996 General election, the PP

4 The heirs of these two parties, DYP and SHP, were major parties, AP and RPP, before
the 1980 Coup d 'etat. The DYP is the heir of the JP, Justice Party. The leader of the
DYP, Suleyman Demirel -currently President of the Republic, had been the leader of the
JP as well. The SHP is the heir of the CHP, but the SH Fs leader was Erdal Inonu, who
is son of Ismet Inonu who was colleague of Ataturk and who served until early 1970s as
the leader of the CHP. The CHP's leader before the Coup d'etat of 1980 was Bulent
Ecevit who is currently the leader of the DSP.
5 Before the coalition government formed by DYP and RP, the two conservative parties,
the ANAP and DYP, formed a coalition government, but it had lasted in three moths.
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which is a conservative party established government with the Catalans
and Basques.

Table-II/2
Total Poll of Left and Right Wing Political Parties
Left Wing
Right Wing
1982
52.5
33.2
48.7
1986
26.0
1989
48.6
23.8
1993
48.4
34.8
1996
48.1
38.00
(Compiled from El Pais March 5 1996, p.25)

In the Spanish party system after the democratic transition it is
seen on a national level that Left wing parties have dominated politics;
Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol (PSOE/ Spanish Socialist Workers'
Party) and Izguierda Unida (IU/ United Left Party).
The

Turkish

intervention.

party system changed after the

1980 Army

Since the 1983 general election, while new parties

emerged, such as the ANAP, the strength of the old parties was reduced.
Electoral support for parties was volatile, however, and the total support
for Left parties decreased. As indicated in the above graphs and latest
opinion surveys, the Turkish party system is dominated by the centreright parties; even the main opposition party is another centre-right
party, the ANAP.
There is no doubt that the Turkish party system is a multi-party
system. In the December 1995 General election, (shown in table 11/10
below) no party could gain a majority in the TBMM. Despite a very high
national quota, there are five parties in the TBMM. Among the parties
which were unable to pass the national quota in the 1995 General
Election, the Milliyetci Hareket Partisi (MHP/ Nationalist Action Party)
polled 8.18 per cent and the Halkin Demokrasi Partisi (HADEP/ People s
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Democracy Party) polled 4.17 per cent. However, the combined seats of
the two main parties did not give them a majority in parliament. As the
two parties fell short of the required seats to establish coalition
government, a minority government was established by the two centreconservative parties, the ANAP and DYP; after a period of negotiation
which took two months (for further details of the December 1995
General election see table 11/10).
Since the 1980 military intervention Turkish politics has been
dominated by Right wing parties. Among the parties, Cumhuriyet Halk
Partisi (CHP) and Demokratik Sol Parti (DSP) are centre-left parties,
Halkin Demokrasi Partisi (HADEP) is Kurdish nationalist but also
socialist. Their total support was 29.56 per cent in 1995. On the other
hand, all other parties are Right wing parties. While Dogru Yol Partisi
(DYP) led by Tansu Ciller, the first woman prime minister of Turkiye,
and Anavatan Partisi

(ANAP) led by Mesut Yilmaz is center

conservative parties, Refah Partisi (RP) is a religious party and the
Milliyetci Hareket Partisi (MHP) is a nationalist party. The Right wing
gained 68.35 per cent of the total vote in 1995. As indicated in the above
graphs, current parliamentary politics in Turkiye is strongly dominated
by Right wing parties.

-

The Military and Politics

Both Spain and Turkiye have had authoritarian regimes in their
recent histories. In Turkiye it lasted three years to 1983, while in Spain
authoritarianism lasted from the end of the Spanish Civil War in the
1930s until it gradually ended in 1977.
Turkiye has experienced armed forces intervention three times
after the establishment of the Republic (Pevsner 1984:26-84). The first
was carried out by the young lieutenants in 1960.

After a new
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constitution was written in 1961, general elections were held and they
returned to their barracks. The 1980 intervention was carried out by the
high ranking generals. They dissolved both parliament and the political
parties. A new constitution was written in 1982 and once more they
returned to their barracks. These two were direct interventions. There
was also an indirect intervention in 1971.

The Army forced the

parliament to make amendments to the Constitution and establish a
cabinet comprised of people from both inside and outside of the
Parliament.
The return of the armed forces to their barracks after the 1980
intervention does not mean the Army completely left politics to civilian
politicians.

The Generals made Milli Guvenlik Konseyi (MGK/the

National Security Council) a constitutional institution that can affect
governments. The MGK is a significant force in politics which plays an
important

role in

making

crucial decisions, especially decisions

regarding security.
In Spain after the death of Franco, the Army gradually retreated
from politics to a certain degree (Carr 1987:9).

Donaghy and Newton

argue that, between 1976 and 1978, with the constant threat of political
instability and economic crisis, Spain was able to make considerable
progress in establishing new democratic institutions "based on the twin
principles of modernisation and decentralisation" (Donaghy & Newton
1987:5). They argue that the Moncloa Pact (pactos de la Moncloa) of 1978
was an important sign of co-operation in economic matters by the major
political parties who were "all signatories to the agreement". With both
inflation and unemployment reaching over 20 per cent, the economic
situation deteriorated badly between 1976 and 1981. Instability was made
worse by escalating Basque-inspired terrorism.

The "euphoria

which

accompanied the restoration of democracy dissipated into disillusion.
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Reactionary generals thus gained ammunition to indulge in sabrerattling and more importantly the attempted coup of 23 February 1981.
The

coup brought matters

to a head and the

disillusionment

characteristic of the years 1978-81 dissipated rapidly. Broad based sectors
of the population demonstrated in favour of democracy and the new
Constitution. Moreover:
A further healthy sign was the level of moderation and
willingness to compromise shown by the major political
parties and the trade unions, the members of which showed
considerable restraint in sacrificing personal and sectoral
advancement in the interests of the consolidation of
democracy (Donaghy & Newton 1987:6).

It can thus be argued that due to the 1981 demonstrations against the
coup attempt (Carr 1987:7), the military threat to democracy disappeared
in Spain (Graham 1984:206-209).
In the Republic of Turkiye the armed forces not only have
considerable power due to the constitution but, as explained below, it is
unlikely that the people would resist in any coordinated or organised
fashion. The Army has the strength of the MGK which is "composed of
the chief of general staff and the force commanders meeting with the PM
and ministers of defence, the interior, and foreign affairs under the
chairmanship of the President of Republic" (Harris 1988:183). The MGK
can affect civil governments, because "decisions of the MGK are to be
given priority consideration by the Council of Ministers"

(Harris

1988:194) as a constitutional obligation.
The most significant question is whether the Army in Turkiye
will intervene in the future?

It is most likely that any military

intervention would be dependent on what conditions might arise.

If

there is a deadlock in the decision making bodies the armed forces are
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likely to intervene. Although some people and organisations, such as
trade unions

and human

intervention,

broad

based

rights groups, would be against the
resistance

against

possible

military

intervention on the scale which happened in Spain in 1981 is unlikely.
There were no public demonstrations against the interventions in 1961,
1971-3 or 1980. In contrast, if we look at the referendum for the 1982
Constitution, we can argue that the armed forces found support with the
people. The question arises as to why the people in Turkiye have been
unwilling to resist interventions from the armed forces? To answer
this question the role of the armed forces in the history of modern
Turkiye requires special examination.
The armed forces had a significant role in the development of the
current political system. The constitutional movement in the Ottoman
Empire was started by a group of soldiers. Both the declaration of the
1878 Constitution, its re- declaration in 1908 and amendments in 1909 as
a parliamentary monarchy were made by the modernisers in the
military.

Moreover, the establishment of the modern-secular Turkiye

was a product of the Army corps commanders, such as M.K. Ataturk and
I. Inonu.
Analysis of the 1960 intervention by young officers shows that it
maintained the progressive characteristics of the Army by further
developing parliamentary democracy in Turkiye. The 1961 Constitution
contributed to the development of democracy (Pevsner 1984:31-34), by
protecting human rights and the development of the trade union
movement.

However, both the 1971 and 1980 interventions reversed

the progressive characteristic of the Army, because the 1971 amendments
to

the

1961

Constitution

and

the

1982

Constitution

brought

comprehensive restrictions on both democratic institutions and cultural
and political rights.
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Another characteristic of the Army in Turkiye is that despite the
three interventions in recent history they have never intended to
establish a dictatorship.

The longest intervention lasted three years.

Furthermore, the removal of the Army from office did not happen as a
result of a decision by civilian forces. After each intervention the military
returned to their barracks of their own will.

When the military took

Government they claimed that after public life had been put in order
they would leave the government to the civilians.

And they did

(Pevsner 1984:85). This may be one of the main reason why there were
no public demonstrations against army interventions in the past.
The question arises whether there will be another coup d'etat in
Turkiye in the future? It can be argued that there will not be another
Junta as the conditions which led to the interventions in I960, 1971 and
1980 are no longer present: because the three coup d'etats were due to
the underdevelopment of democratic institutions.
could

not

interventions.

overcome

the

Turkiye

problems

now

has

that
more

The institutions

occurred
developed

before

the

democratic

institutions and the institutions may overcome the problems that have
led to interventions in the. past (Mango 1994:30). There is no longer a
strong ideological division between major political parties that may lead
to a deadlock in the decision-making process. Since the general elections
in 1991 Turkiye has been run by coalition governments without major
ideological disputes between coalition partners.

The two coalition

partners of the 1991-1995 office term had been the major rivals before the
1980 Junta: the DYP (conservative) and SHP/CHP (center-left) formed a
coalition. The DYP and RP (pro-Islamists) formed a coalition after the
1995 general elections.
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While it cannot be argued that intervention from the armed
forces and the subsequent constitutional reforms have brought political
stability to Turkiye, they have brought about a political "stand off."
Military intervention has brought further fragmentation6 in the party
system and in turn coalition governments. The democratic institutions
and a number of aspects of civil society are more developed and stronger
than before, especially the mass media. With around 20 country-wide
TV channels and 10 newspapers the Media are incomparably more
influential than before.

The process of integration of Turkiye to the

European Union is another reason to expect a declining possibility of
future interventions.
The most likely cause for a future intervention would be any
challenge to secularism.

The main threats to secularism are analysed

below. These threats are mainly constituted by forces, such as the Alevi
sect followers. On the other hand left and liberal movements and other
civilian organisation, such as lawyers7 and doctors' organisations, have
the capacity to stop the overthrow of secularism through parliamentary
process.

More importantly, the RP (the pro-Islamist) and the party

currently in government has chosen parliamentary means to establish
an Islamic order. It is difficult for the RP to win a majority without
making a concession to secularism.

Turkiye has also expressed its

ambition to join the European Union, an ambition which can only be
realised if it remains secular.

With such forces in mind there are

6- This point is put clearly later in the political parties part of this chapter.
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considerable reasons to be optimistic that there will not be another junta
in Turkiye, as long as there is not a revolution for Ser'i Order1.

Trade Unions

In Spain laws relating to trade unions changed in 1977. Since then
the right to strike and collective bargaining has become free. The 1978
Constitution guaranteed the rights of trade unions and Employers'
associations under Article 7. The Article recognises the rights of unions
and employers' organisations to defend their legitimate interests within
the boundaries laid down by the Constitution and the law, provided that
they are democratically constituted and run.
The right to join a union is granted to all citizens other than
members of the armed forces (A.28.1) and members of the
judiciary (A. 127.1), and there is an equal right not to join a
union (A.28.1) (Donaghy & Newton 1987:180).

The major national trade union
General

de Trabajadora

(UGT/

the

confederations are Union
General

Workers'

Union),

Comisiones Obreras (CCOO /Workers Commissions) and Workers'
Syndicalist Union (USO). The first two are entitled to be called 'the most
representative unions78’ which have obtained 10 per cent or more of the
total number of delegates or members of works' committees.
Perez-Diaz argues that trade unions in Spain took a very
significant part in the democratic transformation of the mid-1970s
(Perez-Diaz 1993:209). Donaghy and Newton argue that

7 Ser'i Order is the system which is run according to Islamic rules.
8 "These unions are automatically entitled to become part of negotiating committee£for
collective agreements above the level of the single company and to nominate
representatives to the boards of public bodies" (Donaghy & Newton 1987:184).
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Despite the lack of formal consultative machinery and lack of
cohesion in the trade union movement, it has been possible
for the government, management and labour to come
together and agree programs of joint action. This degree of
partnership has doubtless been encouraged by severe
economic problems faced by Spain and by awareness of the
political danger inherent in disrupting Spain's new
democracy. In general the attitude of the unions has made a
positive contribution towards overcoming some of these
difficulties and towards preparing the Spanish economy for
harmonisation with the EEC (Donaghy & Newton 1987:193).

In Turkiye the establishment of trade unions goes back to the
1950s. After World War Two with the establishment of a multi-party
system, the formation of trade unions was made free. The golden years
of the trade union movement, however, were in the late 1960s and
1970s. The unions were very active in this period of politics. But the
1971 intervention saw the influence of unions reduced. The process of
curbing union powers was completed in the 1980 military intervention.
Devrimci Isci Sendikalari (DISK/ Confederation of Revolutionary
Workers Syndicate) was banned and the trade union movement went
into deep recession. Under the restored democratic and parliamentary
structures of the 1980s there are now three trade union confederations.
Turkiye Isci Sendikalari Konfederasyonu (TURK-IS/ Confederation of
Turkish Workers' Syndicate) is the biggest trade union confederation.
The ban on the DISK (socialist) was removed.

HAK-IS is a right wing

trade union.
The 1990s has become a new era for the trade union movement in
Turkiye. Despite legal restrictions on the establishment of trade unions
many have emerged. However, they do not have a bargaining rights. In
Turkiye formal links between unions and political parties have been
strictly banned. It is, however, difficult to argue that the trade unions
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may affect the national policies. They have always been kept out of the
decision making process.
In summary it can be seen from above that the political system of
Spain has been stable since the democratic transformation of the mid1970s. The Spanish King has the role of parliamentary monarch.

He

does not have political responsibility for his duties as head of state.
Political responsibility is taken by elected politicians

who

must

countersign any action by the Head of State. The basis of power in the
Spanish state is the Spanish people, not the Spanish monarch.
Although the Turkish President is empowered independently, the
President is still a parliamentary head of state.

He is very much

involved in daily politics, especially in the appointment of members of
the high courts and in times of emergency.
The election systems of both Spain and Turkiye contain universal
democratic principles. Both countries use a proportional representation
system which favours major parties. Despite attempts to limit minority
parties in Turkiye, the election system still does not satisfy the major
parties. Before almost every general election in Turkiye, the electoral
system has been amended. The expectation that the election system may
affect the party system by enhancing the power of major parties has not
been fulfilled.

In contrast the number of parties has increased.

As

exlplained below, this may be because of the régionalisation of political
parties. The Turkish party system has become a typical example of a
multi-party system. On present trends, it looks as if none of the present
parties will be able to gain a majority in parliamentary elections. The
centre-right and far right-wing political parties dominate politics. The
performances of Left wing political parties since the 1980 intervention
have decreased.

The centre-left parties, the CHP and DSP share the

traditional 35 per cent gained by the left in most polls.
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The Spanish party system is a multi-party system as well. As in
Turkiye, new parties have emerged in Spain and old parties joined
together. After the democratic transformation of the mid-1970s regional
parties have become effective in national politics. The party system is
divided between the right and left wing. The left wing political parties,
PSOE and IU, dominate Spanish politics.
The electoral systems and party systems in both countries are still
in a period of transition. As a result in Spain and especially Turkiye the
stability of the party system is open to question.
Intervention by the armed forces is now very unlikely in Spain
and the power of the army in daily politics has significantly reduced. In
Turkiye although intervention in the future is possible, the democratic
institutions

have

developed

enough

to

hinder

intervention, making further major interventions

possible

future

less likely.

In

Turkiye there has been no substantive formal restructuring to reduce the
power of the Army and to prevent possible future intervention.

No

government has yet been able to curtail the power of the Army which
retains significant power through the MGK which may even affect the
council of ministers.
As might be expected after a prolonged period of authoritarian
government, trade unions in Spain and Turkiye are still weak; their
organisations are loose. In Turkiye the suppression of trade unions has
been continued by civilian administrations.
affiliate

with

other

institutions,

such

They are not allowed to
as political

parties

and

international labour organisations, like the ILO. The last two military
interventions have greatly affected

trade unions.

Despite increased

militancy in the 1990s they still have not reached the power they had
before the 1980 military intervention.

In Spain, despite having weak

organisations, trade unions have an effect on the stabilisation of Spanish
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politics, as in forming the 1978 Constitution. In contrast to Turkiye there
have always been close links between the Spanish political parties and
the trade unions.

THE STRENGTH OF THE MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES9

In this section the strength of the major parties through both
regions and provinces will be analysed. I shall argue that in Spain the
strength of the PSOE has remained relatively constant especially in
relation to the PP. The source of the improved performance of the PP in
the last election is a transfer of votes from "other10 parties. I also find
that both regional identification and tradition play a very important
role in the determination of voting behaviour.
In Turkiye, on the other hand, the fragmentation of the party
system continued in the 1995 general election.

In the last general

election it became clearer that a régionalisation of politics occurred. This
is very obvious for the case of the Halkin Demokrasi Partisi (HADEP).
Refah Partisi (RP/ Welfare Party) is not merely a phenomenon of the
1990s, but its roots go back to the rapidly changing socio-economic
conditions

of the

mid-1960s and concurrently

the

very

strong

propagation of Islam. With the intensification of these socio-economic
conditions in the 1990s, the RP has become the major party, despite
Turkiye's strong and lengthy commitment to the West.

The RP s

strength differs between the periphery and centre, and between urban
and rural areas: it is very strong in the rural sector and the periphery,
while it is still weak in the centre and urban areas, except in the shanty
9 There is another chapter called "Regions: Formation and Inequality" in aChapter three. In
that section I looked at the causes of division between regions, such as cultural, historical
and geographical; development process and development level of regions.
10 The category 'others' here is used to refer to all other parties both regional and
independent candidates. In the proceeding essay, I also use it as other than the three
country wide parties.
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towns in Istanbul and Ankara. I also argue that the performances of the
centre-left parties, the Demokratik Sol Parti (DSP) and Sosyal Demokrat
Halkci Party/Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (SHP/CHP), differ according to
region: while the DSP is stronger in the West and urban areas it is non
existent in the East and therefore I argue that it is not a country-wide
party; the SHP /CHP is strong in the provinces where the followers of
Alevi sect constitute a large number of left-wing voters. Internal party
problems include the lack of a charismatic leader, leadership contests
and its incapability to meet its election promises and satisfy supporters,
during its term in office. These issues have contributed to the failure of
the SHP /CHP in the 1990s.
Party strength for the purposes of this chapter is determined by the
number of votes that each party wins in recent national elections.
Therefore, as an indicator of strength, in Spain the ranking of parties in
each constituency is considered, while in Turkiye both ranking and the
performances of parties are considered. Analysis will be based on the
recent elections. For Spain I examine three elections: the 1993 and 1996
general elections and the last regional elections. For Turkiye only the
1995 general election will be used. However, before starting my analysis
of the strength of the major parties, I want to give an overview on the
state of major parties in the last decade.

Spain
In Spain the performances of the country-wide parties, the PSOE,
the IU and the PP, have improved significantly in the last decade. Their
share of total votes increased from 83.48 per cent in 1989 to 84.92 per cent
in 1993 and to 86.91 per cent in 1996. The performance of some regional
parties, such as CiU, PNV and HB, has been steady. As seen from tableH/3, the votes garnered by the category 'others' hayidramatically dropped.
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The decrease between 1989 and 1993 was 8.93 per cent and in the 1996
general election the decline was 4.74 per cent.
The disappearance of the CDS (centre-right party) was one of the
main reasons for the decrease in the performance of the category 'others'.
In 1989 the CDS polled 7.95 per cent of country-wide votes cast. After the
resignation of its charismatic leader Adolfo Suarez11, a former Prime
Minister, the party did not recover support. It polled 1.76 per cent in
1993 and in 1996 it totally disappeared. The disappearance of the CDS
benefited the PP with its young leader, Mario Anzar. The PP became the
only country wide centre-right party.
The disappearance of the CDS does not fully explain the increase
in votes for the PP, because that increase was more than the total votes
for the CDS. In the 1993 general elections the PP garnered 34.82 per cent
of country wide votes cast. The increase was 8.99 per cent in comparison
with the 1989 poll. In 1996 it garnered a further 4.03 per cent of votes and
became the major party in Spain. In other words, it gathered a further
2,915,491 votes in 1993 and a further 1,457,056 votes in 1996. Thus the
number of votes the PP garnered was more than the those of the CDS.
We must ask the question where do these votes come from? Has there
been a swing from the PSOE to the PP?
An examination of the number of votes of the PSOE in this period
shows that while the performance of the PSOE declined, such was
considerably less than the improved performance of the PP. Although
the percentage of votes gained by the PSOE in the poll decreased, as seen
from table-II/4, it significantly increased the total number of votes it
won. In 1993 its proportion decreased 0.81 per cent, while the number of
its votes increased 1,035,515. The same trend occurred in 1996 as well; it
11 Adolfo Suarez was Prime Minister and the
transformation to democracy.

leader of the

UCD during the
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garnered a further 168,427 votes but its proportion decreased 1.20 per
cent. It can not be argued that there was a swing from the PSOE to the PP
because the number of its votes did not decrease, but rather increased.
The question arises why the PSOE lost 16 seats in 1993 and 18 seats in
1996. Close examination of each constituency shows that the PSOE lost a
few thousands of votes in those constituencies where it lost seats.
However, even in these constituencies the loss of the PSOE was
significantly less than the gain of the PP. It therefore can not be argued
that there was a swing from the PSOE to the PP*. There was an expected
swing from the PSOE to Izguierda Unida (IU/ the United Left Party)
because the Socialists broke their relations with the UGT, their trade
union ally.
Table-II/3
Spain General Elections
P arty
Turnout
N a t io n a l
PSOE
PCE-IU
A P/PP
R eg io n a l
CiU

1977

1979

1982
78.£

1986

1989

1993
77.29

1996
78.06

29.27
9.38
8.33

30.49
10.74
5.96

48.4C
4.12
26.18

44.06
4.61
26.00

39.55
9.05
25.83

38.68
9.57
34.82

37.48
10.58
38.85

3.70

2.50

3.65

5.02

5.04

1.70

1.50
0.96

1.8S
1.0}

1.53
1.15
0.13
18.05

1.24
1.06
0.20
18.03

4.95
0.88
1.24
0.88
0.50
8.78

4.61
0.89
1.28
0.73
0.88
4.74

cc
PNV
HB
BNG
Others

(El Pais March 5 996, p.25 & Arango 1985:173)
As the PP, the Communists (the IU) recovered and improved
their performance. They polled as well as they did in the 1979 general
elections.

After the unification of communists under the IU they

doubled their votes and polled 9.05 per cent of country wide votes in
1989, In the same general election, as seen from table-II/3, the votes of
socialists decreased almost in the same proportion as the increase in the
* The PP may have also benefited from the increase of the turnout, which is 0.77 per cent.
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poll of the IU.

However, this can not be inferred as a swing from

socialists to communists because of the increase in the number of
socialist votes.

In 1993 the IU garnered a further 395,134 votes and

increased its proportion to 9.60 per cent.

In 1996 it polled a further

395,124 votes. The Communists, therefore, have 21 seats in the Cortes.
Table-II/4
The Votes of Major Parties in the Consecutive Elections
1989
1993
1996
votes
%
votes
%
votes
%
8,115,568
39.60
9,150,083
38.79
9,318,510
37.48

The
PSOE
The PP
5,285,972
25.80
The IU
1,858,588
9.13
The
1,617,716
7.95
CDS
Total
83.48
(El Pais March 5 1996, p.25)

8,201,463
2,253,722
414,740

34.77
9.60
1.76
84.92

9,658,519
2,629,846

38.85
10.58

86.91

The gains of both the PP and IU were not made at the expense of
the PSOE. The most likely source of their gain was the category 'others',
constituted by the CDS and regional parties. There was also an increase
in the turnout12. In 1996 the turnout was 78.06 per cent, while it was
77.29 per cent in 1993.
The improvement in the performances of country-wide political
parties cemented their growing dominance in the Spanish general
elections. It will be very difficult, however, for either the PP or PSOE to
win an absolute majority in the Cortes in the short term, unless the IU
or regional parties, such as the CiU and PNV and CC, lose votes. Due to
the steady performances of regional parties in the last decade this is not
likely to happen at least in the short term. Therefore, each of the major
parties will have to enter a coalition with some of these regional parties
to have a majority in the Cortes.

12 As we do not know the number of new voters, new voters are disregarded in this examination.

Map-1

jq 7

THE STRENGTH of MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES, 1993 GENERAL ELECTIONS
In terms of taking first place in each constituency

The PP
The PSOE
Regional parties,
the CiU&.thePNV

Map-2
THE STRENGTH of MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES, 1996 GENERAL ELECTIONS
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The performances of the major parties, the PSOE, the PP and the
IU, differ between regional elections and general elections. In the 1995
•
*13
regional elections , the total poll of the major parties was 77.8 per cent,
while it was 86.91 per cent in the 1996 general election.

Map-3
THE STRENGTH of MAJOR POLITICAL PARTIES, 1995 REGIONAL ELECTIONS13

13 It has to be mentioned that the 1995 regional elections did not include the regional
elections of Catalonia, Galicia, Euskadi and Andalucia. In Catalonia and the Euskadi
the regional parties dominate politics while in Andalucia and Galicia the PSOE and PP
dominate politics.
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The PSOE polled 31.10 per cent, in the 1995 regional elections, while its
share was 37.48 per cent in the 1996 general elections. The PP garnered
34.57 per cent in the regional elections, which was less than its poll in
the 1996 general elections. The proportion of seats won by the regional
parties was 9.14 per cent in the 1996 general elections, while it was 22.82
per cent in the 1995 regional elections. It is evident, therefore, that the
kind of election, whether regional or general, affects the electorate's
choice of political parties.

In other words, voters are more likely to

support regional parties in regional elections.
Although the performance of the country-wide parties has
improved, the importance of regional political parties has continued in
Spanish politics. Regional parties are needed as coalition partners by the
major parties. In 1993 and in 1996 neither of the country-wide parties
could win a majority in the Cortes. In the 1993 parliamentary term, the
PSOE established a minority government which was supported by the
CiU and PNV. The two regional parties had 17 and 5 seats respectively.
In 1996, they won 16 and 5 seats respectively and the PP relied on their
support to form a government.

The strength of these regional parties

along with the CC and BNG shows considerable stability. Therefore, in
Spain in forthcoming elections these regional parties will be needed -by
the two major parties as coalition partners.

The 1996 General Elections

Despite the loss of office,

considering the poor economic

circumstances of Spain in the 1990s, the performance of the PSOE in the
1996 general election was much better than many expectations.

Because

of the difficulties confronting the PSOE, Ignacio Sotelo argued that a
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share of 25 per cent of votes in the next elections would be a "loss
honourably gained (Prevost 1995:106). There were a number of reasons
for this argument, such as bad economic performance in early 1995,
corruption and a significant number of scandals, such as GAL (Anti
Terrorist Liberation Group). GAL was one of the most important reasons
for the Socialists defeat arising from the revelation that the government
had organised the assassination of suspected Basque terrorists in the
mid-1980s. This is known as the GAL affair. Some police officials were
imprisoned in December 1994 (Prevost 1995:100). Although the Socialist
leader Gonzalez continually denied that he had any information about
these assassinations, the image of the PSOE was badly damaged. More
importantly, as Prevost argues, corruption continued:
In Fall 1993 the Madrid based El Mundo newspaper published
a long list of property inside and outside of Spain allegedly
owned by Luis Roldan, the general director of the Civil
Guard. Mario Ruhio, head of the government run Bank of
Spain, was accused of having 'kickbacks in a scheme that
favoured the operation of Ibercop, another major Spanish
bank' (Prevost 1995:99)

Although the Socialists were in office for 14 years the unemployment
rate consistently stayed at the highest level for OECD countries.
Furthermore, when "in January 1995 Spanish peseta and the Madrid
Stock Market went into crisis", the PSOE's situation worsened (Prevost
1995:107).

Because of these problems, it was expected that the PSOE

would have polled less than 30 per cent which means that it would have
only won 120-130 seats in the Cortes in the 1996 general election. Due to
these expectations, it can be argued that the performance of the PSOE was
very good in the circumstances.

Ill

The strength of major political parties in regional areas (see map-1
and map-2) shows that the effects of regions on the electorate for the
selection of political parties is significant.

For example, the PSOE is

stronger than the PP in Andalucia and Extremadura. This is not because
these regions are industrialised regions in Spain. As will be analysed
below, in Andalucia, the contribution of industry to total civilian
employment of the region is 15.6 per cent, while in Extremadura it is 10.8
per cent.

In other words, in both regions the number of industrial

workers is less than those in the other regions. These regions are also
amongst the poorest regions in the country.

One hypothesis for the

support for socialists in these regions is that it is because of a lengthy
socialist tradition. Gillespie suggests that:
Andalucia, which together with Catalonia was a traditional
fiefdom of the anarcho-syndicalist^ and anarchists, then began
to gain greater representation in the party (PSOE). Andalucia
and Extremadura grew from 36 per cent of PSOE membership
in 1930 to 45 per cent in 1932, as rural workers joined the
UGT's new National Federation Land Workers (FNTT),
encouraged by improvements decreed by Largo Caballero as
Labour Minister in 1931-2. The FNTT increased in size from
36,639 members in June 1930 to 392,953 by June 1932, amidst
growing agrarian unrest (Gillespie 1989:32).

It can be inferred, therefore, that these two regions have traditionally
been socialist strongholds. The usual reliance on industrial workers has
been replaced by reliance on agrarian workers on whose strength these
regions became socialist strongholds .
Despite the strong presence of the PSOE in Andalucia, it lost votes
and in turn 5 seats. Although the PP improved its performance in the
1996 general elections, Andalucia is still a socialist stronghold. As can be
understood from the graphs below, the gain of the PP was considerably
more than the loss of the PSOE. While the PSOE lost 44,745 votes, the PP
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won a further 330,526 votes. In 1993, for example, in Almeria the PSOE
polled 10.6 per cent higher than the PP. The gap between their polls was
30 per cent in Sevilla, 17 per cent in Malaga and 15 per cent in Granada.
In the 1996 general election, on the other hand, the PP won further votes
and the gap between them dramatically decreased. The gap decreased to 3
per cent in Malaga, 6.21 per cent in Almeria. The PSOE still leads the PP
in Sevilla by 18.5 per cent, in Huelva by 19.0 per cent and in Cordoba by
11 per cent.
________________________________ Graph- II/l___________________
T h e perform ances o f parties, A ndalucía,
in c o m p ariso n w ith their 1993 & 1996 general performance
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(Compiled from El Pais Marc 5 1996, p.29)

An examination of the distribution of seats between political
parties shows that in the 1996 general election the greatest loss for the
PSOE was in Andalucia. It lost 5 seats, one of these was won by the IU
and the others were won by the PP. The PSOE has 32 of 62 seats of the
Autonomous Community of Andalucia in the Cortes, while the PP has
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24 seats and the IU has 6 seats. In regional elections, the PSOE again
leads the PP.

In the last regional election in 1994 the PSOE gained a

majority in the parliament of Andalucia.

Despite these losses for the

PSOE it can still be argued that Andalucia is a socialist stronghold and
that its strength is based on tradition.
In Extremadura, like in Andalucia, the performance of the PSOE
has been very good. It can be inferred from Gillespie's research that it is a
traditional socialist stronghold. This tradition is also based on agrarian
workers rather than industrial workers. The contribution of industry to
total civilian employment of the region in 1991 was 10.8 per cent, while
the contribution

of agriculture was 21.7 per cent.

The

average

contributions in 1991 were 22.9 per cent and 10.7 per cent respectively.
Although it is one of the least industrialised regions in Spain, it can be
seen from electoral maps that the performance of the PSOE was higher
than that of the PP in Extremadura. However, the PSOE's poll dropped
from 51.45 per cent in 1993 to 48.38 per cent in 1996 and it lost one seat.
The PP's poll, on the other hand, increased from 35.73 per cent in 1993 to
40.34 per cent in 1996. The PP has 5 of the 11 seats of the Autonomous
community of Extremadura in the Cortes.
An examination of each constituency makes it clear that the PSOE
still leads the PP in Extremadura. In the 1993 general elections the PSOE
led the PP in Caceres by 14 per cent, in Badajoz by 16 per cent. The gap
between them in the 1996 general election decreased to 5.63 per cent and
9.58 per cent respectively. On the other hand, examination of the
changes in the number of votes garnered by them shows that the loss for
the PSOE was considerably less than the gains for the PP. The loss of the
PSOE was 1,422 votes in Caceres and 3,862 votes in Badajoz, while the PP
gained

19,422 votes

and 23,987 votes

respectively.

In

these

114

constituencies the IU garnered a further 5,747 votes in Badajoz and 4,294
votes in Caceres.
Graph-H/2
The Performances of Major Parties, EXTREMADURA
1993 & 1996 General Elections

B Extremadural 993
□ Spain1993
H Extremadural 996
0 Spain'! 996

Others

Extremadura
Year
1993
1996

seat
4
5

PP
votes
238,191
281,600

seat
7
6

PSOE
votes
343,115
337,693

seats
11
11

total
votes cast
666,609
698,025

(Compiled from El Pais Marc 5 1996, p.34)

Therefore, it cannot be argued that the improved performance of both
the PP and IU was due to the poor performance of the PSOE. The poll
for the category 'others', however, reduced from 4.91 per cent in 1993 to
2.36 per cent in 1996. From the graphs above, it can be seen that there
was also an increase in the number of votes cast in 1996 which may be
because of new voters combined with higher turnouts.
In contrast to the strong presence of the PSOE in the two less
industrialised regions, Andalucia and Extremadura, in another less
industrialised region, Galicia, the PP is traditionally strong, as it is in
Castilla Y Leon. In the civil war both regions supported nationalists.
Franco himself was a Galician.

Gillespie suggests strong historical

reasons for this. Support for the Left as a whole has traditionally been
weak in the north-west, especially in Galicia and Leon which had been
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strong areas of support for Franco from 1936.

The socialist presence in

the region in the early 1940s was constituted mainly by guerrillas, a
number of Asturian origin. The rebels attempted to rally support for
their parties in the north-west, but were forced to withdraw in 1947.
Galicia has at times displayed a Socialist orientation but it has always
occurred as a result of outside initiatives.

Galicia has sent no

representatives to national party meetings and no cadres were sent to
work there. "Even as late as 1973, when Francisco Bustelo went there to
take up a post at the University of Santiago, the PSOE in the north-west
was Virtually non-existent" (Gillespie 1989:198-199).

It can thus be

inferred that Galicia and Castilla Y Leon are traditionally right wing
strongholds. The strength of tradition can be seen from the fact that the
class structures of both regions are not different from those of
Andalucia and Extremadura. With 30.2 per cent of the labour force
employed in agriculture in 1991, Galicia is one of the least industrialised
regions in Spain. It is also amongst the poorer regions.
Castilla Y Leon is a middle-ranking region. The contribution of
agriculture to total civilian employment of Castilla Y Leon is 18.3 per
cent, the third highest rate in Spain. It can, therefore, be argued that the
strength of major parties depends on traditional cultural factors rather
than on the class structure* of these regions.
Despite the improved performance of the PP in Galicia, from
47.07 per cent in 1993 to 48.52 per cent in 1996, it lost one seat.

The

performance of socialists in the last two general elections was less than
their country-wide average. In 1993 the PSOE polled 35.91 per cent of
votes cast in the region, while in 1996 it polled 32.97 per cent. Unlike in
other regions, the performance of the communists declined. In Galicia
the IU's poll decreased from 5.26 per cent in 1993 to 3.71 per cent in 1996.
* By class structure, I refer to the division of labour force between sectors.
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Graph-n/3

G alicia
Year
1993
1996

PP
seat
15
14

PSOE
seat
votes
10
569,899
9
548,144

votes
746,964
806,846

total
seats
votes cast
25
1,587,037
25
1,662,749

(Compiled from El Pais Marc 5 1996, p.33)

An

examination

of

the

performances

of

each

party

in

constituencies shows that the gap between the PSOE and PP doubled in
1996.

In 1993 the smallest gap between them was 7 per cent in La

Coruna, but it doubled in 1996. Although the PSOE garnered a further
2,107 votes, the gap between them increased to 21 per cent in the Lugo
province. In 1996 the gap was 16 per cent in Pontevedra and 14 per cent
in Orense. However, the PP lost one of its 15 seats that it won in 1993.
The PSOE lost one seat as well. These two seats were won by the BNG, a
regional party. Unlike the other regions, in Galicia the regional party
increased its votes and won two seats from the major parties.
As argued above, Castilla Y Leon, like Galicia, is a traditional
Right wing stronghold. The PP garnered a further 102,697 votes cast in
the region in 1996 and its proportion rose to 52.40 per cent.

Its

performance in the region was 13.55 per cent greater than its country
wide performance.
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G raph-n/4
The Performances of Major Parties, CASTILLA Y LEOls
1993 & 1996 General Elections
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Castilla Y Leon
Year
1993
1996

seat
20
22

PP
votes
771,705
874,402

PSOE
seat
votes
13
597,961
11
581,921

seats
33
33

total
votes cast
1,629,105
1,668,648

(Compiled from El Pais Marc 5 1996, p.30)

The PSOE, on the other hand, lost 16,040 votes and its proportion
decreased to 34.87 per cent which was less than its country-wide average.
Examination of their strength in constituencies shows the strength of
the PP in Castilla Y Leon. In Avilla, for example, the gap between the PSOE
and the PP was 20 per cent in 1993 and it increased to 28 per cent in 1996.
The smallest gap in 1993 was 4 per cent in the Leon province, but it
increased to 11 per cent in 1996. Although the PSOE won a further 4,846
votes in Valladolid and 815 votes in Segovia, the gap increased from 9
per cent to 13 per cent and from 16 per cent to 22 per cent respectively.
The PP also won further seats and has 22 of the 33 seats of Castilla Y Leon
in the Cortes. The PSOE, on the other hand, lost two seats and its seats
declined to 11. As in the general election, the PP also dominates regional
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elections.

In both regions, it has absolute majorities in the regional

parliaments.
Unlike the above mentioned regions, in the last general election,
the ranking between major parties changed in Castilla-La Mancha,
Aragon and Asturias. As Gillespie argues, Aragon used to be a socialist
stronghold: "In Aragon there was virtually no organised body of
Socialists outside Zaragoza, but in that city the PSOE had a relatively
durable organisation" (Gillespie 1989:199-200).
appears to be a significant factor.

Here class structure

The class structure of Aragon has

changed in the last decade. The contribution of the service sector to
civilian employment of the region increased from 41.3 per cent in 1980
to 53.3 per cent in 1991. The proportion of industrial workers, on the
other hand, declined, but at 25.5 per cent, is still higher than Spain's
average of 22.9 per cent. Despite an increase in its wealth in the 1990s, it
is not among the top five richest regions.
Although the PSOE lost two seats and first place in all three
constituencies of Aragon, there was no swing from the PSOE to the PP.
The PSOE slightly improved its performance in Aragon from 34.31 per
cent in 1993 to 34.50 per cent in 1996.

The improvement in the

performance of the PP is due to its coalition with the PAR, a regional
party, which polled 18.99 per cent in 1993 (El Pais March 5 1996, p. 29).
The performance of the coalition in 1996, 48.04 per cent, was less than
their total performance in 1993, 51.86 per cent, but this coalition cost the
PSOE two seats. The IU lost its seat as well. Therefore, in Aragon the PP
won a further 4 seats; one of these was PAR'S seat. The PSOE has 5 seats,
while the PP has 8 of the 13 seats of Aragon in the Cortes. It can not,
however, be argued that there was a swing to the PP. It was in fact due to
the coalition of the minor and regional parties of the Right.

The

performance of the PP in Aragon depends on its coalition with the PAR.
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If the coalition is not able to continue it will be possible for the PSOE to
win its seats back in the succeeding elections.
Graph-H/5
The Performances of Major Parties, ARAGON
1993 & 1996 General Elections
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(Compilée from El Pais Marc 5 1996, p.29)

However, notwithstanding these factors the performance of the PSOE in
Aragon was under its country-wide average.
Examination of the performances of major parties in provinces
supports my argument that there was no swing from the PSOE to the PP.
The PP led the PSOE by 8.37 per cent in Teruel, by 4.9 per cent in Huesca
and by 16.5 per cent in Zaragoza. On the other hand, examination of the
number of votes won by each political party shows that the PSOE lost 820
votes in Zaragoza, while it garnered a further 4,313 votes in Huesca and
1,061 votes in Teruel. As happened in Andalucia and Extremadura, the
increase of the poll of the PP was not due to the loss of the PSOE.
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Asturias has been a traditional socialist stronghold. As Gillespie
argues, however, "as was traditional in Asturias, the PSOE failed to
attract intellectuals.

The organised Socialists were pre-eminently

miners, and occasionally attempts were made from here to launch a
national mineworkers' union" (Gillespie 1989:195). Asturias is a mining
area and socialists found roots among mining workers.

Unlike in

Andalucia and Extremadura, in Asturias the strength of the PSOE is
based on industrial workers. The strength of the economy in the region
has not changed in the last decade, but the structure of employment has
changed. In the last decade, the contribution of the service sector to
civilian employment of the region increased from 36.6 per cent to 51.0
per cent in 1991. The decline of the contribution of industry was faster
than that of the average in Spain.

.

Graph-n/6
ASTURIAS,
Performances of Parties in 1993 and 1996 General Elections

45.00%
40.00%
35.00%
30.00%
25.00%

20 .00 %
15.00%

10. 00% 5.00% -

0 00
.

%

-

Others

Asturias
Year
1993
1996

PP
votes
258,355
294,811

PSOE
votes
271,877
282,337

total
votes cast
691,799
714,693

(Compiled from El Pais Marc 5 1996, p.30)

In Asturias although the PP took first place in the 1996 general
elections, the improved performance of the PP was not due to a
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declining performance from the PSOE. Both parties, especially the PP,
improved their performance. The PP garnered a further 36,456 votes,
while the PSOE a further 10,460 votes.

Both parties exceeded their

country-wide averages. Their polls were 41.25 per cent and 39.51 per
cent respectively. The IU garnered a further 5,017 votes, but its overall
proportion remained the same. The distribution of seats between parties
remained the same as in 1993. In 1996 8 seats of the Autonomous
Community of Asturias were shared between the PSOE and PP. The PP
won 21 of the total 45 seats, while the PSOE won 17 seats in the regional
parliament in the last regional election.
As in Aragon and Asturias, in Castilla-La Mancha the ranking of
parties changed in the 1996 general election. It is a bridge region between
the strongholds of the PSOE, Andalucia and Extremadura, and those of
the PP, Castilla Y Leon and Galicia.

The performance of the PP was

higher than that of the PSOE in the provinces which are close to Castilla
Y Leon, Guadalajara and Cuenca. In the 1996 general election, the PSOE
lost votes in all these provinces, except in Guadalajara. Like the above
regions, Castilla La Mancha is a less developed region in Spain. Unlike
in Andalucia and Extremadura, in Castilla La Mancha the GDP per capita
increased in the second half of the 1980s. The gap between Castilla La
Mancha and rich regions has reduced, but it still remains amongst the
poor regions.

The contribution of the service sector to civilian

employment of the region, 46.8 per cent, is the lowest in Spain.

The

contribution of the agriculture, 16.3 per cent, is above the average of 10.7
per cent. As in the above mentioned regions, therefore, it can be argued
that the strength of political parties in Castilla Mancha depends on
tradition rather than the class structure of the region.
In Castilla la Mancha, as in other regions, the loss of the PSOE
cannot explain the gain of the PP.
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Graph- 13/7
The Performances of Major Parties, Castilla La Mancha
1993 & 1996 General Elections
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(Compiled from E Pais Marc 5 1996, p.31)

Against the loss of a few thousand votes by the PSOE the PP won a
further ten thousand votes. The PP garnered a further 70,895 votes and
its proportion increased from 43.00 per cent in 1993 to 47.25 per cent in
1996, while the PSOE lost 7,037 votes and its share decreased to 42.54 per
cent in 1996 from 45.20 per cent in 1993. The IU garnered a further 34,193
votes and its proportion increased to 8.39 per cent in 1996; it was 5.63 per
cent in 1993. In 1993 the PP led the PSOE in two provinces, by 12.2 per
cent in Guadalajara and by 3.4 per cent in Cuenca.

In 1996 the gap

between the PSOE and the PP increased 17.08 per cent and 7.2 per cent
respectively. On the other hand, the PSOE in 1996 could only hold its
first place in Ciudad Real by leading the PP by 0.9 per cent. In Castilla La
Mancha the PSOE lost one of its seats in Toledo. In 1996 of the total seats
of Castilla La Mancha in the Cortes, 9 were won by the PSOE, while 11
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were won by the PP.

The PSOE holds the majority in the regional

parliament by having 24 of the 45 seats.
In two of the richest regions in Spain, Madrid and Baleares, the
performance of the PP is better than that of the PSOE. The employment
structures of both regions are similar to those in developed countries.
The service sector dominates the employment structure of the two
regions. The contribution of the service sector to civilian employment
in 1991 in Madrid is 70.3 per cent and in Baleares it was 67.2 per cent. The
contribution of industry to employment is 19.9 per cent and 15.9 per cent
respectively.
Graph-n/8
MADRID, the Performances of Major Partie:
1993 & 1996 General Elections
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(Compiled from El Pais Marc 5 1996, p.34)

In the last decade, the number of industrial workers in Madrid declined
6.8 per cent, while the Spanish average declined 4 per cent.
In the last two general elections in Madrid, the performance of the
PP improved, while that of the PSOE decreased. The PSOE polled 35.00

124

per cent in 1993 and 31.27 per cent in 1996 in the capital region. The
performance of the PP was higher than its country-wide average.
polled 43.90 per cent in 1993 and 49.29 per cent in 1996.

It

As in other

regions, in Madrid the loss of the PSOE was considerably less than the
gain of the PP. In 1996 while the PSOE lost 58,471 votes, the PP garnered
a further 257,849 votes. The PSOE lost two seats in 1996. One of them
was won by the PP, while the other was won by the IU. In Madrid, of the
34 seats the PP won 17, the IU won 6 in 1996.
In Baleares, on the other hand, as seen from table-II/5, the PSOE
improved its performance.

It won a further 15,098 votes in 1996 and

in turn its proportion rose to 36.03 per cent, but it is still less than its
country-wide average. Although it garnered a further 2,740 votes, unlike
its country-wide performance, the performance of the PP in Baleares
declined. It is, however, still above its country-wide average.

The IU

improved its performance by gamering a further 8,595 votes.
Table- II/5
Balearic Islands, distribution of votes and seats
IU
PSOE
PP
Year
1996
1993

Total
votes
430,871
412,191

seat votes
4
194,201
4
191,461

%
45.07
46.40

seat votes
3
155,243
3
140,145

%
36.03
34.00

seat votes
0
33,169
0
24,574

%
7.70
5.90

(El Pais Marc 5 1996, p.32)

The number of seats won by the PP and PSOE in Baleares did not change
in 1996. In both regions the PP also dominates regional parliaments.
The Autonomous Community of Valencia is another region
where the performance of the PP was higher than that of the PSOE. As I
will demonstrate below in discussing economic development,

the

employment structure of Communidad Valencia dramatically changed
in the last decade.

The contribution of industry to total civilian
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employment of the region dropped from 34.6 per cent in 1980 to 27.7 per
cent in 1991. The proportion of the labour force employed in the service
sector rose from 42.6 per cent to 54.3 per cent in the same period.
While the performance of the socialists in the region was closer to
their country-wide average, that of the PP was above its country-wide
average. The PSOE garnered a further 49,039 votes, but its proportion
decreased from 38.39 per cent in 1993 to 37.60 per cent in 1996. The PP
polled 43.10 per cent by gamering a further 141,237 votes. The results of
the examination of their performances in constituencies coincides with
this trend.
Graph-n/9
Distribution of votes in Com m unidad Valencia,
1993 & 1996 general elections
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(Compilée from El Pais Marc 5 1996, p.32)

For example, in Alicante the PSOE garnered a further 19,655 votes, but
the gap between them increased from 3.6 per cent in 1993 to 5.89 per cent
in 1996, because the PP increased its votes from 340,312 in 1993, 43.5 per
cent, to 381,510 in 1996, and a share of 45.77 per cent. It therefore cannot
be argued that there was a swing from the socialists in 1996.

The
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distribution of seats between them did not change in the Autonomous
Community of Valencia.

The PP won 15 of the 32 seats of the

Communidad Valencia in the Cortes, while the PSOE won 13 seats, the
IU won 3 seats and the UV (a regional party) won 1 seat.
Politics

in

Catalonia

and the

Basque

Country

are

more

complicated than in the other regions. This complexity is due to the
issue of nationality in these regions. The weakness of the Madrid based
Right wing political parties has been due to both the 'ethnicity question'
and long opposition by the region to Madrid's centralism. As Gillespie
argues, the socialists benefited from the question: "The 'national
question' proved a good deal less problem some to socialists in the
Basque Country than it did in Catalonia" (Gillespie 1989:84). In other
words, the strong opposition of the Right wing parties to the demands of
these regions, and on the contrary the socialists' more favourable
approach to regional issues has led to these regions becoming socialist
strongholds. Gillespie argues that during the Franco period Vizcaya (and
particularly Bilbao) had an important role in the socialists' survival and
recovery. While there were periods when Asturian organisations were
held as the example for other provincial federations to follow, Vizcaya
had its tradition and "proletarian concentration to fall back upon.
Moreover, due to Basque Nationalist Party support for the republic, the
region "lacked a vengeful civilian right bent upon the vanquished or
collaborating in repression ordered by Madrid". Gillespie argues that the
region had considerable organisational significance as well:
Moreover, given the party's strength in the north and the
existence of the emigre concentration in southern France,
Bilbao occupied a key strategic location for the purpose of the
PSOE. It was an obvious distribution center for propaganda,
correspondence, and money smuggled in from France,
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especially during the years 1954-72 when the leadership was
based in Toulouse (Gillespie 1989:174).

It is significant that in these regions because of nationalities issues there
emerged left wing political parties with ethnic identities. These are the
EA, EE and HB in Basque Country, and ERC in Catalonia.

Socialists in

contrast with the Madrid-based-right wing parties have traditionally
been very strong in these regions.
The strong presence of socialists in the two regions in respect to
other country-wide parties is also a result of the early industrialisation of
the regions.

The very large number of activists among industrial

workers made it possible for socialists to gain roots in these areas. Today
the social structures of these regions favour socialists.

The Basque

Country along with Catalonia are two of the most industrialised regions
in Spain. In 1991 the two regions took the first two places in terms of the
contribution of industry to civilian employment of the regions; 34.3 per
cent and 33.3 per cent respectively. These two regions are also amongst
the rich regions in Spain.
Despite the very long presence of the socialist movement in the
Basque country, the performance of the PSOE was considerably worse
than its country-wide average. While it garnered a further 2,043 votes,
its proportion decreased from 24.48 per cent in 1993 to 23.55 per cent and
it lost two seats. The PP, on the other hand, garnered a further 54,139
votes and increased its proportion from 14.66 per cent in 1993 to 18.32 per
cent in 1996. Despite the considerable gap between their performances,
the number of seats each party won was the same ie. 5 each. The IU
polled 9.23 per cent by garnering a further 40,233 votes. It also won a seat
in Vizcaya.

Although the performance of the country-wide political

parties improved in the Basque Country, their total poll still only
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constituted half of the votes cast in the region, because the regional
parties are dominant in Euskadi.
Graph-II/10
The Performances of Major Parties, THE BASQUE COUNTRY
1993 & 1996 General Elections
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(Compiled from E Pais Marc 5 1996, p.33)

In one of the three provinces, Vizcaya, the PNV (a regional party) leads
all other parties. In Guipúzcoa the PSOE is the strongest party and the
HB, the ETA's legal wing, comes second. In Alava, on the other hand,
the balance of strength shifted to the PP in the 1996 general elections.
The PSOE lost two seats in the Basque Country. One of these was won by
the PP in Alava, the other was won by the IU-EB in Vizcaya. The PP
now has 5 of the 19 seats of the Basque Country in the Cortes, while the
IU-EB has 1 seat, the PNV 5 seats, the HB 2 seats and the EA 1 seat. On
the other hand, in the regional elections of 1994 no party could win a
majority. Four regional parties, the PNV, the HB, the EA and the UA,
have 46 of the 75 seats in the parliament. The PSOE won 12 seats, while
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the PP won 11 seats. It is clear that regional parties are dominant in the
Basque Country because of the nationalities question.
In Catalonia, as in the Basque Country, the regional parties are
dominant. The regional parties poll half of the votes in the regions. For
example, the regional parties of Catalonia polled 43.79 per cent in 1993
and 35.08 per cent in 1996. The success of the regional parties in the
Basque Country is more significant. They polled 54.56 per cent in 1993
and 48.90 per cent in 1996. The performance of regional parties, such as
the CiU and the PNV was higher than those of the major parties in
Vizcaya, in the Basque14 Country and in Lleida and Girona, in
Catalonia15. In the two other provinces of Catalonia, Barcelona and
Tarragona, the PSOE took first place.

The regional parties have also

become coalition partners for the two major parties, because none of the
major parties could win a majority in the Cortes.
The performance of the PSOE in Catalonia was considerably better
than that of the PP. Unlike the decline of its country-wide proportion the
PSOE's performance in Catalonia improved. It polled 39.30 per cent in 1996
by garnering a further 242,161 votes. Its share was 34.88 per cent in 1993.
The PP, on the other hand, garnered a further 70,487 votes and its
proportion increased from 17.04 per cent in 1993 to 17.97 per cent in 1996.
Examination

of

the

performances

of

each

party in

the

constituencies displays the strength of the PSOE in Catalonia. In the two
largest provinces, Barcelona (the second largest city in Spain) and
Tarragona, the PSOE led all other political parties, including the regional
parties. In Barcelona the PSOE led the PP by 19.40 per cent in 1993 and by
21.88 per cent in 1996. In other provinces, Girona and Lleida, the CiU led

14 Basque country = Euskadi = Pais Vasca
15 Catalonia = Cataluna
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all political parties. The performance of IU improved slightly, but less
than its country-wide average. It polled only 7.65 per cent.
____________ Graph-11/11____________
The Performances of Major Parfi éW A LO N IA ,
1993 & 1996 General Elections
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Of the 47 seats of Catalonia in the Cortes, 19 were won by the PSOE with
one increase in 1996, 8 were won by the PP and 17 were won by regional
parties. The regional parties dominate the regional elections as well.
They won 84 seats of the 135 seats of the Catalan parliament. Although
the CiU lost its majority in 1995, it won 60 of the 135 seats. The PSOE
won 34 seats, while the PP won 17 seats in 1995 (Keesing's Record of
World Event, May 1995: 40561).
in the Canary Islands, as in baleares and Madrid, the service sector
dominates the employment structure because of the tourist sector. The
service sector is the main contributor to civilian employment in the
region, which at 73.2 per cent is the highest in Spain. The contribution
of industry to civilian employment is 9.4 per cent, the second lowest
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after the Balearic Islands, while the contribution of agriculture is only 7.6
per cent.
Country-wide parties have improved their performance in the
Canary Islands. In the 1996 general election the PSOE garnered a further
18,883 votes, but its proportion remained the same as in 1993. The PP,
on the other hand, polled 37.72 per cent by gaining a further 55,769 votes.
Its share was 33.90 per cent in 1993. The performance of both parties
declined to below their country-wide averages. The IU also increased its
vote.

After the merging of regional parties into the CC in 1991 they

became very strong in the region. The CC polled 24 per cent in Tenerife
and 26 per cent in Las Palmas.
Graph-II/12
CANARIAS,
The Performances of Major Political Parties, 1993 & 1996 General Elec
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(Compiled from El Pais Marc 5 1996, p.32)

In Tenerife the PSOE led the PP by 34.21 per cent and 32.52 per cent in
1996. In Las Palmas, on the other hand, the PP led the PSOE by 42.43 per
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cent to 25.77 per cent in 1996. The number of seats each won in 1996
remained the same as in 1993. The CC won 4 seats in 1996, as in 1993. It
won 22 of the 60 seats in the regional parliament. The PP has 18 seats,
while the PSOE has 16 seats.

When both the regional elections and

general elections are considered together, the Canary Islands is
another region where there are strong regional political parties, like in
Euskadi and Cataluna.
In La Rioja, Murcia and Navarra, the performance of the PP was
better than that of the PSOE. Murcia reflects the Spanish average in
terms of both GDP per capita income and the contribution of each sector
to civilian employment, while Navarra and La Rioja are amongst the
more industrialised regions. In La Rioja, the contribution of industry to
the GDP of the region dropped sharply in the last decade.

The

contribution of industry to civilian employment of the region, however,
did not decrease greatly. It stayed 4 per cent below the 1980 ratio. The
contribution of agriculture to civilian employment rose from 2.6 per
cent in 1980 to 12.0 per cent in 1991.
regions of Spain.

Navarra is amongst the richer

It is also an industrialised region.

In 1991 the

contribution of industry to civilian employment of the region was 32.2
per cent, while the national average was 22.9 per cent.
Table-H/6
CANTABRIA
Year
1996
1993
LA RIOJA
1996
1993

PP
N. of
Total
seat votes
%
votes
3 174,867 50.62
345,450
2 121,967 37.00
329,640

PSOE
N. of
seat votes
2 122,464
3 122,418

177,048
170,545

2
2

87,568 49.46
78,792 46.20

2
2

698,905
656,463

5
4

349,732 50.04
310,507 47.30

3
4

iu
N. of
seat votes
%
39,399
35.45 0
0
24,453
37.10

% Others
11.41 2.52
7.40 18.50

36.58
37.60

0
0

15,485
11,850

8.75
6.90

5.21
9.30

264,449 37.83
253,324 38.60

1
1

73,721 10.55
63,717 9.70

1.58
4.40

64,757
64,037

MURCIA
1996
1993

(El Pais Marc 5 1996, p.30,32,34)
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In La Rioja despite the improved performance of the PP, the
distribution of seats between country wide political parties remained the
same as in 1993. The PSOE's vote decreased from 37.6 per cent in 1993 to
36.58 per cent in 1996, although it won a further 720 votes. The IU polled
8.75 per cent by garnering a further 3,635 votes.
In Murcia the performance of the PP was considerably better than
its country wide average. It polled 50.04 per cent in 1996 by garnering a
further 39,225 votes. The PSOE garnered a further 11,125 votes, but its
percentage decreased to 37.82 per cent. The IU polled 10.55 per cent of
regional votes cast. The PSOE lost one of the 4 seats it won in 1993 in
Murcia. It has 3 seats, while the PP has 5 seats and the IU has 1 seat In
both La Rioja

and Murcia, the PP is also present in regional

governments. The PP has 17 of the 33 seats in the regional parliament of
La Rioja and 26 of the 45 seats of

Murcia's parliament.

Navarra was rewarded by the Franco regime by being able to have
economic and political privileges, such as collecting taxes, because there
had been no hostility towards Franco during the civil war in the 1930s.
The support for the Right wing in Navarra, therefore, continued after
Franco.
Table-II/7
Year
1993
1996

Total
votes
310,881
323,853

sea
t
2
2

1993
1996

N. of
votes
112,228
119,340
HB
32,221
26,693

IU-EBN

PSOE

PP-UPN

NAVARRA

%
36.10
36.85
10.40
8.24

sea
t
2
2

N. of votes

34.90

sea
t
0

27,043

8.70

97,951

30.25

1

40,550

12.52

EA
11,437

3.70

3,540

3.79

3,145

N. of votes

%

108,305

12,260

%

PNV
1.10
0.97

(El Pais M arc 5 1996, p.33)

Unlike in the Basque Country, the performance of the PP is higher than
those of the other political parties in the region. It polled 36.10 per cent
of votes cast in 1993 and 36.85 per cent in 1996. Despite improving its
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performance, it lost one seat in 1996. It has to be mentioned that the
Basque Country based regional parties, such as the HB, EA and the PNV
have supporters in Navarra, because people in Navarra are Basques as
well. The HB polls an average of 10 per cent, while the EA polls below 4
per cent. In Navarra the PSOE has 2 seats, while the PP has 2 and the IUEBN 1 seat.

The Basque country based HB has 5 seats in Navarra's

regional parliament, while the EA has 2 seats.
Ceuta and Meilla are the provinces on the African continent and
they are not regarded as regions. Each one is a province and represented
by one seat in the Cortes.
Table-H/8
CEUTA
1996
1993

pp

%

Others

0

11,439

35.56

0

701

2.18

50.90

0

12,170

40.60

0

0

0.00

8.82%
8.50%

50.85

0

11,599

43.08

0

935

3.47

2.60%

0

687

2.60

Total votes seat N. of votes %
1
32,171
17192
53.44
30,012

1

26,924

1

15276

IU

PSOE
seat N. of votes

%

seat N. of votes

MELILLA
1996
1993

26,425

0

13,691
11,865

44.90

1

12,885

48.80

(El Pais Marc 5 L996, p.34)

In both provinces the performance of the PSOE in 1996 declined and it
also lost its seat in Melilla. In Melilla in 1993 the PSOE led the PP by 48.8
per cent to 44.9 per cent. The PP polled 50.85 per cent of votes in 1996. In
Ceuta the performance of the PP exceeded that of the PSOE. On the other
hand, the PSOE remains in office at the local level in coalition with the
provincial parties, while in Melilla the PP has a majority in the
provincial parliament.
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Turkiye
The instability in the party system in Turkiye has continued in the
1990s.

The results of the elections between 1983 and 1995 and the

performance of political parties have been volatile. The number of parties
that won seats in the TBMM has increased, see tableTI/9. Despite a very
high country wide quota16, 10 per cent, in the 1983 and 1987 general elections
three parties managed to win seats in the Meclis17, while in the 1991 and 1995
general elections five parties managed to win seats. In 1995 the votes of the
two other parties, the MHP and HADEP, were also very high. They could
not win any seats, however, because of their disqualification by the country
wide quota. Nevertheless, their performance, especially that of the HADEP,
requires examination. As indicated in graph 13, the performance of the
political parties is also volatile. Swings have occurred between the Left and
Right wing political parties:

between competing left wing parties: and

between right wing parties.
Table-II/9
1983
ANAP
HP1819
MDP15

1987
ANAP
SHP
DYP

1991
DYP
ANAP
SHP
RP
DSP

1995
RP
DYP
ANAP
DSP
CHP
(SHP)

After the 1987 general elections, the total performance of the centre-left
parties, the CHP and the DSP, declined. Their total share was 33.5 per cent

16 The parties that can not exceed this quota are automatically disqualified, even if they
won 100 per cent of the votes cast in a constituency.
17 Meclis means parliament.
18 The HP merged with the SDDP in 1985 to established the SHP.
19 MDP merged with the DYP in 1985.
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cent in 1987, 30.5 per cent in 1991 and 25.38 per cent in 1995. However,
while the performance of the DSP has improved by 4 per cent between
1991 and 1995, that of the CHP decreased after 198720.
The fragmentation in the party system is most obvious on both
sides of the centre. Fragmentation occurred immediately following the
1980 Coup d'etat. There are two centre right wing political parties, the
ANAP and the DYP.

(Compiled from http://www.cc.utk.edu/~basoglu/secim.html)

The ANAP, a right wing conservative party, was the only political party
which was allowed to join in the 1983 general elections by the Coup
leaders.21 And it has been able to survive.

It was in government

between 1983 and 1991. Its performance has gradually declined since the
1983 general election.

The decrease was 9 per cent between 1983 and

1987, 12 per cent in 1991, and another 4.65 per cent in 1995.

The

performance of the DYP has also been unstable. The DYP was in office in
20 Actually the fail of the SH P/CH P has started after the 1989 municipal elections.
21 Before the 1983 election, the MGK (National Security Council) had the right to veto the
parties which had members who had been among executive of the political parties before the
1980 coup intervention.

137

coalition with the SHP/CHP between 1991 and 1995. Its performance
increased by 8 per cent between 1987 and 1991, but decreased 7.8 per cent in
1995. In the 1995 general elections their polls were very close to each other.
The DYP polled 19.2 per cent,
cent.

while the ANAP polled 19.7 per

As will be analysed later, their performance differs between

regions.
In the center-left, as in the center right, fragmentation occurred
after the 1980 Coup d'etat. There are two center left political parties,
Demokratik Sol Parti (the DSP) and Sosyal Demokrat Halkci Parti/
Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (the SHP/CHP). The DSP was established in
1985 by Rashan Ecevit, wife of Bulent Ecevit22, former leader of the
Republican People's Party (RPP/ Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) and its
performance has gradually improved. It polled 8.5 per cent in the 1987
general elections, 10.5 per cent in 1991 and 14.6 per cent in 1995. It is
now the biggest party23 of the left-wing.

On the other hand, the

performance of the SHP /CHP, which pursues a similar line to the RPP24,
had improved until the 1989 local elections, but has since declined. Like
that of the center right parties, the performance of the centre-left parties
varies between regions. This will be analysed further below.
Many new parties emerged after the 1980 Coup d'etat, but one of
them, the HADEP, is particularly worth analysing in some detail. The
emergence of the HADEP brought a new kind of fragmentation to the

22 Bulent Ecevit was banned from active politics at that time by the Corps of the 1980
Coup d'etat. The ban was abrogated in 1987 by referendum and Mr Ecevit replaced Mrs
Ecevit.
231 have to mention . that some people argue that the DSP is not social democratic
party, due to its very nationalist approach to the Kurdish unrest. It also opposes to the
entry of Turkiye to the EC. One of the main reason for this argument is that it appraises
the relations with the other Muslim countries.
241 use the RPP for the party before 1980 period. After this period, I use two terms for
social democratic inheritance of the RPP, the SHP until mid-1995, and the CHP after
that. In fact the CHP is the Turkish abbreviation of the Republican People's Party. I
found necessary to the indicate the newly again emergent RPP version as the CHP.
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party system of Turkiye, that of ethnic identity and regionalism.

It is

pro-Kurdish and a socialist party, as is the HB of Spain. The HADEP's
ancestor, the HEP, made an election coalition with the SHP and won 21
seats in the Meclis, while the HADEP joined the 1995 general election in
coalition with the re-emerging socialist parties and polled 4.18 per cent of
country-wide votes cast.

Its performance in the East of Turkiye,

especially in the South East, was particularly strong.

It placed second

after the RP.
It can be also argued that the fragmentation in the far right is
institutionalised because of the improvement and stable performance of
the two far right wing political parties, the RP and MHP. The MHP is
ultra nationalist, while the MSP/RP is pro-Islamist.
the late 1960s.

Both emerged in

They were the fruits of the changing socio-economic

conditions of the late 1960s (Margulies and Yildizoglu 1988:15). Their
performance has improved significantly since their re-emergence in the
mid-1980s. In the 1987 general elections the RP polled 7.2 per cent, while
the MHP

polled 2.1 per cent. However, both parties were disqualified

from having seats in the TBMM by the 10 per cent country wide quota.
They made an election coalition in the 1991 general election and polled
16.88 per cent.

The performance of both parties has dramatically

improved since. In the 1995 general elections the RP polled 21.31 per
cent, while the MHP polled 8.19 per cent.

The RP was in office in

coalition with the DYP.

The Refah Partisi (RP/ Welfare Party)

Before examining the results of the 1995 general election, an
analysis of the emergence of the RP is necessary. It will thus become25
25When it reemerged after the 1980 coup d'etat its name was the Nationalist Workers
Party (Milliyetci Calisma Partisi /M CP).
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easier to understand its rise in the 1990s. The RP is not a phenomenon
of the

1990s as its roots

go to

industrialisation of the late 1960s.

the

rapid

urbanisation

and

Margulies and Yildizoglu26 argue

that the emergence of the RP originated in the economic crisis of the
late 1960s which brought about a "number of dislocations in the
existing balance of class forces". Big business interests often registered
as large holding companies based for the most part in Istanbul, which
had close links with foreign capital, clashed with "the interests of small and
medium provincial capital". The Justice Party (Adalet Partisi / AP) was the
main beneficiary, becoming identified as the party of big business. As a
result it lost the support from other constituencies, accelerating the rise of a
number of smaller parties. "One of these, the Nationalist Order Party (later
the National Salvation Party, or NSP27, (Milli Selamet Partisi /MSP),
emerged as the first party in many decades to openly espouse an Islamist
political philosophy. The Party's congress, in 1970, echoed with cries of
"AUa-u-ekber”."
The rise of the MSP is significant because it allowed the return of
Islam to act as "a rallying cry for socio-economic opposition to the
central authority". Electoral support for the Party came from artisans,
small traders and other low income earners from rural areas. These
social groups were hardest hit by the economic crisis and had been
unable to defend themselves through existing political institutions.

As they also indicate that there has
been an Islamist movement growing
independent of the RP: "W hile the MSP became the organised Islamist expression of
popular discontent, an unofficial Islamist movement also grew alongside it. This
movement went far beyond the party. It spread through unofficial Quranic courses, local
associations and youth clubs, charitable associations formed around mosques, and a
variety of journals... Significantly, the urban working class did not line up behind the
Islamist banner: it had its own means of struggle (industrial strikes) and its own
independent organisations (trade union). An Islamist labour confederation (H ak-Is)
remained marginal (Margulies and Yildizoglu 1988:15).
27The MSP is ancestor of the RP. Mr Erbakan, currently leader of the RP, was founder
and leader of the MSP.
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"These groups felt not only their economic welfare, but also their
traditional institutions and values to be under attack. They saw the
growing socialist movement as a threat to the family, religion and
cultural values"

(Margulies and Yildizoglu, 1988: 14-15).

Hence

Margulies and Yildizoglu argue:

The MSP's propaganda stressed the importance of 'morals and
virtue', opposed secularism to the extent possible within the
law, and strongly attacked communism, freemasonry and
Zionism. Party leader Necmettin Erbakan became 'the
champion of independent industrial development'. He
opposed Turkiye's entry into the EEC, as this would further
strengthen big business vis-a-vis smaller provincial
businesses. He branded the EEC as a product of a 'new crusader
mentality'. (Margulies and Yildizoglu 1988: 14-15).

The MSP joined a coalition government led by the social democratic
Republican People's Party (RPP or CHP)

in 1974.

The coalition was

significant because it broke an historic barrier and granted the MSP and
its policies a degree of legitimacy. The MSP was the third largest party in
parliament, during the 1970s, with about 11 per cent of the vote. The
Party gave political organisation and a national voice to the lower and
middle classes. Thus it granted the Islamist movement the legitimacy of
a national party platform.

"The very existence of the MSP forced all

major parties to take the 'Islamist' vote into account and court it more
explicitly" (Margulies and Yildizoglu 1988:14-15).
As some authors argue, but without noting its importance, there
are other causes of the rise of both the RP and Islamist movement.
These causes are not immediately related to the changing social and
economic structure of Turkiye. One of the most important of these, as
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Margulies

and Yildizoglu

argue28, is the elimination

of harsh

suppression of the Left after the 1980 Coup d'etat:
... the anti-socialist stance of the generals favoured the
religious right. With the physical elimination of the Left and
its organisations, socialism practically disappeared from the
national arena as an oppositional movement. The right-wing
opposition, by contrast, was able to obtain positions in parts of
the state bureaucracy and the educational apparatus where the
left had previously been influential... The demoralisation and
sense of crisis within the left led a few left-wing intellectuals
to embrace Islam, giving the movement some fresh ideas and
theological interpretations (Margulies and Yildizoglu 1988:16
17).

Socio-economic conditions in the 1990s, especially through to
1995, have worsened.

The rapid increase in inequality has strongly

affected the middle-class.

Inflation has risen to 100 per cent.

The

currency has been devalued a number of times after the 1991
general election. The nature of the media has changed. There are
16 country-wide TV channels, hundreds of local TV channels and
thousands of radio stations.

Discontent regarding for traditional

institutions and values, which started with the fast urbanisation of the
late 1960s, has deepened. Corruption allegations have intensified the
discontent. In addition, with thousands of victims of the separatist war
the political unrest in the East has deepened. The incapability of centre
political parties to deal with these problems has opened the way for
political parties that oppose the social and political structure, such as the
RP, HADEP and MHP.
28Margulies and Yildizoglu argue that "These general effects of the coup combined w ith
a number of developments which made the subsequent period a fertile one for the
growth of the Islamist movement Firstly, sodo-economic conditions that gave rise to
the movement in the 1970s continued and in some cases intensified after 1980. Clearly
less important but nevertheless significant has been the impact of the Iranian
revolution and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. These two developments came
together to present Islam as a world force ('a third way') capable of fighting both
capitalism /imperialism and communism" (Margulies and Yildizoglu 1988:17).
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There have also been international causes of the rise of the
Islamist movement in the 1990s.

Islamists base their international

policy on the so-called Muslim-Christian conflict.

This issue is

frequently raised in internal politics. Relations with Christian countries
which are in conflict with Muslim countries are especially condemned
as are relations with their allies such as Israel.

Improvement in

relationships between Turkiye and 'Muslim countries', such as Iraq and
Iran, are actively sought.

It can be argued that the 1980s' Iranian

revolution, Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and the wars in Bosnia
and Chechenya all contributed to the rise of the Islamist movement.
Due to the combination of worsening social, political and economic
conditions, not only the 'unofficial Islamist movement prospered.' The
RP became the biggest party after the last general elections held in
December 1995.
'Propagating Islam' also contributed to the rise of the Islamist
movement in Turkiye since the 1980s. Islam has been propagated both
by the state, as a 'cement for national unity,' and by illegal Islamist
groups. Rouleau's study of the respected English-language newspaper the
Daily Turkish News highlighted the fact that:
Turkiye had no fewer than 290 publishing houses and printing
presses, 300 publications including four dailies, some hundred
unlicensed radio stations and about 30 likewise unlicensed
television channels, all propagating Islamic ideology... (Roulau,
1993:119).

In addition to Public schools, the state has financed Islam-oriented
schools, or imam hatip

schools, where tens of thousand of young

people29 (Aksit 1991:145-147), "many of whom will certainly enter
29 In early 1994, it was estimated that every 1 in every 10 students of high school attend
these imam-hatip.
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government services", are trained in the teachings of the Prophet.
Under

the

current

constitution,

promulgated

by the

military

government, the teaching of region (ie. Islam) is compulsory in all
schools 'to cement national unity', in the words of General Kenan Evren,
head of the military coup d'etat of 1980" (Roulau 1993:119).

As a result

the RP improved its performance and took first place in the 1995 general
election while the Left movements, especially the SHP/CHP, have
entered into a deep recession.

Sosyal Demokrat Halkci Parti/ Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (SHP/CHP)

The SHP/CHP, unlike the RP, has gradually lost strength since the
1989 local elections. To understand the SHP/CHP, a brief analysis of its
ancestor, the RPP, is important.

The founders of the RPP were also the

founders of the modem Turkish state, M.K. Ataturk and his colleagues. Until
1945 there was a single party system in Turkiye and that party was the RPP.
The characteristics of the Party and of the State were the same. In 1950 it lost
the government to the Democratic Party. After the mid-1960s, changes began
to occur in its ideology.

When the RPP moved to the Left in the

late 1960s (Pevsner 1984:37,40,60-64) it 'gradually became, at least in
some aspects, a western style social democratic party.

It became very

strong in growing urban areas' (Tachau 1991:109), due to support from
the intelligentsia who are, in the words of Mango, 'progressive,
enlightened and free-thinkers, in the nineteenth-century sense of the
term' (Mango 1991:172). Tachau argues that:
Moreover, it appears that the improved performance of the
RPP in urban areas was due
in large part to electoral shifts
among the lower class, and these shifts apparently involved
direct switches from the support of the Justice Party (Adalet
Partisi /AP) to the RPP. Interestingly, the RPP's performance
did not improve in similar fashion in rural areas, either in
more industrialised or in less developed provinces (Tachau
1991:109).
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This electoral shift, however, should not be understood to mean that the
RPP had support of a large number of the working class, as its
counterparts in northern Europe. The class identity of the HP/SHP/CHP
was not clear in the 1980s.
After the ban on the RPP along with other political parties by the
Generals in 1981 the HP/SHP took over the RPP's heritage.
argues

Mango

that the SHP/CHP comprises features of the RPP, such as

"attracting the support of a considerable part of the intelligentsia"
(Mango 1991:172).
As Mango argues, cultural identity in Turkiye, is very important
in determining voting behaviour.

The study of Turkish politics, is

characterised by the considerable attention given to the apparent lack of
a positive correlation between income levels and voting behaviour.
Poorer citizens have often voted for 'right-wing' rather than for 'left
wing' parties. This fact has led to the argument that cultural factors are
more significant than economic ones in determining party choice.
Such cultural divisions are not peculiar to Turkiye. While they may be
stronger than in many other European countries and are likely to
persist, both in Turkiye and in Europe generally, they do not present an
unbreachable barrier to achieving a democratic society or to the goals-of
social democracy.

The question remains whether perceived cultural

identity is a more important factor than perceived economic interest in
determining voting behaviour? (Mango 1991:181)
The question does not have a simple answer since
and cultural interests may coincide.

both class

A voter might consider that if30

30 "Distinguished from European social democratic parties by its origins, the SHP shares
with them this characteristic of attracting the support of a considerabe part o
"ie
intelligentsia. The social identity -in Marxist terms, the class basis- of the SHP is uncertain,
but its cultural identity, like that of the RPP, is clear: it is perceived to be the party ot the
"progressives', of the 'enlightened', of free-thinkers in the nineteenth-century sense o
e
term" (Mango 1991:172).
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people with a shared identity win government they will ensure that
their ethnic, cultural and class compatriots will benefit. It is rational to
hypothesise that religious voters may well believe that the election of a
theist government will bring personal material benefits, just as might a
secularist voter entertain similar hopes of a secular government.

As

Mango has argued:
In the circumstances, it is impossible to determine whether it
was 'religious reaction' (ie. cultural factors) or economic
discontent which mobilised support for the Free Party in the
1930s (when the world economic crisis had caused much
hardship among the public), and the Democratic Party in the
late 1940s (when the economic effects of the Second World
War and of the policies pursued by the RPP to manage a war
economy were still keenly felt). Where poorer citizens vote
for 'right-wing' parties for reasons of both cultural identity
and economic self interest, because 'left-wing' parties had
failed to improve their lot in the past and are believed
incapable of doing so in the future, the assumed absence of
correlation between personal income and voting behaviour is
illusory (Mango 1991:181).

As explained by Mango, because of the effects of cultural identity on
voting behaviour, deficiency of class identity of firstly the RPP and later
both HP/SHP/CHP and DSP becomes clear.
Many other characteristics of the RPP, such as strong voter
attraction in urban areas, were also carried over to the HP/SHP. In the
1987 general election and the 1989 local elections, the HP/SHP 's
performance in metropolitan areas maintained the trend. It took first
place in all constituencies of Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir and Adana by
garnering considerably more votes than its country-wide average. In the
1989 local elections 40 of the 67 provincial centre's mayors were SHP
candidates (Mango 1991:197-198). After 1989, however, it gradually lost
ground in metropolitan areas, until it only polled 20 per cent of the
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votes cast in the 1991 general election and 13.2 per cent in the 1994 local
elections . In the 1995 general election, it hardly exceeded the country
wide quota; it could poll 10.72 per cent. In metropolitan areas its vote
was 10.51 per cent (see graph-II/14). From the results of the 1995 general
elections, it can be argued that the SHP/CHP has lost the identity of being
a party of the intelligentsia.
The

performance

of the SHP/CHP declined

not

only in

metropolitan areas, but all around Turkiye. Unlike the decline of its
counterparts in Europe, that of the SHP /CHP in the 1990s can not be just
explained by a changing social structure because the same social structure
had given rise to the SHP between 1984 and 1989. The causes of the
decline of the performance of the SHP/CHP can be grouped into four
• 32

categories. First, the SHP has not had a charismatic leader. Leadership

in Turkiye is crucially important. The SHP leader Erdal Inonu was not a
charismatic leader** , although his personality was considered respectable
even by supporters of other parties. He was not seen as a true leader.
This led to a leadership battle in the party after 1989.

Several early

congresses were held but until late 1995 the battle was not finalised. The
first battle was between Inonu and the contender Baykal which was to
continue for over three years.

After Inonu's retirement from the

leadership the battle continued between two new contenders. Karayalcin
and Gurkan. After the merger of the SHP with CHP leadership battles
still ensued. The last battle was won by Baykal assisted by the merger in
mid-1995 a few months before the 1995 general election.

The widely

publicised fractional rivalries within the SFIP/CHP have affected people
31 However, the SHP and CHP separately entered the 1994 local elections. The poll
given above is just SHP's; the CHP's is not included.
32 As Tachau argues as well, "in one sense, this strong dependence on personal leadership
reflected a deep-seated attribute of Turkish political culture" (Tachau 1991:113).
•In Turkey the state is seen as 'father'. The 'true leader' should act as a father. He
should control his family in every way and no one in the family challanege him.
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as the sentiment the party can not even run themselves let alone the
Country still holds. Because leadership is such a significant factor for
success of political parties in Turkiye, this factor alone explains much of
the decline of the SHP/CHP in the 1990s.
The second cause stems from allegations that some bureaucrats
engaged in corruption.

The first allegations appeared in the newly

growing Turkish media. It was alleged that some bureaucrats of the
Istanbul municipality, which was under SHP governance, illegally made
money for both themselves and the Party. One of the bureaucrats was
imprisoned.

The party also accepted that it received funds over

the

limit allowed by the law. Although these are very common practices in
Turkiye, the involvement of party members in corruption was very
damaging to the Party's reputation.
The SHP's election coalition with the newly established Kurdish
party, the HEP, in the 1991 general election is a third cause. Due to this
coalition some candidates from the HEP entered the Meclis.
representatives
movement.

allegedly

supported

the

pro-Kurdish

These

separatist

Later the HEP was banned and some of its members

imprisoned. The SHP was severely criticised in public and was blamed
for letting these people become members of the Meclis. If we remember
that the DSP's very Right wing approach to Kurdish unrest coincided
with a strong improvement in its electoral performance, it can be argued
that the SHP / HEP coalition contributed to the decline of the SHP.
Finally, the poor performance of the SHP during its term in office
in coalition with the DYP is another likely cause of its decline in the
1990s. The Party could not convince its coalition partner to meet most of
its election promises. In other words, during their term in office the
DYP was dominant and there were few changes or initiatives which
could be attributed to the SHP. Of these changes, the most important
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one is "the right to have a lawyer during interrogation'. The Party could
not implement its promise to abolish taxes on minimum wages.

The

coalition, therefore, increased the perception that the social democrats
were incapable of running the country.

1995 General Elections

The last general election in Turkiye was held on the 24th of
December 1995.

Volatility and fragmentation continued in Turkish

politics. While the total vote for the centre left parties decreased to 25.38
per cent, its worst level since the late 1960s, the total vote for the right wing
increased.
Table-II/10
December 24th, 1995 Turkish General Election Result
Total votes
Turnout
Total valid votes
Party

RP
DYP
ANAP
DSP
CHP
MHP
HADEP
OTHERS
YDP
MP
IP
YDH
YP
BGMZ

: 34,155,981
: 29,101,469;
:28,126,993
%
Votes
gathered
6,012,450
5,369,009
5,527,288
4,118,025
3,011,076
2,301,343
1,171,623
589,179
95,484
127,630
61,428
133,889
36,853
133,895

'

21.38
19.18
19.65
14.64
10.71
8.18
4.17
2.09
0.34
0.45
0.22
0.48
0.13
0.48

% 85.20
N. of Seats

158
135
132
76
49
—

Without % 10
Country Wide
Quota
137
118
122
73
44
34
22

(http: / /www.cc.utk.edu/~basoglu/secim.htl)
The left wing electorate in metropolitan areas supported the DSP instead
of the SHP/CHP. It was the first time that the DSP polled more than the
SHP/CHP. The performances of both parties (see map-6 and map-7) vary
over the different regions. It is difficult to argue that the DSP is a
country-wide party because of its poor performance in the East.

The
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performance of the DSP in metropolitan areas was higher than its
country-wide average, while that of the CHP was slightly less than its
country-wide average. The performances of centre right political parties,
the DYP and the ANAP, decreased, while those of the far right parties,
the RP and the MHP, increased. The improved performance of the two
far right parties was the direct result of the poor performance of the two
centre right parties.

It is therefore evident that the volatility of the

Turkish electorate was maintained in the last general election.
Moreover, as outlined above, the fragmentation of the party
system continued in the 1995 general election. The Turkish party system
became a typical example of a multi-party system. Despite a very high
country-wide quota, 10 per cent of country wide votes cast allowed five
parties33, the RP, DYP, ANAP, DSP and CHP, to win seats in the Meclis.
Two of the five parties, the CHP and DSP are centre-left parties; two of
them, the ANAP and DYP, are conservative and the RP is a pro-Islamist
party.

The RP which became the largest party in the 1995 general

election is currently in office in coalition with the DYP. There are two
other parties with a high level of voter support, the HADEP and MHP,
outside the Parliament. The MHP is an ultra-Turkish nationalist party,
while the HADEP is a pro-Kurdish and socialist party, similar to the HB
in Spain. They polled 8.18 per cent and 4.17 per cent of votes respectively
but they were disqualified by the country wide quota.
The emergence of the HADEP, however, meant that the party
system experienced a new kind of fragmentation. It brought new kinds
of divisions such as regionalism and ethnic nationalism into the party
system. Therefore, it must be considered an exceptional party amongst
the political parties which have emerged since the establishment of the
33 There is another party, the BBP (The Great Unity Party), in the Meclis, which is a
pro-Islamist and ultra-Turkish nationalist. It could enter the Meclis by establishing
election coalition with the ANAP. It has 7 members in the TBMM.
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multi-party system in Turkiye. It is the third Kurdish oriented party to
emerge after the 1980 Coup d'etat. The former Kurdish parties, the HEP
(the People's Labour Party) and the DEP (Democratic Labour Party) were
banned due to allegations that their members had relations with the
illegal PKK (the Kurdish Workers Party).

The HADEP joined the

election in alliance with the socialist parties, the SIP (the Socialist Labour
Party), the SPP (the Socialist United Party) and the DDR (the Democratic
and Transformation Party)34. Against its 4.17 per cent of the country
wide average, in the East its proportion was very high, see map-8. It can
be argued that because of both its strong presence in the East and its
ethnic national identity the emergence of the HADEP is potentially as
significant as the rise of the RP.
My analysis of the party system and political parties allows an
analysis of the results of the 1995 general elections and the performance
of major political parties in different regions. The constituencies where
each party took first place are analysed and displayed in map-4. The RP
took first place in 36 of the 82 constituencies of Turkiye. The DYP took
first place in 22 constituencies, while the ANAP took first place in 11
constituencies. The DSP took first place in 7, with the HADEP 4 and the
CHP2.
The election results show that relatively larger parties were
favoured by the election system through the distribution of votes. The
RP won 28.72 per cent of seats with its 21.38 per cent vote.

^ h e s e socialist parties formed a socialist party called the ODP, the Freedom and
Solidary Party, in January 1995.

Map-4

The Strength of M ajor Political Parties in the 1995 general Election
In terms of taking first place in each constituency
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The CHP won 8.90 per cent of the seats with its 10.71 per cent, while the
DSP won 13.81 per cent of seats with its 14.64 per cent.

Hence, the

election system favours bigger parties, while it punishes smaller parties.
An examination of the performance of the RP through the
constituencies in the 1995 general election shows that its performance
was relatively high in rural and peripheral areas while it was low in
urban and central areas. Graph 14 illustrates that in urban areas, except
Istanbul, its performance was less than its country-wide average while
it was higher in rural areas. Its performance was less than its average
in the West, while it was higher in the East.

Graph-II/14
Metropolitan Areas and Turkiye
The Performance of Parties, 1995 General Election

B Metropols
□ Turkiye

ANAP

HADEP Others

(Compiled from http://www.cc.utk.edu/~basoglu/secim.htl)

In areas of economic

and political unrest, or where people are affected

by bad socio-economic conditions, such as in the East and shanty towns
of Istanbul, its performance was considerably higher that its country
wide average.

Although the performance of the RP improved in

metropolitan areas, such is still lower than its country-wide average

Map-5

The Electorate Map of the RP in the 1995 General Election
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Close examination of the performance of the RP in urban areas shows
that it was relatively weak in metropolitan areas35, such as Izmir, Adana,
Bursa and Mersin. Although it took first place in all three constituencies
of Istanbul with an average 24 per cent poll, and in one of the two
constituencies

of

Ankara,

its performance

was

lower than its

countrywide average (see graph 11/14). In the coastal provinces of the
Mediterranean and Aegean seas (see the electorate map of RP -map-5-) it
polled lower than its average. It also took first place by polling 29.2 per
cent in Kocaeli, which is the second most industrialised province after
Istanbul according to 1986 statistics (Sonmez 1990:68). In the 1994 local
elections the RP also won local government in Ankara, Istanbul and
Konya.
The RP, however, performed very well in rural areas, especially
in central Anatolia and the East. In some provinces in Central Anatolia,
such as Aksaray, Konya, Karaman, Yozgat and Sivas, it polled two times
higher than its country-wide average of 21.38 per cent. In Konya, for
example, the RP polled 44.1 per cent. In Sivas and Yozgat, where the
pro-Islamist and ultra-Turkish nationalist parties have been very strong,
the RP polled 39.20 per cent and 35.94 per cent, respectively. In the East
where Kurdish unrest has deepened the RP's performance improved.
The vote for the RP was even higher than that of the HADEP. The RP
did well in Bitlis, Siirt, Mus, Bingol, Sanli Urfa and Adiyaman. It polled
53.9 per cent in the Bingol province.
The performance of the DSP (as seen in graph-H/14) improved in
the metropolitan areas. While its country-wide average was 14.66 per
cent, it polled 19.25 per cent and took second place after the ANAP m

35 These are Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Bursa, Mersin and Adana.
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metropolitan areas.

The performance of both the CHP and DSP36,

however, in line with that of their ancestor the RPP, was relatively poor
in rural areas. The DSP polled badly in rural areas (see graph-E/14). The
poor performance of both parties was more significant in the East.
Although the CHP took first place in Tunceli and polled very well in
Erzincan, its average in the East was only 6.58 per cent. The DSP's vote
was even worse; it polled only 3.15 per cent in the East.
The trend established in the metropolitan areas and in those
provinces with a relatively high proportion of Alevi sect followers also
applies in the East for the CHP and DSP. They performed particularly
badly in the South East. In the South East the CHP polled 3.85 per cent,
while the DSP polled 2.00 per cent.
The significance of the poor performance of these parties in the
East is that it can not be explained by the rural/urban divide. The most
salient issue is their approach to the Kurdish question. In addition, the
existence of the HADEP made it almost impossible for these parties to get
support in the East because left wing voters supported the HADEP. The
country-wide left wing political parties, therefore, became very weak in
Eastern Anatolia (see graph-II/15). Because the DSP performed poorly in
the East, it is difficult to argue that the DSP is a country-wide party.
In the 1995 general election, the centre-left parties also performed
badly in their former strongholds. For example, in Mersin they lost their
first place to the ANAP and the CHP fell to fourth place, while the DSP
took fifth place. Izmir is another province where Left wing movements
used to be very strong. In one of the two constituencies of Izmir the DSP
took first place by polling 24.0 per cent.

36 However, it has to be mentioned that the DSP denies that it is heir of the RPP, even though
its leader was the last leader of the RPP before the 1980 C o u p d e ta t.
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Ankara, Hatay, Diyarbakir, Hakkari, Kars and Gaziantep were other
provinces where the Left lost first place.

For example, in Hakkari

province in the 1983 general election the Left polled 51.1 per cent, in 1987
31.5 per cent and in the 1989 local elections 33.6 per cent (Sonmez
1990:205). In 1995, on the other hand, the CHP polled 2.66 per cent, while
the DSP polled 1.97 per cent.
The DSP took first place in seven provinces (see map-4). Three of
the seven provinces, Edirne, Kirklareli and Tekirdag, are in the west
of Turkiye.

These are amongst the rich provinces. Adana is another

province where the DSP took first place. The DSP took first place in one
of the two constituencies of Izmir. While Izmir is one of the richest
provinces, Adana reflects the Turkish average. The other two provinces,
Zonguldak and Bartin which are mining areas, are on the coast of the
Black Sea.

Like its poor performance in the East, its performance was

very poor in the provinces where the followers of the Alevi37 sect
constitute a high proportion of left wing supporters.

These provinces

include Corum, Yozgat, Sivas, which are in central Anatolia; Hatay on the
Mediterranean coast; Adiyaman, Tunceli, Erzincan and Malatya in the
East. The Alevis have been supporters of left wing parties since the early
1970s.
The CHP, on the other hand, took first place in Tunceli and Hatay.
These two provinces have always been safe constituencies for the Left
(see the electorate map of the CHP map-6). The majority of people in
Tunceli, in eastern Anatolia, are Alevi followers. The comparison of the
electorate map of the DSP, map-7, with that of the CHP, map-6, shows
37 The Alevi sect is very different from the other sects of Islam. Actually it is difficult to
argue that it is a part of Islam. This is simply because the Alevis in Turkiye do not go to the
Mosque, do not fasten in holy months, Ramadan, do not go to Mecca for pilgrimage. More
importantly the Alevi women do not wear the black veil and they are not separated from
men in public meetings. They also praise Ali who is cousin of the Prophet Mohammed more
than Mohammed himself.
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that the CHP is a country-wide party, although it polled less than the
DSP. However, it is still very weak in the East, especially in the South
east. It performed best in Erzincan with 26.76 per cent. Tokat, Ankara-1
and Corum are the other provinces where it polled considerably higher
than its country -wide average.

In these constituencies Alevis also

constitute a majority of the left wing electorate.
The CHP did not do as well as the DSP in metropolitan areas. For
example, in the three constituencies of Istanbul, the two constituencies
of Izmir, Adana and Bursa, the DSP polled better than the CHP. In
Ankara, on the other hand, the CHP's performance was better than the
DSP's.
The régionalisation of politics is important for the centre right
wing political parties as well. The support for centre-right parties differs
significantly between regions. For example, (see map-4) the DYP38 took
first place in almost all provinces in West and South west Anatolia,
except in one of the two constituencies in Izmir. In the Isparta province
the DYP led all other parties by polling 39 per cent. It also took first place
in the three of nine provinces of the Marmara region, Canakkale,
Balikesir and Bursa, which are relatively rich and industrialised areas.
These provinces have a continuity with the western and south western
provinces (see map 4). Of the other provinces where the DYP took first
place, two are on the Black sea coast, Karabuk and Kastamonu, two are
on the Eastern border, Ardahan and Igdir. Of the other three provinces
Sirnak is in Eastern Anatolia, Nigde is in central Anatolia and Kilis is on
the southern border of Turkiye. Sirnak, Ardahan and Igdir are amongst the
poorer provinces while Karabuk’s economy is based on mining.
The

provinces

where

the

ANAP

took

first

place

vary

geographically, although most of them are on the Black Sea coast.
38 For the electorate map of the DYP see appendix.
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Régionalisation is important for the ANAP39, because it took first place
in eight of the ten provinces on the Black sea coast (see map-4). Its best
performance, 54.53 per cent, was in the Rize province, home town of the
party leader, Mesut Yilmaz. In the metropolitan areas its average vote
was the highest, although it only took first place in two constituencies:
one each of the two constituencies of Ankara and Mersin (see graph-14).
Of the provinces in which it took first place, Yalova is in Marmara;
Mersin is on the Mediterranean coast; Mar din and Erzurum are in
eastern Anatolia; Nevsehir and one of the constituencies of Ankara are
in central Anatolia.
Graph-n/15
East, South east, Turkiye
The Performances of Parties, 1995 General Election
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(Compiled from http://www.cc.utk.edu/~basoglu/secim.htl)

The performance of the HADEP also requires examination,
although it could not win any seats in the Meclis, due to its
disqualification by the quota.

39 For the electorate map of the ANAP see appendix.

Map-8

The Electorate Map of the HADEP in the 1995 General Election
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It is a pro-Kurdish and socialist party. It polled 4.17 per cent of country
wide votes cast, and took the sixth place in the 1995 general elections.
Examination of the performance of HADEP (see both map-8 and graphH/15) shows that it is a regional party with a Kurdish ethnic identity, like
the regional parties that have ethnic identity in Spain.

It polled 15 per

cent of the votes cast in the East and took first place in 4 of the 22
constituencies of the East.

These are Diyabakir, Van, Batman and

Hakkari. Its share was 46.47 per cent in Diyarbakir, 27.27 per cent in Van,
37.40 per cent in Batman and 54.35 per cent in Hakkari. It performed
considerably over its country-wide average in Siirt; 26.68 per cent,
Mardin; 22.01 per cent, Sirnak; 25.86 per cent and Igdir; 21.70 per cent.
These provinces are all in South east Anatolia. HADEP performed even
better in the South east (see graph-II/15). It polled 21.78 per cent of the
votes and took first place in the South east, against the RP's average of
20.9 per cent. In these provinces the Kurdish movement has been very
strong. HADEP’s performance outside the East, however, was very poor.
Here it polled over its country-wide average only in three constituencies,
Gazi Antep, Mersin and Adana.

Its performance was poor in

metropolitan areas, such as Istanbul (see graph-II/14), although Kurds
constitute 15.0040 per cent of Istanbul's population (Sonmez 1990:223).
Due to its high performance in the East, the HADEP is best considered a
regional party with an ethnic identity.

Conclusion
In Spain in the last two general elections, the PSOE lost many
seats and thus lost office. Although support for both PSOE and PP has
40 As Sonmez argues, Kurds constitute 10.46 per cent of Istanbul's population ini 1975 11.96
per cent in 1980 and 12.55 per cent in 1984. The increase has probably been higher in the
1990s due to the war in the East. This is also because some people have been forced to leave
the East. Therefore, the percentage of Kurds living in Istanbul can be more t aan
per cen
of the population (Sonmez 1990:223).
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changed, I have argued that it is difficult to claim that there was a swing
from the PSOE to the PP. Hence the PSOE is not subject to a long term
decline in its electoral fortunes. My examination of support for these
parties across the regions demonstrates this point. In certain regions,
including Catalonia, Baleares, Aragon and Asturias, the PSOE improved
its performance.

In some other regions, such as the Basque Country,

Murcia, La Rioja and Communidad Valencia, even though it garnered
an increasing number of votes, its proportional support decreased,
because the PP was able to concentrate the right wing votes behind it. In
the other regions, such as Madrid, Castilla Y Leon, Galicia, Extremadura,
Andalucia, Castilla La Mancha and Navarra, the PSOE's support
declined. It lost 12 seats in these regions. Even in these regions, the loss
of the PSOE was considerably less than the gain of the PP. All these facts
indicate that there was not a swing from the PSOE to the PP but a
consolidation and concentration of the right wing support base.
The source of the PP's increased strength lay in the consolidation
and concentration of the votes of the minor parties. The results of the
general elections, show support for 'other', mainly right wing parties has
gradually decreased. The disappearance of the CDS was the main reason
for the rise of the PP. Additionally, some regional parties, such as the
PAR in Aragon, made an election coalition with the PP. Because of this
partnership PP won a further 4 seats. In 1996 the PP may have also
benefited from a higher turnout. Hence, it is clear that the swing to the
PP was not from the PSOE. There is evidence of a swing from the PSOE
to the IU.

However, the increase in votes garnered by the IU was

considerably more than those lost by the PSOE.
I have argued that both regional social structural variations and
regional political parties play a significant role in Spanish politics. The
effects of regional interests on the electorate in the election of political

164

parties is significant, especially in the relatively less developed regions,
such as Galicia, Castilla Y Leon, Extremadura and Andalucia. In all
provinces of Galicia and Castilla Y Leon, the performances of PP were
considerably higher than those of the PSOE, while in all provinces of
Extremadura and Andalucia those of the PSOE were considerably higher
than those of PP.

Castilla La Mancha is a bridge region between

strongholds. While in the provinces on the border of Extremadura and
Andalucia, the PSOE polls higher than PP, in the provinces on the
border of Castilla Y Leon the PP polls higher than PSOE.
In the "historical regions', the Basque Country and Catalonia,
regional parties, such as the PNV, HB, CiU and ERC, are dominant in
both regional elections and general elections. These regional political
parties are also needed as coalition partners because in the last three
general elections neither the PSOE nor the PP can win an absolute
majority in the Cortes. I have argued that due to the steady performance
of the regional parties Spain is likely to be governed by coalitions in the
next decade.
Tradition has been an important factor in support for political
parties in Spanish electorates. The performance of both major parties is
more dependent on tradition than the class structure of the regions,
especially in the less industrialised and poorer regions. Although the
employment structure and developmental level of these regions are
similar, Galicia and Castilla Y Leon are the PP's strongholds, while
Extremadura and Andalucia are the PSOE's strongholds.

Traditional

socialist support has been strong in the latter two, while electoral
support has been negligible in the former. Navarra had been favoured
by the Franco regime. These trends prove the argument that tradition is
crucial in the Spanish regions.

While Navarra is one of the most

industrialised regions in Spain, the PP has gained considerably more
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support than the PSOE. In the most industrialised regions, the Basque
Country

and

Catalonia,

the

main

parties'

performance

differs

significantly. In the Basque Country PSOE's performance was very poor,
while in Catalonia PSOE's performance was better than the PP's. Strong
ethnic nationalism in these regions contributes to the weakness of the
Madrid based Right-wing political parties. Bigger regional parties, such
as the CiU and PNV, are right-wing parties. While the right-wing are
stronger in these regions, it is not a Madrid based right-wing.
The December 1995 general election in Turkiye saw a continuing
fragmentation and volatility.

The party system

example of a multi-party system.

became a typical

Despite a very high country wide

quota, there are five parties which were able to win seats in the
parliament. Volatility was demonstrated by the swing in voter support
not only between left-wing and right-wing parties, but also among
competing Left-wing and Right-wing parties. While the RP became the
biggest party, the performance of centre-right parties, the ANAP and the
DYP, became closer. The DSP, on the centre-left gained more support
than the SHP/CHP
Fragmentation has increased in the 1990s. With the emergence of
the HADEP, the party system has become even more fragmented. As
mentioned above, the HADEP is a regional party with an ethnic national
identity, similar to those of Spain. HADEP's average performance in the
East was considerably higher than its country-wide average, especially in
the South east where Kurds constitute the majority of the population of
the

region.

In

the

far right

fragmentation

has

also

become

institutionalised by the growth of the RP and MHP, since the late 1960s.
Hence, fragmentation occurs in the centre-left and in the centre-right
starting after the 1980 coup d'etat. The localised support bases of the
political parties in the regions means that
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régionalisation of political parties has become a major force in the party
system in Turkiye.
The

Refah

Partisi

(RP/ Welfare

Party) is

not

merely

a

phenomenon of the 1990s, its roots go back to the rapid changes in the
socio-economic conditions which began in the late 1960s and have
intensified in the 1990s.

The rise of the RP also stems from the

propagation of Islam with religious courses, religious media and
religious schools.

The RP's strength is in the areas most affected by

socio-economic changes, such as the shanty towns of metropolitan cities
and the rural industries of the East. In the provinces of central Anatolia,
such as Konya, Si vas, Yozgat and Karaman and in the East where the
Kurdish question has continued for 14 years, support for the RP was
considerably above its country-wide average. Its average performance in
urban areas, however, was lower than its country wide average. Its poor
performance was obvious in the provinces on the Aegean coast.
The overall performances of Left wing political parties has
declined in recent years. This is mainly due to the decline in support for
the SHP/CHP, because the DSP improved its performance, especially in
urban areas. However, the DSP is not a country-wide party because its
support is almost non-existent in the East. Support for SHP/CHP, on
the other hand, was spread all over the country, despite its relatively
poor performance in the East. The SHP/CHP polled very well in the
provinces where the Alevi followers constitute most of the left
electorate. Its support in the metropolitan areas decreased.
I argued that there are four main reasons for the decline of the
SHP/CHP. These include the lack of a charismatic leader after the 1980
intervention, the leadership battle within the party, its election coalition
with the Kurdish party in 1991 and its poor performance while in office.
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Its rival is Bulent Ecevit, the very charismatic leader of the RPP in the
1970s. The SHP/CHP took the fifth place in the 1995 general election.
In the short term, if these conditions continue, it can be argued
that the fragmentation in the party system of Turkiye will continue
because the socio-economic conditions will continue to worsen. In the
light of recent historical patterns of support, we may, therefore, expect
the rise of a socialist party, the ODP, due to the inadequate response of
the centre-left parties to changing socio-economic conditions. The rise of
a socialist party will be a barrier to the further rise of Islamist
movements and in turn the rise of the RP. The strength of the RP in the
future also depends on its ability to respond to deteriorating socio
economic conditions in office. A continuation of the fragmentation of
the Islamist movement or the rise of fundamentalist factions in the
party also threaten the RP. Of course, another possibility is its absorption
by secularism.
Despite having authoritarian regimes in their recent history, the
parliamentary system in both Spain and Turkiye have been stable in the
last two decades. The role and power of the heads of states in both
countries are subject to similar controls as their counterparts in
developed countries.

In addition, the threat of

future authoritarian

regimes, mainly resides in the armed forces, the political power of which
have decreased in both countries, especially in Spain.
The further development of democratic institutions and greater
integration of both countries into the democratic countries league, the
European Union, have led to a weakening of the role and power of the
armed forces. Furthermore, the election process works well. Since the
last takeover of power by civilian politicians, regular elections have been
held in both countries. More importantly, changes of government have
occurred as a result of these elections. Moreover, in both countries there
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are workers' organisations which have a strong democratic heritage.
The trade union movements in both countries reflect a Mediterranean*
type of labour movement with a low overall ratio of union membership
and considerable fragmentation. Although they are far from being able
to perform the role played by Scandinavian trade unions

in the

establishment of a social democratic welfare state, they have considerable
defensive powers which can defend aspects of social citizenship as well
as civil and political rights
In addition, both Spain and Turkiye have true political parties.
Both countries are multi party systems. The party system of Turkiye is a
typical example of a multi-party system. In the party system of Turkiye
fragmentation has occurred both in the centre-right and in the centreleft. In Spain there are two major parties, the PSOE and PP, and minor
parties*41. Fragmentation in Spain is due to tensions brought by the
nationalities question. There are two kinds of left and right parties, ie.
country-wide-centre-right party and regional centre-right parties.
From my analysis of the development of the political systems in
both Turkiye and Spain I argue that the political systems are good
enough to allow social democratic parties to carry out policies to
promote social justice.

The developmental level of their political

systems corresponds to the level

of their economic

and social

development. Spain is economically and socially more developed than
Turkiye in terms of its ability to meet goals of social justice.

These

distinctions between Spain and Turkiye become clearer through an
analysis of economic and social development indicators which are the
themes of the next chapter.
*By Mediterranean I refer to the countries on the Mediterrannean sea. Their
characteristics include low ratio of union membership/ fragmented trade union and late
industrialisation.
41 By minor party, the parties far from being able to form government is meant here.
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CHAPTER THREE
SOCIAL JUSTICE
and ECONOM IC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPM ENT
in SPAIN and TURKIYE
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Introduction

In this chapter I shall address the question of whether the social
and economic development of Spain and Turkiye has reached a level
which can allow a social democratic party to address social justice issues.
As I explain in chapter one social democracy of the 1990s retains the
traditional goal of seeking to create conditions of social justice.

W hile

contemporary social democracy seeks social justice by different means in
than in earlier periods, the goal of social justice is unchanged. The means
to achieve the goal have changed, .as in many cases has the precise
definition of social justice has changed. In chapter two I examined the
parliamentary systems of Spain and Turkiye and their democratic
political institutions.

I found that parliamentary systems of both

countries are developed well enough for social democracy to gain office.
In this chapter I will analyse their economic and social developmental
levels. The argument of this chapter is that, while the levels of economic
and social development of Spain and Turkiye in comparison with three
developed countries in Europe: Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands,
have considerable areas in need of social democratic reform, the structure
of the economies allows for a more traditional social democratic alliance
to develop. The industrial structure of Spain and Turkiye is contrasted
with the service oriented and emerging "post-industrial" or "post-fordist"
economies of northern Europe. I will thus examine the contribution of
major sectors, such as agriculture, industry and services, to total civilian
employment and GDP. Their wealth, employment structure and lastly
regional

inequality

are

also

examined.

In

comparing

social

developmental levels, indicators used primarily by social democrats, ie.
health care and education, are used. Such study relies on analysing two
indexes published by the UN Development Program, the HDI and GDI
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LEVELS of ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT of SPAIN and TURKIYE

The developmental level of Spain and Turkiye are analysed to
understand
northern

their

specific problems

in comparison

with

developed

European social democratic countries, such as Denmark,

Germany and Netherlands.

The contributions of major sectors both to

GDP and to the total civilian employment of each country, GNP per
capita, GDP per capita PPP (Purchasing Power Parity), real GDP growth
rate, labour force participation and unemployment are examined to
enable a multi layered comparison.

Contributions of sectors to GDP & civilian employment

The contribution of major sectors, such as industry, agriculture and
the service sector, either to total civilian employment or to GDP, is an
indicator of the developmental level of a country. The contribution of
each sector both to GDP and to civilian employment is one of the
significant differences between developed and developing countries. In
the developed countries the contribution of services to GDP is high,
industry is decreasing its contribution from a high point usually achieved
over two decades ago, while that of agriculture is low. On the other hand,
in developing countries the contribution of agriculture is high but
declining, while that of industry is low but often growing.

There are

differences among developing countries as well depending on the
orientation of the economy: whether investment is export oriented or
geared to import substitution.
In

terms

of the

contribution

of

each

sector,

to

civilian

employment, Turkiye has a profile typical of a newly industrialised
country.

In 1992 the contribution of agriculture to total civilian

employment was 43.9 per cent, while industry was 22.1 per cent and that of
the service sector was 34 per cent. In contrast the figures in Denmark were
5.7 per cent, 27.7 per cent and 66.6 per cent respectively.

The difference
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between Turkiye and Germany and the Netherlands is much greater, as
will become apparent below.

Agriculture's contribution declined in

Turkiye 11 per cent from 1980 to 1992.

In Turkiye the decline of

agriculture's contribution has meant a shift in employment to both
industry and the service sector. In the developed countries industry's and
agriculture's contribution is declining and employment is growing in the
service sector.
In terms of the contribution of each sector to the GDP, the
developmental level of Turkiye is more moderate.

Although the

contribution of agriculture to total civilian employment is the highest
proportion, agriculture's contribution to the GDP is the lowest.

In 1992

agriculture's contribution to the GDP was 16.6 per cent, industry's 35.4 per
cent and the service sector's 48.0 per cent. In the light of these figures
Turkiye demonstrates that it is a country that has recently passed from a pre
industrial to an industrial country.
Table-Ill/I
Sectoral Contributions
Agriculture
Indus
try

Contributton to
civilian
employnient %

Service
Agri
culture
Indus
try

Contributton
to GDP
%

Service

Y ear
1980
1992
1980
1992
1980
1992
1980
1992
1980
1992
1980
1992

Turkiye
54.9
43.9
18.9
22.1
26.2
34.0
21.7
16.6
31.0
35.4
47.3
48.0

Spain
19.3
10.1
36.1
32.4
44.6
57.5
7.1
4.6
38.6
34.8
54.3
60.6

Denmark
7.1
5.7
30.4
27.7
62.4
66.6
4.8
3.5
25.0
23.5
70.2
73.1

Germany
5.3
3.1
43.7
38.3
52.9
58.5
2.1
1.3
42.7
8.2
55.2
60.5

Netherlands
4.9
4.0
31.7
24.6
63.6
71.4
3.5
3.6
31.8
28.1
63.7
68.2

(Source: OECD In Figures-188 1994)

Unlike Turkiye, Spain is an industrialised country. In terms of the
contribution of each sector to total civilian employment, according to 1992
figures, however, there are still important differences between Spain and
the developed countries.

Agriculture's contribution is 10.1 per cent in

Spain, while it is 5.7 per cent in Denmark. In comparison to the typical

173

share in developed countries agriculture has a very high share in civilian
employment.

Industry's contribution, at 32.4 per cent was higher than

both Denmark's, 27.7 per cent, and Netherlands', 24.6 per cent.

The

contribution of the service sector in Spain, 57.5 per cent, was only 1 per
cent less than that in Germany, 58.5 per cent, while it was considerably
less than that in Denmark, 66.6 per cent, and that in the Netherlands, 71.4
per cent. In terms of the changing trend of the contribution of each sector
to civilian employment, Spain shows a similar trend to the developed
countries.

While the contributions of both agriculture and industry

decline, the contribution of the service sector increases.
In terms of the contribution of major sectors to the GDP of Spain,
the figures show similar level to those of civilian employment.

In the

light of these figures it can be argued that Spain is an industrialised
country.

Income
The second criterion used for comparing countries is their GNPs
(Gross National Products). GNP can be used as an indicator of wealth of a
country. However, the size of the GNP does not give much information
about the particular nature of wealth in a country because it is the GNP
per head of population in the country which makes the amount of the
GNP for each citizen meaningful.

Typically lesser developed countries

show a low GNP per capita; although this is not always the case. Oil rich
countries with low populations and high GNPs are often poorly
developed in terms of the goods and services which are available to the
general population and wealth is often concentrated in a very few hands
(eg. Kuwait, Brunei, Saudi Arabia). Hence, while GNP per capita may be a
useful first indicator more qualitative measures must be used to
determine the level of development.

The rate of change of GNP per
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capita can give a useful index of trends. The GNP per capita of Spain and
Turkiye

in comparison

with the

developed

countries,

Denmark,

Germany and Netherlands, is shown below. As seen in table III/2, GNP
per capita in the developed countries is higher than those in Spain and
Turkiye.
Table- III/2
Current GNP Per Capita (US $)
Y ear
1970
1976
1980
1982
1986
1988
1989(ES)
1992

Turkiye
400
1,000
1,390
1,290
1,110
1,280
1,370
2,030

Spain
1,100
3,060
5,300
5,320
4,840
7,750
9,150
14,320

Denmark
3,130
8,040
13,120
12,110
12,650
18,540
20,510
26,310

Germany
2,860
7,480
13,340
12,270
11,990
18,460
20,750
23,360

Netherlands
2,500
6,850
12,020
10,930
10,040
14,510
16,010
20,850

(Source: World Tables 1989-90; Human Development Report 1995)
The trend figures are important in this comparison.

In 1970 GNP per

capita in Germany was 7 times higher than that in Turkiye. But the gap
between them increased to 11.5 times in the 1992. Turkiye has not been
able to reduce the gap despite considerable growth. The GNP per capita in
Spain in 1970 was 2.6 times less than that in Germany, while the gap
between them reduced to 1.63 times in 1992. In this period while Turkiye
increased its per capita GNP. 5 times Spain increased 13 times.

Real GDP per capita, PPP $
Even if wealth and income distribution figures are used the
question still arises as to whether GNP per capita is a satisfactory indicator
of comparative wealth for countries. In many ways it is not a satisfactory
measure because the level of prices as against wages in each country need
to be considered if the comparison is to be meaningful. After combining
the level of prices with GDP per capita there can be found a more
satisfactory indicator of wealth of a country or a better indicator of the
living
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standard of people in that country.

The method is called Purchasing

Power Parity12 (PPP), and it takes prices in each country into account when
finding real GDP per capita. The significance of this measure is illustrated
by the fact that, according to this method, the gap between Turkiye and
Germany reduces to three times (see table IH/3). Both Spain and Turkiye
significantly decrease the gap between them and the developed countries
in terms of GDP per capita PPP.
Table- m / 3
Real GDP Per Capita (PPP $)
Year
1987-a
1990-b
1990-c
1992-d

Turkiye
3,781
4,652
5,020
5,230

Spain
8,989
11,723
10,840
13,400

Denmark
15,119
16,781
15,380
19,080

Germany
14,730
18,213
16,290
21,120

Netherlands
12,661
15,695
14,600
17,780

a= actual
(Source:
b= Human Development Report 1993,
d= Human Development Report 1995,
c= World Development Report 1992)

The gap between Turkiye and Germany in 1987 was 3.895 times, it reduced
to 3.245 in 1990. In the same period the gap between Spain and Germany
reduced from 1.638 to 1.502 times. In this period in Spain the increase of
real GDP per capita PPP23 was 1.205 times, while in Turkiye it was 1.327
times.

2 (The purchasing p ow er parity (PPP) th eory is a short-cut method of estimating the
equilibrium exchange rate when a nation has a balance-of-payments disequilibrium. The
need for such a measurement arises because a nation does not usually have knowledge of the
exact shape of its demand and supply curves of foreign exchange. Indeed, the theory was
elaborated and brought forcefully back into use by the Swedish economist Cassel to
estimate the equilibrium exchange rate et which nations could return to the gold standard
after the disruption of international trade and the large changes in relative commodity
prices in the various nations caused by World War I. Of course, under a freely fluctuating
exchange rate system, there is no need for such a measurement since the exchange rate is
supposed to automatically gravitate towards the equilibrium rate. There is an absolute and
relative version of the PPP theory" (Salvatore 1993:473).
3 The examination of the Purchasing Power Parity, see the table in the appendix, in terms
of different needs, each country provides different level of living standards to its citizens.
For example, a certain amount of food and beverages and tobacco is U$ 66 in Turkiye, while
it is 92 U$ in Germany. The gap between Turkiye and Germany is 0.5 times, while in terms
of real GDP (PPP) the gap is three times. On the other hand, in terms of medical an d
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Growth of GDP
An analysis of the growth rate of real GDP shows that the lesser
developed countries reduced the gap between themselves and the
developed countries.

It is seen that the GDP growth rate of the lesser

developed countries is not less than those of the developed countries.
Table- ffl/4
Real GDP Growth Rate
Percentage changes from previous period
Y ear
1970-77
19781982198619901991199219931994-

Turkiye
6.1
1.5
3.6
7.0
9.3
0.9
6.0
7.5
-5.4

Spain
4.7
1.5
1.6
3.2
3.7
2.2
0.7
-1.1
2.0

Denmark
2.5
1.5
3.0
3.6
1.4
1.3
0.8
1.5
4.4

Germany
'
2.7
3.0
-0.9
2.3
5.7
5.0
2.2
-1.1
2.9

Netherlands
3.3
2.5
-1.4
2.7
4.1
2.3
1.3
0.4
2.5

OECD
average
3.5
4.1
-0.1
2.6
2.6
1.0
1.6
1.2
2.9

(Source: OECD Outlook- V.57,1995)

However, as seen from the GNP per capita, the gap between the two
groups has not decreased but has widened in favour of the developed
countries.

Employment
U nem ploym ent
The unemployment rate is another criterion used for compaiing the
economic performance of countries. The meaning of unemployment for
a country is that the country can not use its sources efficiently. There are
also social effects of unemployment. It can create social problems, such as
an increasing usage of drugs, alcohol and crime. As I argued in Chapter
one social democrats, such as C.A.R. Crosland, emphasise the negative
effects of unemployment on social justice. Many of the social democrats

health care the gap between them is twelve times.
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discussed in chapter one argued that full employment contributes to the
fulfilment of social justice, because citizenship, taken beyond m inimal
political rights, should entail a right to work (Sayers 1987:17).
In the 1990s, however, it is difficult to distinguish between
countries in terms of unemployment.

As seen from the figures below,

there are not many differences between the lesser developed and
developed countries.
Table- m / 5
Unemployment Rate
Y ear
1978198019821984198619881990199219931994-

Turkiye
9.8
8.1
7.0
7.6
7.9
8.4
8.0
7.9
8.7
10.9

Spain
7.0
11.5
16.4
20.1
21.0
19.5
16.3
18.4
22.7
24.1

Denmark
7.3
7.0
9.8
10.1
7.8
8.6
9.6
11.2
12.2
12.1

Germany
3.7
3.2
6.4
7.9
7.7
7.6
6.2
7.7
8.9
9.

OECD
average
5.2
5.7
7.9
7.9
7.8
6.8
6.2
7.6
8.0
8.1

Netherlands
3.8
4.0
8.5
10.6
8.4
7.8
6.0
5.4
6.5
7.5

(Source: OECD Outlook 1996)

In the 1990s, in all countries except in Spain, the percentage of
unemployment is similar.

The unemployment rate in Denmark is

higher than that in Turkiye. However, in the future it can be expected
that there will be higher unemployment

in Turkiye because of a

combination of its young population, its high population growth, rapid
rate of structural

change in its GDP, and changing employment

opportunities. In other words, more young people will expect work in
the future.
number

More people will be forced out of agriculture so that the

of unemployed

people will

increase.

In

unemployment rate is very close to the OECD average.
highest unemployment
countries,

despite

Turkiye

the

Spain has the

rate, 24.1 per cent in 1994, among OECD

14 years of socialist

government.

The

high
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unemployment rates in many European countries have a significant
effect on their ability to achieve social justice goals.

Due to high

unemployment rates in both countries, it cannot be argued that they can
contribute to the fulfilment of social justice or the requirements of social
citizenship.

But unemployment rates taken on their own can be

misleading if Labour force participation rates are not considered as well.

Labour force participation rate
To make a satisfactory statement about the state of employment of
a country and its effect on the fulfilment of social justice, labour force
participation and unemployment need to be analysed together. This is
because a low unemployment rate with low labour force participation
does not contribute to the fulfilment of social justice. In 1993 in Turkiye
labour force participation is 56.9 per cent and in Spain it is 57.7 per cent,
while in Denmark it is 81.3 per cent, in Germany 69.7 per cent and in
Netherlands 60.4 per cent. As seen from the figures below, the rate in
both Spain and Turkiye is much lower than those in the developed
countries and the OECD average.
Table- ffl/6
Labour force participation rate

Year

Turkiye

Spain

Denmark

Germany

Netherlands

76.1
79.2
80.3
82.6
82.8
81.2
81.3

68.7
68.3
67.3
68.0
68.6
69.9
69.7

60.3
57.7
57.4
56.4
57.4
59.6
60.4

59.8
71.6
1970-77
56.3
68.2
1980
55.8
62.9
1983
55.8
60.9
1986
57.3
59.6
1989
57.5
56.6
1992
57.7
56.9
1993
(Source: OECD Outlook, 1995 & 1996)

OECD
Average
67.5
69.0
68.8
69.4
70.6
70.9
70.7

It is also seen that in Turkiye participation declined from 71.6 per cent m
1970 / 1977 to 56.6 per cent in 1992 and then it slightly increased to 56.9 per
cent in 1993, while the decline in Spain stopped in the mid-1980s and
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then it slowly increased.

The decline in labour force participation in

Turkiye occurred against the age structure of the Turkish population which
was younger than it is now. Hie number of people eligible for work at
60.5 per cent in 1992 is higher than in I960, at 55.1 per cent. The cause of
the decline in labour force participation in Turkiye is most likely to be a
result of the decline of agriculture's contribution to total civilian
employment (see above table HI/1). Not all people who left agriculture
can return to the labour force in other forms of employment hence, they
tend to leave the labour market. Most of these people are women.

The

labour force participation of females demonstrates this argument because
women's labour force participation declined from 37.3 per cent in 1972 to
33.8 per cent in 1991 (see table m/23).
In summary thus far it can be seen that, in terms of the criteria
used by UN agencies and the OECD, Spain and Turkiye are less developed
than Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands. The gap between Turkiye
and the developed countries is obvious. Turkiye is a developing country,
especially in terms of the contribution of agriculture to total civilian
employment. The gap is much bigger in terms of current GNP per capita.
In the comparison of real GDP per capita (PPP $) the gap, however, is less.
The labour force participation in both Spain and Turkiye is less than
those in the developed countries.
unemployment.

In addition, Spain has huge

It, therefore, cannot be argued that Turkiye and,

especially Spain, contribute to the fulfilment of the social citizenship
provisions of social justice goals because of their high unemployment
and low labour force participation. But overall country comparisons can
be misleading to a degree if there are considerable regional variations.
Taking social justice criteria seriously, therefore, involves the study of
regional disparities.
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REGIONS: Form ation and Inequality

Clark has argued that transforming the Spanish state from an
authoritarian state requires both parliamentary democracy and regional
autonomy.

While many analyses of the restoration of democracy in

Spain, have highlighted the successful transformation of the political
institutions of the state from dictatorship to a parliamentary democracy
headed by a constitutional monarch, such accounts have focussed only on
the central apparatus of the state in Spain.

Equally as significant,

according to Clark, has been "the transformation of a unitary state into
one based on seventeen regional governments

called Autonomous

Communities."
One of the central features of post-Franco reforms has been
devoted to the devolution of increased power, resources, and
responsibility to Spain's "historic regions" (whose autonomous
status antedated the Spanish Civil War), as well as other
regions that gained autonomous status after 1978. Many would
argue that the gains for the autonomous regions during the late
1970s were of monumental importance for Spanish politics
(Clark 1987:139).

Hence,

one

of

the

important

features

of

the

democratic

transformation of Spain after the mid-1970s was the establishment of the
Autonomous Communities and the devolution of some powers of
central government to them. The Autonomous Communities or regions
are critical to this section.

Regions in Spain and Turkiye are examined

because they form a primary site of political, cultural and economic
identification. First, the formation of regions is examined. The causes of
divisions between regions are not only ethnic divergence but also the
geographical features of these countries, the historical development of the
administration systems of these countries, the needs of authoritarian
regimes and subjective sentiments. Second, the economic developmental
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level of regions is examined.

It is found that regions formed around

nationality questions also have different levels of development.

These

can be the relatively more developed regions in Spain, the Basque
Country and Catalonia, or the less developed regions in Turkiye, such as
Eastern Anatolia. Lastly, the process of economic development of regions
is analysed to examine the effects of central economic policies on the
development of these regions.

I argue that the effects of economic

policies applied to the East have made it the least developed in Turkiye.
Regionalism is thus a product of a whole configuration of social, cultural,
geographic, economic and political factors.
The nationalities question in both Spain and Turkiye has been
present for many decades and is analysed in chapter four. The question
arises: why do these countries have such movements?

Apart from the

nationalities question but often related to it are regionalist movements,
especially in Spain.

The formation of regions in both countries is the

theme of the next section.

The Formation of Regions
Spain
The causes of the formation of regions in Spain are not only
cultural, linguistic or racial but there are also geographical and historical
causes. Hooper argues that it is part of an existential crisis of Europe: to
some extent, the strength of regional feelings in Spain is simply a
manifestation of the Mediterranean tendency to subjectiveness (Hooper
1995:371). People give first priority to their patria chia, little fatherland,
and then to their regions.

The State comes after all these (Hooper

1995:372). Hooper adds to this subjective or physiological explanation a
physical cause, mountains between regions are another cause for the
formation of regions, as he argues:
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apart from being a formidable obstacle to communication between
the people of the periphery, it is itself rive by a succession of mountain
ranges -those East and West ramparts- as Laurie Lee called them,
which go ranging across Spain and divide its people into separate
races (Hooper 1995:372).

Barton4 agrees with Hooper about the effects of the geography of Spain on
the formation of regions.
The political and economic causes of the formation of separate
regions in Spain can be found in. the course of its history (Barton
1993:107). Hooper argues that the Muslim invasion was influential in the
formation of regions: "the Muslim invasion shattered the tentative unity
that had been achieved by the Visigoths" (Hooper 1995:374). When the
Muslims invaded Iberia, unification of regions in other countries of
Europe began. "The arrival of Muslims also put paid to any hope of a
single language5... Galician, Babel (language of Asturia), Castilian,
Aragonese, and Catalan..." (Hooper 1995:375) all flourished. The Muslim
invasion finished in 1492 by occupation of the Kingdom of Granada, the
last Muslim stronghold on the Peninsula (Hooper 1995:377). However,
Barton argues that the control achieved earlier by both the Romans and
Visigoths was very limited:
But if, as some historians have asserted, the administrative and
cultural unity imposed by Rome over the peninsula seems in
some way to presage the subsequent political unification of
Spain, recent studies have sought to emphasise the limitations
of their control... For one thing, we are told, the patina of
Roman culture was not spread evenly across the peninsula and
4 Barton argues that "the physical divisions have endowed the peninsula with an
astonishing regional diversity with the result that even if political unity has been
frequently held up by some as a natural goal, Spain's 'geographical handicap', as SanchezAlbomoz once referred to it, has in fact tended to encourage the development of regionalist
and separatist movements" (Barton 1993:106).
5 Hooper suggests that "today almost a quarter of Spain's inhabitants speak a vernacular
language in addition to, or instead of the official language of the State" (Hooper 1995:375).
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in some areas, notably in the mountainous districts of Galicia,
Asturias, Cantabria and the Basque country, tribal organisation
seems largely to have remained in place (Barton 1993:112).

Recent research suggests that despite the centralising efforts of the
Visigothic regime it retained all the fragility and decentralising
tendencies of the Roman Hispana before it (Barton 1993:114).
Although the political unification of Spain was completed, the
national unification of Spain was not (Barton 1993:107; Perez-Diaz
1993:194). Thompson claims that the contribution of the union of Castile
and Aragon to cultural as much as political and economic unity was very
limited.

He argues that even "the idea of community as a national

entity" was little developed not only in attempting to form a "union of
the crowns, but also in regard to the component kingdoms of the crown
of Castile itself" (Thompson 1995:127). It is explicit that Castile itself
opposed the process of true political and economic unionisation of Spain.
As Thompson argues:
Equally consistent was the belief, enunciated in a particularly
unambiguous manner by a royal councillor of Castile early in
the reign of Philip IV, restating what the Comuneros and the
Cortes had asserted a hundred years before, that The taxes that
are imposed should be for the defence of the province that pays
them, and for its own ends, and not to subsidise other princes,
or even for other associated kingdoms even if they belong to the
same king" (Thompson 1995:130-131).

Thompson argues6 the other kingdoms under the union were treated as
foreigners (Thompson 1995:132)7.

As illustrated above, the political

6 He also argues that: "it is much more common in the seventeenth century than in the
sixteenth to find the kingdom divided into Old Castile, New Castile and Andalucia, and
for a little' Castile to be spoken of as apart from some of the component parts of a 'greater'
Castile, such as Asturias and Galicia. Dominguez Oritz talks of an 'Andalusian front' in the
Cortes in the seventeenth century; but equally there are indications of a Castilian front, and
the hostility of Old Castile to Andalucia in the Cortes is apparent" (Thompson 1995:154).
7 Thompson argues that "Alongside the unrestrained enthusiasm for peninsular unity
expressed in certain political and cultural quarters in the later fifteenth century, there was
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unification of Spain was very limited, because even the leader of the
Union contributed to the continuation of small kingdoms, which are the
basis of today's regions.
Along with Castile's nullification of any movement toward a true
unification of Spain, political and economic divisions were apparent in
Castile itself (Newton 1983:100). Thompson argues that Castile was itself
a composite kingdom within a monarchy that was itself an aggregate of
monarchies. Castile performed the functions of both a core kingdom and
the ruler of an empire brought together during the course of the
Reconquest.

It was created by aggregating conquered lands within a

defined territory.

However, indistinct political, legal, cultural and

historical identities which had been partially submerged in the process of
conquest and resettlement remained. Due to the open-ended nature of
the Reconquista:
the protracted indefiniteness of the extent and the limits of the
territory of the crown of Castile, compared with the kingdoms
of the crown of Aragon, the accretion of successive layers of
space external to the core kingdom but themselves emotionally
void of political personality, ruptured the territorial coincidence
between community loyalty and political obedience. A clear
vision of Castilianism was therefore blurred by this parallax
between a core and an extended Castile. Eight kingdoms
continued to be individually represented in the Castilian Cortes
(Castile, Leon, Toledo, Murcia, Cordoba, Jaen, Seville, Granada)
and even in the early sixteenth century it was common to refer
pluralistically to 'the crown of the kingdoms of Castile, and of
Leon and of Granada' (Thompson 1995:136).

The politically, economically and culturally divergent state of Spain
created in these open-ended political arrangements continued until the
start of the industrialisation in Spain.

an equally pronounced sense of Castilian territoriality, in which the Aragonese were
regarded as no less foreign than Gascons and Navarrese (Thompson 1995:132).
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The restructuring of military organisation in the 17th century had
its effect on the development of both provincialism8 and regionalism.
Thompson9 argues the growth of regionalism was also related to
developments in military organisation and "the course of military events
in the seventeenth century which tended to enhance provincialism and
to create new institutional forms for the expression of provincial
sentiment".

The integration of the monarchy as a whole was thus

undermined by the exigencies of the military organisation which was
meant to facilitate it (Thompson 1995:152). This was because the structure
of military organisation both reflected and contributed to the political
and economically divergent nature of the state in Spam.

It is a very

important cause for the formation of regions in Spain, especially that of
Extremadura.
The politically and economically divergent state of Spain originates
because regions possessed special 'political faculties and economic
privileges'.

Hooper claims that under

the Habsburg and Bourbon

8 Thompson also argues that "the prevalent sense of community in Castile was civic rather
than national; Castile was a community of substantial, semi-independent cities and towns,
not (at least until the eighteenth century) dominated, as Catalonia, Valencia and Aragon,
by a single mega-capital city. That structure as a community of cities was embodied in the
composition of the Cortes" (Thompson 1995:137).
9 Thompson continues, "the squadrons, paid and fitted out by the provinces, were to sail
under the province's name, be commanded by native generals, admirals and captains,
manned by native seamen, winter in their own province, and, in the Galician case at least,
serve provincial interests. The net effect, it was recognised, by shaking natives out into
their own provincial squadrons, was to provincialise the entire Armada and to weaken the
specifically royal component in the fleet. Similarly, territorial defence and the problems
of military recruitment were leading towards a similar sort of provincialisation...
Moreover, the very experience of war, especially of front-line provinces like Galicia,
Extremadura and Andalucia, sharpened their sense of separateness from parts of the
kingdom less burdened and less ravaged. Army structure tended to reinforce this
separateness by taking on provincial forms and imposing a further institutional definition
on the sense of region. Significantly, it was as provinces that Galicia and Extremadura, by
financial contributions to the war effort, acquired their votes in the Cortes, the purchase
and cooperation both definition of regionality and an expression of regional solidarity. But
everywhere the intolerable burdens of war forced localities to think first themselves and
of what was best for themselves and their regions, rather than of the generality"
(Thompson 1995:153).
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monarchs, who ruled Spain from the beginning of the sixteenth century
until the end of the eighteen century...
several regions, which had been once independent, enjoyed
political faculties and economic privileges that seriously limited
the power of the central government and made the
construction of the modern state virtually impossible (Hooper
1995:379-380).

The effects of these privileges on the formation of regions and of regional
consciousness were very important.

For example, the economic

privileges of Navarre were to continue even under the Franco regime.
These

privileges

divided

the

Basque

home-land

into

the

two

Autonomous Communities, Navarre and the Basque Country. Regions
have been very jealous of these privileges and any attempt at annulling
them was a cause of rebellion in the regions (Hooper 1995:379).
It should be noted that the better organised forces seeking
autonomy in Spain could achieve 'home rule' status long before the
democratic transformation of the Spanish state in the 1970s. Under the
Second Republic, some of these autonomous communities, such as
Catalonia, Basques and Galicia, were granted 'home rule statutes10'.
Hence, today's division of the Spanish state into the Autonomous
Communities is not simply a phenomenon of the 1970s but its roots go
back to the Second Republic.
Apart from the effects of political and economic factors on the
formation of regions, colonial sentiments against some regions were also
a crucial cause. The 'undercurrent of discontent' in Catalonia and the
Basque Country had effects on the development of regions and on the
regional consciousness in these regions. Hooper claims that
10 Hooper argues that "When the Monarchy was once again overthrown m 1931, the
pressure for home rule was immense. The Catalans were granted a Statute of Autonomy m
1932, while the Basques and the Galicians were granted on the verge of gaming a limited
form of home rule when civil war broke out again in 1936" (Hooper 1995:382).
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the Bourbon Felipe V who emerged as the victor from the War
of Succession punished Catalans, Aragonese and Valencians who
had supported his opponent by annulling their laws and
institutions and thus creating within the Catalan speaking part of
Spain an undercurrent of discontent that has persisted to this day
(Hooper 1995:380).

Like Catalans, Basques11 have had the same feelings. This psychological
factor forced people of these regions to think that they have been treated
differently and thus they have similar interests or feelings. When these
feelings are combined with the cultural divergence of people living in
those areas from the rest of the people in the country, the areas inevitably
become regions.
Industrialisation112 has also affected the nationalities question.
Early industrialisation of some regions, such as the Basque Country and
Catalonia, in comparison with other parts of Spain is another reason for
differential ethnic nationalist consciousness.

It, however, can not be

argued that early industrialisation is a single cause by itself; it becomes an
important cause when it coincides with ethnic differences, such as those
of the Basques and Catalans.
The effects of early industrialisation in some regions on the
formation of today's regions becomes obvious when it coincides with
unequal development13 among regions (Newton 1983:101).

In other

words, in Spain unequal development of regions is another cause of the
formation of separate regions. As will be examined later, the economic

11 Hooper argues that "When Carlism was finally defeated in the 1870s the central
government penalised the Basques, including the large section of the community which had
stayed loyal to the central government, by annulling their traditional rights and
privileges" (Hooper 1995:381).
12 Hooper argues that "...these two parts of Spain, the Basques and the Catalans, were the
first to become industrialised and were therefore the earliest to nurture a substantial
middle class of the kind which, in many parts of the World, had been eager to support
nationalist aspirations (Hooper 1995:382).
13 This cause is very important in Turkiye as well.
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developmental level of some regions, such as Catalonia, Basque country
and Balearic Islands, are similar to Europe's post industrial countries,
while those of some others are well below the Spanish average.

The

unequal developmental level of regions is illustrated by the unequal
distribution of GDP per capita between the regions. For example, GDP per
capita income is 112.7 in Catalonia, while it is 75.1 in Andalucia; Spain's
average is 100. The inequality between regions contributes to regional
consciousness in both rich and poor regions.
Authoritarian regimes also contributed to the formation of regions.
As Hooper suggests/ ’Franco's centralism’ was another factor for the
formation of regions in Spain: "indeed, such was the intransigence of
Franco's centralism that it succeeded in creating nationalist groups in
areas such as Extremadura and Murcia where no one had previously
questioned their Spanishness" (Hooper 1995:383).
effects of authoritarian

governments

The regionalising

were further

aided by their

assimilation policies toward ethnic nationalities. This was most obvious
in the Franco era for Catalans and Basques.

The Franco regime had

banned the cultures of these 'historical communities'.

As Zaldivar and

Castells argue this was against the tradition in Spain:
Over the centuries Spain was built out of a national, linguistic
and institutional diversity. Even under the system of national
unity created by the Catholic Monarchs, a variety of regional
privileges remained, including those of Aragon, Catalonia,
Navarre, Ala va, Guipuzcoa, Vizcaya; and there was rich
cultural variety including Celtic elements in Galicia, and links
with the Caribbean in the Canary Islands. Repeated attempts in
Spanish history to abolish the fueros and unify institutions and
cultures by force (attempts that were successful in other
European countries, France for example) ran up against deep
popular feeling, and in the nineteenth century, against a
movement among bourgeoisie and middle classes of Catalonia
and Euskadi (Basque Country) for separation from a central
State remote from their history and social interests (Zaldivar &
Castells 1992:145).
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Due to the pressure on the ethnic nationalities and the banning of their
languages, names and the practice of culture, ethnic consciousness has
developed among members of the ethnic nationalities. Furthermore, this
factor has contributed to the worsening of the nationalities question in
Turkiye.

Turkiye

In Turkiye14, unlike in Spain, there are no political regions.
Regionalism is not institutionalised in the constitution and in political
organisations as it is in Spain. The centre has always had doubts about
devolving its authority not only to local governments but also to
peripheral organisations. This scepticism becomes more obvious in the
case of ethnic identity because devolving power to ethnic identities is
reminiscent of the fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire. The structure
of the Turkish state is, therefore, very centralised and there are no
political or administrative regions.

The basis of today's regions in

Turkiye, such as the Mediterranean, Aegean, Black Sea, Marmara, Central
Anatolia, East Anatolia, and South East Anatolia region, is geographical.
These are neither cultural, historical, nor administrative regions.

. .

In terms of levels of economic development and ethnic division,
however, Turkiye can be divided into regions. For example, although
Kurds reside in all parts of Turkiye, they constitute a majority of the
population in both Eastern and South East Anatolia.

Due to the ethnic

differences of the East from the rest of Turkiye, the East can be considered
as a separate region, like the Basque Country and Catalonia in Spain.
14 It has to be mentioned that as Oslon argues that in 1921 in the TBMM a decision on giving
Kurds an autonomous area which includes Tunceli, Elazig, Diyarbakir, Bingol, Mus, B itlis,
Batman, Siirt, Mardin, Hakkari and some parts of Malatya and Adiyaman was taken. The
decision was revised in 1924 just before Sheikh Said rebellion, but still it has not been put
into practice.
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During the Ottoman Empire the administration of Eastern Anatolia was
left to 'Agas'15 (feudal) forces in the East. This kind of administration
continued until the establishment of the Republic. The young Turkish
state had to fight the Kurdish nationalist movement. However, the new
Turkish state allowed feudalism to exist in the East and at times
collaborated with some feudal remnants to suppress rebellions.
The level of development of the East, as will become more evident
below, is considerably less than the rest of Turkiye. The unequal level of
development of the region has strengthened the development of the
Kurdish movement.

The underdevelopment of the region leads people

to think that they are treated differently from the rest of country. W hen
these feelings coincide with ethnic difference, regional consciousness and
ethnic nationalism, begin to rise.

The Economic Development Process of Regions
Spain

One of the main problems in Spain is the unequal economic
development of regions.

Development of some regions, such as the

Basque country and Catalonia, is similar to those of the developed
countries in Europe, while those of some regions, such as Extremadura
and Galicia, is considerably lower than the Spanish average.

The

question arises why some regions in Spain are more developed than
others? The question can be analysed from the case of either developed
regions or of less developed regions. In other words, both the causes of
early development of rich and industrialised regions and the causes of

15 Some feudal own thirty o forty villages. They can more importantly manipulate voters
in their villages. In other words, the success of a party, for example the DYP, depends cn
its relations with the Agas. There is no need to work on voters in these villages. If the DYP
convinced two or three Agas, it would take first place in that province.
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less development of relatively poor and less industrialised regions are
examined.
The geographical position of regions contributed to the early
development of some regions.

Harrison argues that the opportunity

which provinces in the periphery have had to trade with foreign markets
opened the way for them to develop. Hence:
... the Basque provinces owed their industrial and commercial
fortunes to their geographical situation on the main trade route
between central Spain and northern Europe (Harrison 1978:15).

By being on the periphery, these regions16 had an opportunity that the
others did not. This geographical opportunity would also create other
opportunities, such as very early construction of railways by foreign
investors in these areas.
The construction of railways in Spain accelerated the early
development of the regions on the periphery and in turn contributed to
unequal development between regions. Railway construction linked the
Spanish market to 'advanced capitalist nations of

.: Western Europe'.

Harrison argues that

The most deleterious effects of the railway building program
were that by entrusting the construction of the Spanish network
to foreign companies, each with its own conception of what most
beneficial to them, the Progressives and their successors
ensured the economic colonisation of Spain by European
capitalism. Instead of connecting the industrial producers with
the consuming public in the formation of a national market,
the lines built by Pereires, Rothschild and Pros-Gilhou for the
most part radiated from Madrid to the ports and the French
frontier.
Areas with little to offer to the great foreign
enterprises in terms of foodstuffs or raw materials, such as

16 Like the Basque provinces, "the initial expansion of the Catalan industry depended an
the existence of a prosperous regional market in agricultural products. But m the second
half of the century Catalan manufacturers came to rely on Spain's American colonies,
which provided a vigorous and expanding market for their products (Harrison 19 8. )
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Galicia, had very poor connections with the rest of Spain, while
Almeria in the south east had none at all (Harrison 1978:52-53).

Here lies another cause of unequal economic development between
regions in Spain: economic colonisation of Spain by other European
countries.

In the process of economic colonisation, foreign investors

invested only in those regions which were profitable to foreign rather
than national interests.

Foreign investment had little to offer to the

construction of the national market.

Thus foreign investment has

contributed to unequal

between regions in Turkiye.

development

Regions, such as Extremadura and Galicia, which had to rely on 'deficient
internal trade' within a poor market lost out (Harrison 1978:15).

The

more there were positive effects stemming from geographical position for
some regions to develop, the more the negative effects of geography
impeded development in other regions.
The distribution of land among agricultural families has also
impeded the economy of some regions. Harrison argues that "... poor
agricultural productivity, which resulted in chronically low per capita
incomes among rural consumers, in turn put the brakes on industrial
development" (Harrison 1993:14).

In southern Spain "large estates"

which control "one per cent of all holdings still occupy 49 per cent of the
cultivated land surface" (Harrison 1978:160).

At the other end of the

spectrum is Galicia which is a classic example of "an area of small
holdings ... in the north western corners of the Peninsula, whose land
surface is divided into 15 million parcels" (Harrison 1978:5). The negative
effects of the distribution of land on the unequal development between
regions can be reversed by the economic policies applied to these regions.
National economic

policies have

also strengthened unequal

development between regions. Such policies can affect the development
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of regions either by accelerating inequality between regions or by reducing
the inequality.

Payne argues that the relative neglect of the rural

economy is not just a measure of "the influence of wealthy landowners
in blocking reforms":
but also (due) to the fact that Franco's government, like most
twentieth century authoritarian states, has been much more
attracted by the glamorous goal of accelerating industrial growth
than by the prosaic tasks of reorganising peasant agriculture (Payne
1967:55).

The evidence gathered by Payne shows that relatively less developed
areas were neglected by the Franco regime. The growth of each sector
during the 1960s, lends weight to his argument.

For example, between

1960 and 1973 the growth rate of industry was 10.2 per cent, services 6.7
per cent and agriculture 2.3 per cent, while average growth was 7.2 %
(Harrison 1993:23). Neglect of agriculture as a result of national economic
policy contributed to inequality between regions in favour of the early
developed regions.

National economic policies also contributed to

inequality between regions in Turkiye.
In Spain inequality between regions declined in the 1980s.

As

Beltran argues, between 1983 and 1987 there was a significant equalising
process.

During this term, as seen in table-ffi/7, all relatively poor

regions, except Galicia, grew at a rate above the Spanish average.

The

growth rate17 was 6.9 per cent in Extremadura, 4.4 per cent in Castilla La
Mancha and 4.0 per cent in Andalucia. In the second term between 1985
and 1989, however, only Andalucia grew (4.9 per cent, above the average,
4.7 per cent) while Extremadura, Galicia and Castilla La Mancha grew but
did not meet the average. OECD figures between 1986 and 1990, tablem / 8 , show that both Andalucia and Castilla La Mancha grew above the

17 See appendix for sectoral distribution of the growth.
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country's average, while Galicia and Extremadura did not meet the
average. The reduction of the gap between rich and poor regions can also
be seen from the increase of real GDP per capita in each region.
Table-III/7
Real Rates of Growth in GDP,
Región
Extrem adura
C an arias
B aleares
Murcia
C astilla-La M ancha
V alencia
A ndalucia
Castilla-Y León
Spain average

1983-87
6.9
6.2
5.3
5.2
4.4
4.1
4.0
3.1
3.3

1985-89
3.9
5.5
5.9
5.4
4.3
5.4
4.9
4.0
4.7

Region
G alicia
N a v a rra
Madrid
Cataluña
Asturias
La Rioja
Euskadi
Cantabria
Aragon

1983-87
3.2
3.1
2.7
2.6
1.8
1.4
1.3
1.1
3.1

1985-89
4.0
5.0
4.6
5.0
2.9
5.0
3.7
4.7
5.1

(Source: 1983-1987 Beltran 1993:227; & 1985-1989 Zaldivar & Castells 1992:155)

The gap between rich and poor regions in terms of real GDP per
capita decreased in the 1980s. As seen from graph-III/2, the ratio between
the richest region, Balearic Islands, and the poorest, Extremadura, was
1.790:1 in 1985 and it reduced to 1.765:1 in 1990. A comparison of real GDP
per capita of each region with the EC's average shows that the inequality
between regions decreased in the 1980s. The argument is valid either for
the gap between Spain's average and relatively poor regions or for the gap
between rich and poor regions. TableTH/8 shows that Spain was more
egalitarian in the 1980s than in the 1960s. For example, the ratio of
inequality for Extremadura was 1.608:1 in 1960 and it reduced to 1,532:1 in
1989. The reduction is more obvious for Galicia and Castilla La Mancha.
Moreover, the ratio of inequality between the richest and the poorest
regions dropped in the 1980s. The ratio of inequality for Extremadura in
1960 was 2,698:1, while it dropped to 2,180:1 in 1989. For Galicia the ratio
was 2,421:1 and 1,765:1 respectively. For Castilla La Mancha it was 2,520:1
and 1,791:1 respectively, while for Andalucia it is 2,404:1 and 1,990.1
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respectively. Table III/8 shows that, in the 1980s, relatively poorer regions
also reduced the gap between them and the EC average.
Table-ni/8
Relative GDP per capita of Regions compared with EC, 1960-1989
__ _______________________ (Average EC = 100)_______________
Regions
1960
1964
Baleares
66.5
88.7
Madrid
81.4
97.5
Cataluña
86.4
101.0
N av arra
69.2
84.4
Aragón
63.3
■ 70.8
Basque Country
99.3
109.3
La Rioja
68.2
79.7
C. of V alencia
70.3
69.4
Total
59.2
68.3
Canarias
45.4
52.5
80.6
Cantabria
86.8
69.7
Asturias
71.6
Castilla Y León
47.3
60.7
Murcia
45.4
49.2
G alicia
41.0
47.5
Castilla-La Mancha
39.4
46.3
Andalucia
41.3
44.8
Extremadura
36.6
36.8
(Source: Zaldivar & Castells 1992:333)

1975
95.2
104.4
102.7
90.3
80.8
109.9
82.5
81.7
80.4
63.2
83.4
84.4
69.0
68.3
60.1
62.6
58.7
47.2

1985
107.4
94.6
88.9
78.8
79.8
81.1
78.6
76.5
71.8
66.2
70.6
68.9
64.4
60.2
57.1
55.2
50.9
47.2

1989
107.5
96.3
94.7
86.0
85.1
83.7
82.8
81.8
76.0
73.9
72.5
72.4
68.3
64.8
60.9
60.0
54.0
49.3

Therefore credit can be given to the Socialists for the reduction of
the gap between regions in the 1980s in Spain, because they were in office
during this term.

They have used the 'Inter-regional Compensation

Fund18 (Fondo de Compensación

Inter-territorial /FCIY effectively to

reduce the gap between rich and poor regions. The fund19 was designed
in the Constitution to help disparate regions. In the 1980s the relatively
poorer regions were given more funds than other regions. As a result, it

18 Donaghy and Newton argue that "Article 157.1 of the Constitution also foresaw the
creation of an Inter-regional Compensation Fund (Fondo de Compensación Inter-territorial
/FC I) as a means of ensuring adequate finances for the disparate regions. This has now
begun to function and the intention is that a minimum of thirty per cent of the amount
designated by the state for public investment should be channelled to the regions in
accordance with a 'needs' formula based on population density, income, emigration and
unemployment levels inter alia. In 1985 Andalucia and Galicia received by far the highest
proportion of the fund, twenty-seven per cent and ten per cent respectively" (Donaghy &
Newton 1987:106).
19 see appendix for distribution of the fund between regions.
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can be argued that the Socialist governments in Spain contributed to the
reduction of inequality between regions.

Turkiye

In Turkiye, unlike in Spain, inequality between regions has
increased.

Moreover, inequality between regions in Turkiye is worse

than that in Spain.

The formation of inequality between regions in

Turkiye has similar causes to that in Spain.

Increasing inequality has

origins which began with colonisation of the Ottoman Empire by
European countries. Sonmez argues that
when Europe started to colonise the Ottoman Empire, they chose
areas which were most beneficial to them. In 18th and 19th
centuries Europeans, especially French and British, built railway^ for
foodstuff and raw materials. These areas were also a market for
them (Sonmez 1990:73-74).

Hence, in a process similar to that in Spain, foreign interests dictated
where essential infrastructure would develop rather than national
interests.

Railways were built primarily to service foreign market

interests and to exploit Turkish resources. As a result the interests of
regions and the national economy suffered.

The railway arrived in

Eastern Anatolia in 1928. The railway between the eastern end of Eastern
Anatolia to the West Anatolia was completed in 1955.
Geographical and topographical conditions have also played an
important part in regional development. One of the causes of the early
development of Marmara is its climate and its prosperous cultivated
land. While the East has very hard winters and dry summers, the West
has a typical Mediterranean climate.

Eastern Anatolia also consists of

very high mountains; the average height is around 1,226 metres above sea
level (Sonmez 1990:256). Geography results in a very poor market in the
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East, while it results in productive agriculture in the West. However, it
has to be mentioned that until the 1960s the productivity of the East had
been equal to Turkiye's average. Since the 1960s, the productivity of the
East has dropped in comparison with the rest of Turkiye (Sonmez
1990:164-201).
Table- ffl/9
East Anatolia and Agricultural Population
A rea
Turkiye
The East
Percentage

Active Population
Total
20,556,786
3,379,789
16.4 %

Agricultural Population
%
58.9
75.6

(Source: Sonmez 1990:261)

The proportion of the population which depends on agriculture in
Eastern Anatolia is considerably above Turkiye's average. While 78.6 per
cent of the population in the East depends on agriculture, the average is
58.9 per cent in Turkiye. This very high proportion of the population
relying on agricultural income results in low per capita income in Eastern
Anatolia and in turn poor markets.

Against these obvious negative

conditions of the East, the question arises whether this process could have
been reversed by economic policies, or how could national economic
policies affect the development of the East?
The application of national economic policies ,in Eastern Anatolia
is another cause of its under development.

After the establishment of

Modern Turkish State, as Sonmez argues, Eastern Anatolia was seen as
'Turkiye's farm'. Furthermore, he argues the necessary policies to put a
brake on the vicious circle of poverty in the East were not implemented
(Sonmez 1990:152). Graph-III/3 shows that the contribution of agriculture
to the GDP of the East is 46.2 per cent, while that in Marmara is only 7.9
per cent. The contribution of industry is 10.5 per cent in the East, while it
is 33.7 per cent in Marmara (Sonmez 1990:152). In Turkiye, as in Spain
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during the Franco era "...in fast growth years of 1960s and 1970s, industry
which is the locomotive of growth was concentrated on regions other
than the Eastern Anatolia either by private hands or by the state"
(Sonmez 1990:156). For example, investment in the East concentrated on
the energy and mining areas. But, as Sonmez argues/"both energy and
mining were necessary for the industry in the West more than that in the
East". Therefore, the national government addressed the needs of the West
rather than those of "the East when making investment in the East" (Sonmez
1990:157).
Table-111/10

Istanbul
Marmara
East

State Investments and th e East
I.Plan
II.Plan
III.Plan
1963-67
1968-72
1973-77
7.40
8.30
5.80
11.70
12.00
12.00
11.92
7.11
11.85

Sectoral Distribution of investment made in th e East
24.1
40.0
Energy
5.0
Mine
9.6
13.2
14.6
Agriculture
11.0
Manufacturing
8.0
7.3
11.2
Transportation
3.0
5.0
H ealth
11.8
17.0
Education
6.3
11.9
Others

16.0
4.0
9.4
27.4
13.6
2.9
15.0
11.7

IV.Plan
1978-81
3.80
15.70
7.20

19.8
11.8
8.4
23.2
8.0
2.5
11.3
15.0

(Source: Sonmez 1990:158)

The data in table HI/10 proves this argument.

The general decline of

investment in the East reflects the drop in energy and mining, (the drop
between plan I. and plan II. and plan III. and planlV). The drop in energy
and mining investment from plan II. to plan HI. was 26 per cent, during
the same period the total drop in investment was 4.81 per cent.

As a

result, it can be argued that the economic policies applied to the East could
not help break the vicious circle of under development of the region.
Besides these policies, foreign investors contributed to the under
development of the East by investing in the Marmara region. In 1972 74.5
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per cent of all foreign firms in Turkiye were in the Marmara and 58.0 per
cent of them were in Istanbul.

In terms of capital investment, these

figures are 85.7 per cent and 49.7 per cent of capital invested respectively.
Table-m/U
The Distribution of Foreign Firms to regions, 1972
A rea

Foreign Investment
Firms
C apital
64
59,404
82
102,407
110
119,520
85.7
74.5
58.0
49.7

Istanbul
M arm ara
Turkiye
Marmara / Turkiye
Istanbul / Turkiye

Share of foreign
in total (%)
39.5
42.1
41.4
41.1
39.5

Turkiye
total capital
1,231,426
2,230,043
2,591,820
86.0
47.5

(Source: Sonmez 1990:57)

In a process similar to that I identified in Spain before the 1980s, a
combination of national economic policies and the actions of foreign
investors contributed to a vicious circle of unequal development between
regions in Turkiye.

.

The Economic Structure of the Regions
Spain
After analysing both the formation and the process of development
of regions, an analysis of the current level of their development is
necessary to identify

the social justice

contemporary social democratic program.

issues

involved

for any

It is necessary, moreover,

because the level of development of regions has significant effects on
nationalities questions such as the 'undercurrent of discontent in the
Basque Country and Catalonia and in the East in Turkiye.
We might recall that I have demonstrated that Spain consists of 17
Autonomous

Communities

and

two

provinces.

The

level

of

development of these regions differs. The difference can be seen through
either population density, or the regional structure of employment as
well as relative GDP per capita levels. The data in table-HI/12 shows that
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population density (population/regional area) is very high in Madrid,
Catalonia, the Basque Country, Valencia and Canary Islands, while it is
relatively low in Extremadura, Castilla La Mancha, Castilla Y Leon and
Aragon.
Table-m/12
Regional area, population and income, 1990, Spain
Regions
Andalucía
Canary Islands
C atalonia
V alencia
G alicia
Aragon
Asturias
Balearic Islands
Cantabria
Castilla - Leon
Castilla - La - Mancha
Extremadura
Madrid
Murcia
La Rioja
N av arra
Basque Country

Per cent
of
total area
17.3
1.4
6.3
4.6
5.8
9.4
2.1
1.0
1.0
18.7
15.7
8.2
1.6
2.2
1.0
2.1
1.4

Per cent
of total
population
17.8
3.8
15.5
9.8
7.2
3.1
2.9
1.8
1.4
6.8
4.4
2.9
12.6
2.6
0.7
1.3
5.5

Share in
GDP
%
13.4
3.8
18.8
18.8
5.5
3.4
2.8
2.3
1.3
6.1
3.7
1.9
16.0
2.6
0.7
1.7
6.5

Per capita
GDP
(Pesetas)
888
1,180
1,435
.
1,435
901
1,295
1,122
1,525
1,157
1,057
990
764
1,498
1,150
1,276
1,532
1,400

(Source: OECD Economic Surveys - Spain 1993)

The regions that have a high population density, the Basque Country,
Catalonia and Communidad Valencia also are amongst the most
industrialised regions in Spain.

The contribution of industry to total

civilian employment of

regions

these

(graph-III/1)

is considerably

higher than the Spanish average. The contribution of agriculture to total
civilian employment in Catalonia at 3.7 per cent, and in the Basque
Country at 2.9 per cent, is similar, while that in Valencia, at 8.4 per cent, is
relatively higher, but it is lower than the average of 10.7 per cent. The
contribution of service sector to civilian employment of these regions is
also similar, slightly lower than the average of 56.3 per cent.
mentioned regions are two of the most industrialised in Spain.

The last
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(Compiled from OECD Economic Surveys-Spain 1993)

In regions with relatively low population density, Extremadura,
Castilla La Mancha, Castilla Y Leon, the contribution of agriculture to
total civilian employment is higher than the average for Spain as a
whole.

The highest contribution is in Galicia with 30.2 per cent.

The

contribution of industry to civilian employment in these regions is well
below the average of 22.9 per cent. In Castilla La Mancha, however, the
contribution of industry is 22.7 per cent.

Only in the Canary Islands,

where the contribution of the service sector to civilian employment of
the region is

very high at 73.2 per cent is the contribution of industry

lower than that of the regions. These are the less industrialised regions in
Spain.
Examining the contribution of the service sector to civilian
employment shows that the regions with the highest average of service
sector employment are also amongst the rich regions, especially Madrid
and Baleares.

But the rule does not apply in the Canary Islands and

especially in Andalucia. Andalucia is amongst the poorer regions, while
Canarias is a middle-ranking region.

In these regions the higher
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contribution to employment of the service sector is due to the tourist
sector. The contribution of the service sector to civilian employment in
relatively poor regions differs. Galicia has the lowest proportion followed
by Castilla La Mancha, while Castilla Y Leon and Extremadura have
similar proportions, but still below the Spanish average.

Graph-III/2
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(Compiled from OECD Economic Surveys-Spain 1993)

Turkiye
Eastern Anatolia is the least developed region in Turkiye. With its
16.9 per cent of total population of Turkiye in 1985 (Sonmez 1990:259) it
covers 27.8 per cent of total area of Turkiye (Sonmez 1990:255). The ratio
of population/total area of the region is 0.607. The population density of
the East is considerably lower than that of the West. The East is also less
urbanised than the West.

In the mid-1980s the urban population in

Eastern Anatolia was 41 per cent, while the Turkish average was 53.0 per
cent (Sonmez 1990:260).

.
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An examination of the contribution of each sector to the GDP of
each region shows that Marmara is an industrialised region, while the
East is a pre-industrial region.
Graph-Ill/3
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(Compiled from Sonmez 1990:152)

The contribution of agriculture to the GDP of the East is 46.2 per cent
whilst it is only 7.9 per cent in Marmara. The contribution of industry to
the GDP of these regions is 10.5 per cent and 33.7 per cent respectively
(Sonmez 1990:152).
The inequality between the East and the rest of Turkiye is
illustrated by the contribution of each region to the GNP of Turkiye. The
share of the East to the GNP of Turkiye has declined since 1965. Its share
was 10.39 per cent in 1965 and it declined to 8.17 per cent in 1979 and to
7.68 per cent in 1986. As mentioned above, although the East has 16.9 per
cent of the population, its share of GNP is merely 7.68 per cent.

This

results in a very low per capita income in the East. On the other hand,
Marmara's share in GNP increased from 30.58 per cent in 1965 to 38.33 per
cent in 1986.
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Graph-Ill/4

The East, Marmara Region and Istanbul
/n

the distribution of the GNP ofTurkiye

--« --M a rm a ra
Istanbul
(Compiled from Sonmez 1990:67, 190, 193)

The comparison of GDP per capita in the East with that of Istanbul and
Turkiye's average shows that GDP per capita in the East is five times
lower than that in Istanbul and 1.5 times lower than Turkiye's average.
The East is considerably poorer than the other regions in Turkiye
(Sonmez 1990:67, 190, 193).
Table- ffi/13
Comparison of Per Capita, Istanbul and Eastern Anatolia

The richest provinces of
the East
The poorest provinces of
the East

A rea
Istanbul 1
Elazig
Siirt
Agri
H akkari

1965
100.0
34.3
33.0
16.8
18.2

1975
100.0
32.4
30.2
17.0
18.7

1985
100.0
53.3
21.9
10.7
9.5

(Source: Sonmez 1990:216)

The data in figure-5 show that in Turkiye, unlike in Spain, the
inequality between regions has increased. The ratio of inequality between
the national average and the poorest region (Spain/Extremadura) in
Spain in 1985 is 1.472:1, while in Turkiye (Turkiye/East) it was 2.394:1 in
1986.

The data in table III/13 and figure III/5 shows the extent to
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which the gap between the East and Istanbul increased between 1975 and
1985, while Turkiye’s average increased against Istanbul.
Graph- IH/5

(Compiled from Sonmez 1990:216)

The comparison of GDP per capita in the provinces in the East with
Istanbul shows that the gap between Istanbul and Hakkari in 1985 was
more than ten fold, while the gap between Istanbul and Elazig was two
fold. The East is not only the least developed region but it is also the
poorest region in Turkiye.
In summary in both Spain and Turkiye the importance of
nationalities questions have continued. The ETA in Spain and the PICK
in Turkiye have

long fought for independence.

The

democratic

transformation of the mid-1970s in Spain, however, contributed to the
resolution

of the

question.

Spain

was divided

into

seventeen

Autonomous Communities and the central government shares its power
(25 per cent of budget is spent by the Autonomous Communities) with
them (Maxwell and Spiegel 1994:77). In Turkiye, on the other hand, the
resolution of the question seems to be far away.
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The nationalities questions in Spain and Turkiye are not a
phenomenon of the 20th century.

They have existed throughout the

course of history, but in Turkiye the problem has increased in recent
years. There are many causes of regionalism. Spain has never really been
a united country even in the Middle Ages. However, politics has often
played

a

significant

representation

system

part

in

developing

in

the

Cortes

and

regional

identity;

restructured

the

military

organisation in the 17th and 18th centuries are among some of the most
important factors for the presence of .regionalism in Spain. The toleration
and presence of regional governments since the Middle Ages has been a
very important part of the administration system of Spain. Economic and
political privileges continued even under the Franco regime.

The

presence of privileges is not only due to jealousies of regions, but the
unwillingness of Castile to press for a true integration of kingdoms. The
barrier before the true integration of the union of Castile and Aragon was
Castile's treatment of Aragon. The treatment of the rebellious regions
resulted in an 'undercurrent of discontent' and this itself became a cause
for the development of regionalism.

The onset of industrialisation

deepened nationalities questions, especially in the Basque Country and
Catalonia. Later in the 20th century, the harsh assimilation policies of
authoritarian regimes increased both the 'undercurrent of discontent' and
national ethnic consciousness.

As I have also shown, the geographical

features of both countries were a cause of the formation of regions in both
countries.
The unequal developmental level of regions in both countries has
also contributed to nationalities questions. The causes for the formation
of unequal development in regions varies. The geographical positions of
some regions in both countries contributed to their early development.
The land structure and topography of relatively less developed regions
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was often a factor in their under development.

In the nineteenth

century, the regions on the periphery benefited from the economic
colonisation of both countries by other European countries.

The

construction of the railway started in the regions on the periphery, while
rail's arrival to the relatively poorer regions occurred almost a century
later. National economic policies introduced in the twentieth century
contributed to the under development of regions, especially in Turkiye.
Moreover, the political exigencies of authoritarian regimes in both
countries contributed to the formation of regions and of unequal
development between those regions. As a result, unequal development
between regions continues and this contributes to discontent which
underlies nationalities questions.
In Spain under the Socialist governments of the 1980s, the
inequality between poor and rich regions and the national average
decreased. The relatively poorer regions are now closer to the average.
Although the unequal development between regions is considerably
higher in Turkiye, the inequality between the East and the national
average has increased at a time when that in Spain was decreasing.
I have argued that the continuation of significant inequality
between regions in both countries will continue to contribute to the
nationalities question. But political causes remain highly significant the
contribution of authoritarian regimes to national unrest is probably
greater than that arising from the unequal developmental level of
regions. Observing the lessons of social democratic rule in Spain would
suggest that the resolution to the nationalities question in Turkiye
requires the establishment of a true democracy, which recognises national
and ethnic issues as legitimate and the devolution of some authority to
regions. Perhaps a federal system in Turkiye would resolve many of the
problems I have identified.
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LEVELS OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF SPAIN and TURKIYE
In comparing the achievements of various forms of the welfare
state and social democratic governments with liberal democrats, social
democratic Political Scientists such as Fracis Castles, use social indicators,
such as health care and education.

Health care is measured by: the

number of doctors and beds per capita, levels of infant mortality and life
expectancy. Education is measured by: literacy and school retainment
ratios.

These indicators illustrate the performance of governments in

meeting goals most contemporary social democrats regard as crucial to
achieving social justice.
policies.

They also show the consequences of public

In other words, the indicators are implications of equal

opportunity and social mobility. Due to the entrenched nature of gender
inequality and its special characteristics it is necessary in analysing social
indicators that gender difference is examined as a special issue.

One

important factor in examining gender difference is an analysis of female
labour force participation, as this has long been considered a strong
indicator of equality of opportunity in employment.

Before examining

such social indicators it is necessary to analyse the demographic features
of Spain and Turkiye .

Demography
The demography of Turkiye shows many of the characteristics of
developing countries, while that of Spain shows characteristics similar to
developed countries. The population growth rate of Turkiye is very high
at 2.3 per cent in 1991 /1992, while that of Spain is very low at 0.2% for the
same period. Turkiye also has very young population.

The data shows

that 35.1 per cent of the population is under 15 years age. Consequently,
the proportion of 15-64 age group in Turkiye is less than that in the other
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countries. The age structure of the population of Spain is similar to the
developed countries.
Table-m/14
Demography

1otal area I h ousand sq km
Population
1992
Growth
1974/75
rate
1991/92
under
1960
15
1992
Age
15-64
1960
structure
1992
64 and
1960
over
1992

Turkiye

Spain

780,6
59,233
2.4
0.220
41.2
35.1
55.1
60.5
3.7
4.4

504,8
39,085
1.0
2.3
27.3
18.4
64.5
67.6
8.2
14.0

Denmark

43,1
5,170
0.3
0.3
25.2
17.0
64.2
67.5
10.6
15.5

(Source: OECD In Figures-188 1994)

Germany

248,6
64,846
-0.4
1.2
21.3
15.5
67.8
69.2
10.9
15.3

Nether
lands

40.8
14,313
0.9
0.8
30.0
18.3
61.0
68.7
9.0
13.0

Health Care
The health care systems of Spain and Turkiye differs considerably.
And the difference demonstrates the impact of a long term social
democratic government addressing its traditional concerns in Spain.
Table- EU/15
Life Expectancy
Year
1981-c
1986-c
1987-a
1990-b
1990-c

Turkiye
62
65
65
65.1
67

Spain
74
76
77
77.0
76

Denmark
75
75
76
75.8
75

(Source: a= Human Development Report 1990,
b= Human Development Report 1993,
c= World Development Report 1992)

Germany
73
75
75
75.2
76

Netherlands
76
77
77
77.2
77

Health care in Spain is similar to that in developed countries, while
health care in Turkiye in comparison to both Spain and the developed
countries is considerably less developed. The success of the health care
systems in Spain and Turkiye can be measured by life expectancy figures.
In 1990 in Spain life expectancy was higher than Denmark and equal to
Germany, while life expectancy in Turkiye was considerably lower than
20

In 1996 it is 1.8.
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any of the comparators. The gap in life expectancy between Turkiye and
the Netherlands is 10 years.

Life expectancy in Turkiye, however,

increased by 5 years between 1981 and 1990. In terms of life expectancy
Spain is in the same category as most of the developed countries.

Infant Mortality
Tnfant mortality' rate is also one of the best available indicators of
health care system of a country (Castles 1978:64). A high infant mortality
rate is an indication of poor health care.
Table- m/16

Country

Life

1960
19.74

women
1960
1991
49.7
68.4

men
1960
46.5

1991
64.1

80.3

67.4

73.2

77.7

72.3

72.0

79.0

66.9

72.6

80.3

71.6

74.0

1991
5.65

Turkiye
4.37
0.78
72.2
Spain
2.15
0.75
74.1
Denmark
0.71
72.4
3.38
Germany
75.5
1.79
0.65
Netherlands
(Source: OECD In Figures-188 1994)

expectancy

at birth

Infant mortality

Although the infant mortality rate in Turkiye reduced from 19.74 per cent
in 1960 to 5.65 per cent in 1991, it is considerably higher than that of the
developed countries and also of that of Spain.

The above figures show

that, since the 1960s, Spain reduced infant mortality to the level of most
developed countries.

In terms of 'life expectancy at birth', although

Turkiye increased from 49.7 years for women and 46.5 years for men in
1960 to 68.4 years for women and 64.1 years for men in 1991, life
expectancies of both sexes at birth are considerably lower than both that in
Spain and those in the developed countries. In terms of both indicators,
Spain is in a similar category to most developed countries.
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Number of doctors, nurses and beds per capita
In terms of the number of doctors, nurses and beds per capita,
Spain also shows similar characteristics to the developed countries.
Turkiye, however, shows characteristics usually the preserve of less
developed countries.
Table- IE/17
Population per
Physician
Country
Turkiye
Spain
Denmark
Germany
N etherlands

1965
2,900
800
740
640
860

1980
1630
460
480
450
540

Nurses
1984
1,390
320
400
380
450

(Source: World Development Report 1992 & 1983)

1965
1,220
190
500
270

1980
1,130
330
210
170
130

1984
1,030
260
60
230

The data in table D3/17 and table-IE/18 shows there is a significant
difference between Turkiye and both Spain and the developed countries.
In the 1990s the number of doctors for per 1,000 population was 3.9 in
Spain, while it was 2.8 in Denmark, 3.2 in Germany, and 2.5 in the
Netherlands.

The. figures for Spain are even higher than those for a

number of the most developed countries.
Table- ffl/18
Per 1,000 of Population
D o cto rs

Country
Turkiye
Spain
Denmark
Germany
N etherlands

B eds

1991

1981

1991

1981

0 .9
3.9
2 .8
3 .2
2.5

0.6
2.6
2.4
2.3
2.0

2.4
4.3
7.8
10.4
11.4

2.1
5.1
8.0
11.3
12.2

(Source: OECD In Figure-188 1994)
The above figures display the consequences of health care in those
countries.

It is clear that Spain has similar quality health care to the

developed countries, while Turkiye has a less developed health care
system compared with both Spain and the developed countries.

The
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priority that each country gives to health care is seen through analysis of
health expenditure as a percentage of GDP.
The low proportion of Turkish GDP spent on health care goes a long
way towards explaining the poor performance of Turkiye in the above
mentioned indicators.

In all countries examined public sector health

expenditure is approximately 4 times higher than that of the private
sector, while in Turkiye public sector health expenditure is less than
private sector's. The figures also show that Turkiye spends less of its GDP
on health care than other countries examined.

Turkiye spends only 4.0

per cent of its GDP, while Denmark spends 6.3 per cent, Germany 8.0 per
cent, the Netherlands 7.9 per cent and Spain 6.6 per cent.
These figures shows that the health care system of Spain displays
similar characteristics to those of developed countries of northern
Europe. Spain spends more of its GDP on health care than Denmark.
Table-IE/19
Health Expenditure as a percentage of GDP, 1990
Country
Turkiye
Spain
.
Denmark
Germany
N etherlands

Total
4.0
6.6
6.3
8.0
7.9

Public sector
1.5
5.2
5.3
5.8
5.7

Private sector
2.5
1.4
1.0
2.2
2.2

Per capita
76
831
1,588
1,511
1,500

(Source: Human Development Report 1995)

In terms of per capita income spent on health care, however, there is
considerable difference between the less developed countries
developed countries.

and

To make the amount spent on health care

meaningful, the purchasing power parity of the amount spent needs to be
considered because the same amount of money (expressed as constant $
US) buys a different amount of service if that service is bought in
different countries. As data in the purchasing parity index (see appendix)
shows; different amounts of money are needed to buy the same basket of
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goods in different countries.

While the basket costs 39 US dollars in

Spain, it costs 62 US dollars in Germany. That is to say if we buy the same
amount of service in Germany instead of buying it in Spain an extra 23
US dollars has to be paid.

Therefore, the gap between Spain and the

developed countries in terms of GDP per capita spent on health care is
filled by the relatively low price of health services. This comparison does
not improve the position for Turkiye, despite its considerably lower price
level for health services there is still huge gap between it and that of
developed countries.

Education
Education is often used as a way of indirectly achieving equal
opportunity and social mobility.

Free (of direct charge) education for all

people, particularly at the tertiary level, can give the children of low
income earners an opportunity to jump to a higher social strata. That is
to say a child of manual worker can be an engineer and in turn enjoy a
better living standard. Of course there are conditions which limit the role
of education as an instrument for social change. For example, if there is
huge quality differences between public and private schools, education
may lose this role, because graduates from public schools will have less
chance of entering university or of finding a job. Although it is difficult
to examine the quality difference between public schools and private
schools, a substantial quality difference between them will negatively
affect the role of education in promoting social mobility. Governments
can contribute to the role of education by increasing the proportion of
national income spent on education. The proportion of GNP spent on
education, therefore, may give an overview of the level of education in a
country, but the best available indicator of education as an instrument for
social change is the retainment ratio of age cohorts between the ages 5
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and 29 (Castle 1978:63).

Higher percentages at all levels mean that the

number of students attending school is a high and that high percentage of
the children of low income earners is present at every level of education.
Lastly these indicators are completed by examining literacy rates to give
an indication of how Spain and Turkiye are meeting social development
goals.
Spain and Turkiye spend less of their GNP on public education
than Denmark and the Netherlands, although they have increased the
proportion in recent years.

Despite having a considerably younger

population (the number of people aged between 5 and 29 constitutes 51.8
per cent of its population) Turkiye spent 3.1 per cent of its GNP which was
1.1 per cent less than Spain, 4.4 per cent less than Denmark and 3.2 per
cent less than the Netherlands in 1991.
Table-

m/20.

Expenditure on Public Education

_____ as percentage of GNP_____
1990
1988
1980
1985
Country
3.1
1.8
2.3
2.8
Turkiye
4.2 (1989)
4.0
3.3
Spain
7.5 (1989)
7.7
7.2
6.9
Denmark
4.1
4.3
4.6
4.7
Germany
6.3
6.8
6.8
Netherlands 7.9
(Source: Statistical Abs1:ract of thé World, 19??)

As I argued earlier the proportion of GNP spent on education does not
give any idea about the role of education as an instrument of social
mobility.

Castle (Castle 1978:63) uses the retention ratio for the age

group 5 to 29 instead.

In Turkiye 38.8 per cent of this age group are

enrolled at the primary and lower levels, which is 11.2 per cent less than
Germany and 18.5 per cent less than Spain in 1991.

This gap may be

because of the underdevelopment of pre-school institutions, because
Turkiye's secondary school retention ratio is equal to the others.

On the
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other hand, in upper secondary at 5.3 per cent, and tertiary levels at 2.5 per
cent, there is a big gap between Turkiye and the other countries.

At the

upper secondary level the gap between Turkiye and Spain is 11.3 per cent,
while at the tertiary level it is 5.8 per cent. It can therefore be argued that
social mobility, which is defined above, in Turkiye is less than that in
Spain and in the developed countries.
Spain,

on the other hand, provides a similar

measure

of

participation of education to the developed countries in terms of
retention ratio. The proportion of students at the primary and lower,
secondary and upper secondary levels in Spain at 7.3 per cent, 3 per cent
and 4.6 per cent respectively are higher than those in Germany.
Table- III/21
Youth population and participation in education, 1991
Population
Share of enrolled students in the population, 5-29
, 5-29 as
percentage
Tertiary
Upper
Primary
of total
education
secondary
secondary
and lower
population
Country
2.5
5.3
31.0
38.8
51.8
Turkiye
8.3
17.0
32.0
57.3
39.1
Spain
8.6
12.4
29.0
50.0
32.4
Germany
9.6
12.3
35.8
57.7
35.8
France
(Source: OECD Economic Survey-Turkiye 1994)

Students as
share of
total
population
20.1
22.4
16.2
20.7

At the tertiary level, however, the retention ratio in Germany is 0.3 per
cent higher than that in Spain. It can be inferred that in Spain social
mobility, in terms of retention ratio, is as high as that in Germany, while
it is in Turkiye considerably less than those in the other countries.
Adult illiteracy is a widespread social problem in the lesser
developed countries, especially in Turkiye, although the signs of
reduction is seen in many lesser developed countries. The high rate of
illiteracy in Turkiye is inherited from the Ottoman Empire.

After the

change of the alphabet to the Roman alphabet in 1928, the data show that
literacy has rapidly
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increased. The increase in literacy was 15 per cent between 1960 and 1970,
5 per cent between 1970 and 1980 and 21 per cent between 1980 and 1990.
Table- m/22
Adult Literacy Rate (%)
Country
Turkiye
Spain
Denmark
Germany
N etherlands

1960a
40
87 ■

1970a
5 5 /1
94 .:
99
9 9 .'
99 -

—
—
—

1980c
60

1985b
74
95
99
99/
99

—

99
99
99

1990b
81
97.
99
9 9 ,'
9 9 ./,

(Source:
a= World Tables 1980,
b= Human Development Report 1993,
c= World Development Report 1983)

Developed countries resolved most of their illiteracy problems
before the 1970s. Spain, on the other hand, almost caught up with the
developed countries by the mid 1990s. There is only a 1.5 per cent gap
between Spain and the developed countries. As with the other indicators,
in terms of literacy level, Turkiye is less well developed than the other
countries, while Spain has almost resolved the illiteracy problem.

Fem ale participation in employment

Another criterion used for comparison of the level of social
development of countries is the labour force participation of females.
Female labour force participation relates to gender inequality.

Like

having a high proportion of females at all levels of education a higher
proportion

of

females

in labour

force

may

mean

there

is less

gender inequality and the country is more socially developed. But a high
female labour force participation ratio may also result from a large
percentage of the population being employed in agriculture. In terms of
female labour force participation, there is a significant difference
between

developed

and

developing

countries.

However,

the
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categorisation of the countries into developed and less developed is not as
clear as the indicators analysed earlier.
Table- m / 2 3
Labour Force, Female (%)

Year

Turkiye

Spain
1972
37.3
20.3
1976
36.1
22.1
1980
34.4
23.6
1984
34.1
24.0
1988
33.8
24.3
1990
33.7
24.4
1991
33.8
24.5
(Source: World Tables 1994)

Denmark

Germany

Netherlands

37.7
40.8
43.9
44.2
44.5
44.6
44.6

40.3
40.8
41.3
40.9
40.6
40.5
39.2

27.3
29.1
31.0
31.0
30.9
30.9
30.8

Female labour force participation in Germany and Denmark is higher
than that in Spain and Turkiye.

On the other hand, participation in

Turkiye is higher than that in the Netherlands.

Unlike the other

countries, participation in Turkiye decreased until 1990, which may be
because

of the

declining

contribution

of

agriculture

to

civilian

employment. While the contribution of industry and of service sectors to
civilian employment increased, women who are forced out of agriculture
are unable to return to employment because of their lower educational
level and because of cultural barriers.
In Spain female labour force participation is considerably lower
than both that in Turkiye and those in the developed countries. This is a
very interesting statistic when we consider the strength of the Spanish
tourist sector which often employs less qualified women.

However,

because of the high proportion of Spanish females in higher education it
is reasonable to expect that a higher proportion of Spanish females will
gain employment in the future.
In

summary

it

is

difficult

to

categorise

countries

into

developmental groups because many sometimes contradictory criteria
have to be used and according to different criteria countries fit into
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different categories. Life expectancy at birth in Spain is higher than that
in Germany and Denmark. Female labour force participation in Turkiye
is higher than that in the Netherlands. The number of doctors per one
thousand people in Spain is higher than that in all developed countries.
More importantly in terms of the HDI (human development index)
Spain ranks ninth in the World, while Denmark ranks sixteenth,
Germany fifteenth, and the Netherlands fourth. However, in terms of
infant mortality, the number of beds for per one thousand people and adult
literacy rate, Spain and Turkiye are less developed than Denmark, Germany
and the Netherlands.

It is clear that in terms of the indicators of social

development, Turkiye is one of the lesser developed countries in Europe,
while Spain can be regarded as a developed country.

Human Development Index (HDI)
The Human Development Index (HDI) combines key social and
economic indicators together and ranks all countries in the World. The
HDI is a composite of

three measurements: "life expectancy at birth,

educational attainment, comprising adult literacy, with two thirds weight,
and a combined primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment ratio, with
one third of weight; and income..." Each country is given a HDI value
which indicates the distance that country has to go to achieve a set of
defined goals: "an average life span of 85 years, access to education for all
and a decent level of income." The aim of each country is have its HDI
score as close to 1 as possible, as that indicates it is in sight of achieving its
goals. Income is treated in a complex manner.

"The HDI adjusts real

income (in purchasing power parity (PPP) dollars) for the diminishing
utility of higher levels of income to human development. The premise
is that people do not need an infinite income for a decent standaid of
living. So, the HDI defines a threshold for income regarded as adequate
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for a reasonable standard of living."

The threshold is set by calculating

"the average global real GDP per capita in PPP dollars in 1992", this
amounted to about US $ 5,000 (Human Development Report-1995:18).
The HDI can thus be considered as an indicator of the social
developmental level of a country. It consists of social indicators, such as
the school retention ratio, adult literacy rate, life expectancy at birth and
it also combines these with income.

As mentioned above, the school

retention ratio is the best available indicator of the role of education as a
social mobility instrument, while the infant mortality rate is the best
available indicator of the role of health care as an equal opportunity
instrument (Castle 1978:63, 64).
The inclusion of GDP per capita (PPP) in the HDI makes it a
valuable indicator in comparing countries. But the HDI should not be
considered, on its own, as a sufficient indicator of development. This is
because there are other indicators, such as the indicators of gender
inequality, that need to be used for examining the level of development
of countries and comparing countries. However, because it is a composite
of valuable indicators the HDI can be used as one measure of the social
developmental level of a country, and for comparing countries to be used
in combination with other measures.
Using the HDI as an indicator of social development of a country, it
is seen that while Spain ranks very high, Turkiye ranks very low among
European countries in the World ranking. Spain's ranking is higher than
Denmark's

and Germany's, although

its real GDP per capita is

considerably less than Denmark's and Germany's. Spain jumps twenty
rungs up the ladder as the last column shows. That means Spain is closer
to 'certain defined goals' given above. On the other hand, Turkiye is far
behind the other countries. Turkiye also falls one rank down in comparison
with its real GDP per capita.
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Table- IÏÏ/24
Human Development Index (HDI), 1992

Country
Turkiye
Spain
Denmark
Germany
Netherlands

Life
expec
fancy
at
birth
years
1992
66.5
77.6 .
75.3
76.0
77.4

Adul
t
litera
cy
rate
%
1992
80.5
98.0
99.0
99.0
99.0

Combi
ned
l.,2., 3.
level
gross
en.lme
nt
ratio %
1992
61
86
84
81
88

Real
GDP
PPP$
capita
1992
5,230
13.400
19,080
21,120
17,780

Adjust
ed
Real
GDP

Life
expe
ctan
cy

5,141
5,307
5,346
5,367
5,343

0.69
0.88
0.84
0.85
0.87

Educ
GDP
ation
real
index
0.74
0.94
0.94
0.94
0.94
0.98
0.93
0.98
0.95
0.98

HDI

GDP
per
capita
PPP$
rank
index
minus
HDI

0.792
0.930
0.920
0.921
0.936

-1
20
-4
-9
16

(Source: Human Development Report 1995)

As seen from the figures above, in terms of their social developmental
levels, Spain is not only closer to the 'defined goals7, but it is also included
with the developed countries, such as Germany and Denmark, while
Turkiye is categorised with the lesser developed countries. However, as
mentioned above, to make the level of social development of these
countries clearer, we also need to analyse the indicators of gender
inequality in these countries.

Gender related Development Index (GDI)
I argued above that gender inequality is a critical indicator of social
development and a crucial measure of social justice. In addition to the
HDI, the United Nations calculates another index called the GDI. As the
table below shows, the calculation of the GDI uses the same indicators as
the HDI.

But in addition the GDI analyses gender inequality.

The

methodology used to calculate the GDI imposes a penalty weighting for
inequality. Hence, the GDI will fall if the achievement levels of both
women and men in a country decline/ or if a greater disparity between
their achievement arises. ’’The greater the gender disparity in basic
capabilities, the lower a country's GDI compared with its HDI. The GDI is
simply the HDI discounted, or adjusted downward for gender inequality”
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(Human Development Report 1995: 73). Examination of the GDI thus
makes clearer the social developmental levels of countries.
Table-m/25
GDI (gender related development index) ranking 1992

C o u n tr y
T u rk iy e
S p a in
D en m ark
N e th e r la n d s

GDÏ

GDI
ran k

0 .7 4 4
0 .7 9 5
0 .9 0 4
0 .8 5 1

45
34
4
20

S h a re o f
e a rn e d in com e
%

A d u lt literacy
ra te
L ife ex p ecta n cy
y e a rs (1 9 9 2 )

(%)
1992

C o m b in e d
p r im a r y
seco n d a ry and
te rtia ry g ro ss
e n ro lm en t
r a tio (% ) 1 9 9 0

F

M

F

M

F

M

F

M

3 0 .2
1 8 .6
3 9 .8
2 5 .2

6 9 .8
8 1 .4
6 0 ,2
7 4 .8

6 8 .6
8 0 .5
7 8 .2
8 0 .4

6 4 .5
7 4 .6
7 2 .5
7 4 .4

7 0 .1
9 8 .0
9 9 .0
9 9 .0

9 0 .6
9 8 .0
9 9 .0
9 9 .0

5 4 .1
8 8 .7
8 5 .6
8 6 .5

6 8 .3
8 3 .0
8 2 .3
8 9 .4

HDI
ran k
m inu s
GDI
ran k
21
-2 6
10
-1 6

(Source: Human Development Report 1995)

The GDI ranking of countries (see table III/ 25) differs from the HDI
ranking.

Turkiye's ranking increases in the GDI calculation

in

comparison to the HDI, while Spain's ranking decreases. Like Turkiye,
Denmark's ranking increases as well. However, inequality between sexes
in Turkiye is only lower in the share of earned income21, while in
education the disparity is higher than those in the other countries.

For

example, in terms of the gross enrolment ratio the inequality in Turkiye is
14.2 per cent, while in the Netherlands it is 2.9 per cent, in Spain 5.7 per cent
and in Denmark 3.3 per cent. A reduction of gender inequality in education
in Turkiye will significantly increase its GDI ranking.
Consideration of the GDI shows that Spain s social developmental
level falls to the category of less developed countries, while Turkiye
remains in the category of less developed countries, despite her better
performance in the gender inequality ranking.

Conclusion

I have argued that Spain, and especially Turkiye, are members of
the lesser developed countries in Europe.

However, in terms of both

21 See also for lower average wage for women in Appendix.
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economic

and social development

indicators,

distinction between Turkiye and Spain.

there

should

be a

The level of development in

Spain is very close to that of developed countries, particularly in
considering most indicators of social development. Turkiye, on the other
hand, displays the status of a newly industrialised country.

The

contribution of agriculture to total civilian employment is very high,
while that of industry is over 20 per cent, but still lags behind the other
countries. In both Spain and Turkiye a key index of their lower
developmental levels is indicated by their substantial inequality between
regions.
The sharpest distinction between Spain and Turkiye is in GDP per
capita. Their employment structures, however, do not differ. Their labor
force participation rates are similar and lower than the developed
countries.

Despite the low labour force participation rate in Spain,

unemployment is very high. In Turkiye it is closer to the OECD average.
In Spain female labor force participation is very low, while in Turkiye it is
higher even than that of the Netherlands. Hence, in terms of the level of
economic

development,

Spain, and especially Turkiye,

are lesser

developed countries in Europe.
Inequality between regions is one of the most important problems
before both countries.

It is one of the chief causes of nationalities

problems, either for relatively richer regions in Spain, or poorer regions
in Turkiye. There are, however, many other reasons for the formation of
regions in both countries, such as ethnic nationalities, the development
of

the

political

manipulation

system,

authoritarian

of economic development

regimes,

geography,

the

by foreign investors

and

national and international economic policies.

It should be noted that

social democrats in Spain have been remarkably successful in reducing
inequality through both economic and political measures, especially by
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decentralising power through autonomous regions. On the other hand,
Turkiye regional inequalities have increased sharply, as the Kurdish
separatist movement

has intensified.

Following Spain's lead, the

regional question in Turkiye requires resolution through a combination
of economic, political and social policies, as distinct from a passive
reliance on the benign ’trickle-down* effects of economic development
which appears to be Turkiye’s response.
The levels of social development in Spain and Turkiye differ
sharply. The indicators of social development show there are significant
differences between Turkiye and both the developed countries and Spain.
Turkiye is a less developed country socially as well as economically.
However, the distinction is not as sharp between Spain and the
developed countries of Europe because Spain displays similar levels of
social development to the developed countries on most indices. The HDI
ranking shows that, despite its lower level of GDP per capita, Spain ranks
higher than Germany and Denmark.

Interestingly however, Turkiye's

ranking increases in the GDI comparisons, while

Spain's ranking

decreases.
The lower social and economic developmental levels of Spain and
Turkiye cannot be inferred, however, that their developmental levels are
not adequate for social democracy to be successful in implementing its
policies.

Rather their level of development, especially that of Turkiye,

means that social democratic policies are imperative, because social
democrats focus on meeting both indicators of human development and
the quality of economic growth.

Their level of social and economic

development is sufficient as is their parliamentary system for social
democracy to work.
Both countries have, however, problems which may impede the
parliamentary

process.

These problems are human

right abuses,
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nationalities questions and in Turkiye religious fundamentalism.

These

specific problems need examination to make clearer their implications for a
social democratic program and democracy.
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C H A PTER FO U R
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Introduction

This chapter examines the specific problems which impede
achieving the goals of social justice in Spain and Turkiye. The presence
of these problems is an indication of the imperfection of democracy in
both countries. I argue that such issues do not simply represent goals
for social democratic attention but may even hinder social democracy in
carrying out its policies through the parliamentary system.

These

problems, therefore, require examination to make the extent of their
impact on the respective political systems clearer.

The existence of

gender inequality clearly affects the process of democracy. As I argued
in chapter three, gender inequality is also an important indicator of
social development.

Hence, any progress towards the resolution of

gender inequality in Spain and Turkiye needs to be examined.
As I argued in the second and third chapter, Spain, through its
democratic transformation
successful in resolving

in the mid-1970s has been relatively

a number

of problems

associated with

nationalities issues and inequalities between regions. However, there
are still serious allegations of human rights abuses associated with
nationalities issues in Spain, such as extra-judicial executions of
members of the separatist Basque group, the ETA. It is evident from
Amnesty International campaigns against human rights abuses that
human right abuses are more widespread in Turkiye.

The Kurdish

separatist movement has been an ongoing problem for Turkiye since
the establishment of the Republic. The Islamist movement, like the
Kurdish movement, has become a serious threat to secularism.

Since

the early 1980s both problems have deepened.
Gender differences in Spain and Turkiye clearly exist.

Although

there are no legal restrictions on women's rights in both countries,
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women have a low level of participation in the labour force and their
literacy rate is low.

They are employed in home-based or in

unrecognised work, such as in agriculture. The number of women in
professional occupations and in politics is very low, especially in
Turkiye. However, the statistics show that the overall conditions for
women have improved in both countries, especially in Spain.
It is difficult, however, to argue there has been adequate progress
in protecting human

rights, especially in Turkiye.

Freedom of

expression and basic civil and political rights such as freedom from illtreatment by security forces, racial and religious discrimination are not
fully guaranteed, at least to the degree that they are in the d ev elop ed
countries.
In this chapter, therefore, I shall examine aspects of civil, political
and human rights. These issues are inseparable from gender inequality,
nationalities

questions

and

the

challenge

from

Islamist

fundamentalism in Turkiye. These issues constitute the main social
justice issues which need to be addressed in any social democratic
political program in Turkiye or Spain.

Gender Issues and Social Justice
Along with many other aspects of social development conditions
for women in Spain have improved in the last two decades. Arribas
argues that one of "the most significant changes to have taken place in
Spain in the last two decades is to the role that women play in society.
They now enjoy a higher level of formal education and thereby an
enhanced presence in the employment market. Such achievements are
accompanied by a greater measure of financial independence. In areas
of legal and social equality Spanish women have made consistent gains
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in the past few years (Arribas 1991:183). These improvements began with
the democratic transformation of the mid-1970s (Trefall 1985:49).
Table-IV /1
’Changes to the Social Situation of Women in Spain’
1950
% of illiteracy
18.3
Children per women
2.5
% women total active population
15.8
% women in agriculture
% of active women with higher qualificat
% women of total university students
—
(Source: Arribas 1991:193)

1960
17.8
2.9
20.1

—

—

—
—

---

1970
12.2
2.8
19.6
26.8
0.6
31.5

1975
10.3
—

21.3
20.9
6.2
31.6

1980/1
8.9
2
24.8
17.1
8.7
39.7

1985/6
5.0
1.2
34.4
12.6
14.1
53.7

These improvements to the role of women began with the
abrogation of laws which were obstacles to women's advancement. The
first step was made in the making of 1978 the Spanish Constitution.
Browne argues that the constitution paved the way for a number of
significant reforms that "were to affect women

directly."

The

Constitution created a framework which made equal treatment for
women a legal requirement and part of the necessary underlying
political consensus, not something "intrinsically threatening to the
social order". The constitution goes further than making all Spaniards
equal before the law (Article 14). It specifically protects women's 'right
to work' and to 'a free choice of occupation or activity, to promotion
through work and to remuneration sufficient to meet their needs and
those of their family.'

And it proclaims that women 'shall in no

circumstances be subjected to discrimination based on sex' (A.35)
(Browne 1989:71).
The 1978 Constitution made more than a symbolic contribution
to improving conditions for women.

Many of the barriers that

had previously prevented women from participating in active life
were abolished in the democratic transformation of the mid-1970s
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(Threlfall 1985:49). The data in Table IV/1 show female illiteracy has
declined while the proportion of women at tertiary level is now above 50
per cent. The percentage of women in the labor force has increased to
almost 50 per cent in the years between 1980 and 1985, while that in
agriculture

decreased.

The

number

of

women

with

higher

qualifications has also increased. Social and economic conditions for
Spanish women have improved significantly, but the effects of these
improvements, however, have not yet made their mark in politics.
Active participation of women in politics is low.

Table IV/2

shows that the number of women parliamentarians is very low,
amounting proportionately to around 6 per cent of total members of
Congress (Browne 1989:70). Browne1 argues that while the number of
women in the labour force has increased, the number of women elected
to the Cortes has been steady (Browne 1989:70). The number of women
enrolling in a political party has also been steady (Threlfall 1984:147).
Table- IV/2
Women in Parliament-Congress of Depu ties
Parliamentary groups
AP
UCD
S o cialist
Communist
C a ta la n
O thers
Total Women

1977-79
No.
%
16
1
7
4.2
10
8.5
3
15.0

1979-82
No.
%
11
2
10
6.0
5
4.0
2
8.7

1982No.
1
0
15
0
19

21

20

13

6.0

5.7

%
—7.4
—-

5.1

(Threlfall 1984:153)

Gender issues present a special set of difficulties for social
democrats in Spain.

It needs to be stressed that polling data suggest

1 Browne argues that "overall, female representation in the Cortes has settled a t
almost about 6 per cent, a level comparable with many other West European countries,
but considerably lower than in Scandinavia. In the mid-1980s, 8 per cent of councillors,
and 6 per cent of the members of autonomous parliaments were female" (Browne
1989:70).
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that the majority of Spanish women prefer right and centre-right wing
political parties. Such conservative parties defend many of the current
values of society which discriminate against women.

Threlfall argues

that the extent of this preference has not dropped under 6 per cent in
favour of centre and right parties (Threlfall 1984:140-146). Hence the
Socialists have a considerable organisational and programatic task
before them to make attract votes from women and gain more women
candidates.
In many developed northern European countries improvement
in the conditions for women are directly related to the strength of the
women's movement.

An active women's movement means that

gender issues will occupy politics and in turn the resolution of many
gender issues will be quicker.

Browne argues that "in Spain the

women's movement has been marginal to the mass of women in
Spanish society, playing the role of agent provocation but ultimately
less influential than the media, the opinion polls and the political parties
(Moxon-Browne 1989:76).
Browne argues that, however, there are a wide range

of

associations relating to women which came into existence in the mid1980s which are "wholly or partly devoted to the advancement of
women's interests". The Coordinadora Estatal is an umbrella group for
feminist associations associated with non-parliamentary parties.

The

two major trade union federations, "the UGT and the C om isiones
Obreras, have women's

groups".

The Roman

Catholic Church

sponsors "a network of women's group throughout the country whose
role is rather ambivalent, at least from a feminist perspective... . The
Association of Conservative Women which aims to preserve what it
regards as the best of traditional values while addressing women s role
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in modern society is allied to the Alianza Popular . There are also
numerous other women's groups which provide services for women
such as abortion advice centres, literacy groups, rape counselling
services and refuges for battered wives.
Table- IV/3
Estimated Distribution of Vote According to Gender and party
General Elections 1979 and 1982
% of total
Left-wing parties
1979
1982
PSOE
30.5
48.4
PCE
10.8
4.1
Sub-total
41.3
52.3
Centre and rig it wing parties
CDS
2.9
CD
5.7
UCD
35.0
7.1
AP
26.2
Sub-total
40.7
36.2
(Source: Threlfall 1984:142-3)

% men

% women

1979
31.5
14.3
44.8

1982
51.7
5.7
57.4

----- 2.7
4.6
29.2

-—

—

33.8

5.8
24.9
33.4

1979
28.4
7.1
35.5

1982
45.0
2.5
47.5

3.1
6.7
39.1
—

45.8

8.7
27.5
39.3

Such organisations may not necessarily be feminist in outlook (MoxonBrowne 1989:80-81). Spanish social democracy thus needs a stronger basis
of support from a more clearly feminist inspired women's movement.
Many of the political changes need to be aided by widespread adoption
into society, through women's groups. Spanish social democracy has
yet to find a successful way of bringing about a transformation of civil
society which will complete its tasks in addressing gender issues.
It is evident that the political and social rights of Spanish women
have been clarified and protected since the democratic transformation
in

the

mid-1970s

by changing

laws and encouraging

greater

participation of women in education and employment. However, as I
argued in chapter three, it is difficult to argue that the gender inequality
in Spain has been reduced to the level of that accepted in the developed
countries of northern Europe.
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In Turkiye, as in Spain, gender inequality is greater than in
developed countries. Kazgan argues that it was only from late in the
19th century that women began to make their mark in the labour
market.

Women were employed first as teachers in girls' schools

demonstrating the influence of Western ideas which were adopted
mostly in the upper social class.

Nearly twenty years later women

started work in factories. Similar to developments in other European
countries this was mainly a result of labour shortages brought about by
successive wars.
professional

Both the first wave of female employment in

work and the second in factory labour

met

with

considerable opposition (Kazgan 1981:132).
Kazgan argues that the huge gender inequality in Turkiye is
inherited from the Ottomans. However, even after World War One,
and the establishment of the Republic of Turkiye, women in Turkiye
were not active in the labour market, except in agriculture.
Nevertheless, after the establishment of the Republic of Turkiye
conditions for women in Turkiye improved greatly. Kazgan argues that
Ataturk's reforms sought to grant women equal legal rights, equal
opportunity in education and a measure of equality in employment.
But the reforms did not bring immediate improvements in labour
market opportunities for women because they lacked the necessary
economic

foundations.

Nevertheless,

in

conjunction

with

the

secularisation of the State, "they facilitated a further encroachment
upon the sex role assignment of Quranic teachings". The reforms also
"initiated

an

modernisation,
requirements

impulse

towards

economic

development

and

which in turn, additively raised the educational
of women,

particularly

in

terms

of labour

force

membership" (Kazgan 1981:132). With the changes that have occurred
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since the early years of the Republic, women in Turkiye began to
participate more fully in the labour market mainly either in education
or the industrial labour force.

Table-IV/4
Labour Force Participation of Women

Years

1950
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975

(Age 15 Years and Over) 1950-1970 in Percentage
Total Labour Force
Non-Agricultural Labour Force
Active
Total active
Non-agricul.
Total
females in total population
female labour
non-agricul.
labour force
in population
as % of active
labour in total
age 15 and over age 15 and over
females
active populatior
47.0
88.4
3.5
17.0
43.1
83.7
3.9
19.8
40.3
79.6
4.7
26.5
37.9
74.1
4.0
28.2
37.5
60.1
10.0
34.8
35.2
51.8
37.8
11.0

(Source: Kazgan 1984:134)

It should be stressed, however, that despite the improvements in
the legal system, such improvement has not been translated to daily
life.

For example, in education the female retention ratio is less than

male retention ratio, especially at tertiary level. The number of women
politicians in Turkiye is very

low

standards achieved in the northern

and

considerably

below

the

European social democracies.

Although female labour force participation is high, the number of
women in non-agricultural sectors, at 11 per cent, is very low. The low
proportion of women in the non-agricultural labour force is perhaps to
be expected. The proportion of non-agricultural labour in the total
active population, at 37.8 per cent, is already low in Turkiye. It can be
inferred, therefore, that a very high proportion of females are employed
in agriculture in what is mostly unrecognised work.
The problem of gender inequality is more starkly apparent in
literacy rates. The proportion of literate females is 20 per cent less than
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that of literate males. The gap between the sexes exists at every level of
education.
Table- IV/5
Distribution of Population by Last School Graduated From and Sex

(Ages 11 and over) 1975

__________

School
Non-graduates
Prim ary school
Junior High
Vocational School at junior-high level
High School
Vocational School at high-school level
College
(Source: Ozbay 1981:160)

Female
59.6
33.0
3.7

0.1

1.7
1.4
0.5

Male
34.1
50.3
7.6
0.2
3.5
2.4
1.9

For example, the gap at the level of primary school graduates is
approximately 20 per cent.

At the next level of graduates the gap

doubles and at college level the gap triples.

The low proportion of

women in both education and labour force is reflected in politics.
T ab le- I V / 6
W o m e n in t h e P a r lia m e n t, 1 9 3 5 -8 0 (National Assembly)
Parliam ent
terms

N of women in
the Parliament

18
1935-39
15
1939-43
16
1943-46
9
1946-50
3
1950-54
4
1954-57
8
1957-60
3
1961-65
8
1965-69
5
1969-73
6
1973-77
4
1977-80
(Source: Arat 1989: 52-59)

Women as
% of total
4.5
3.7
3.7
1.9
0.6
0.7
1.3
0.7
1.7
1.1
1.3
0.9

CHP1
—
—
—
9
1
—

1
--3
2
3
2

jp3

DP2
—

the others

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—
1
4
7

—

—

—
—
—
—
—

.

—

1

—

“ “ -

—

—

2
3
2
2
2

1
2
1
1

.—

»

The gender inequality in Turkiye is most significant in politics.
The figures above show female participation in politics is very low in
Turkiye. The number of women politicians is also very low. After 1945
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the number and proportion of women representatives decreased. Since
1960 the proportion of women representatives has been around 1 per
cent.

Gender inequality in politics is considerably higher, therefore,

than that in education and the labour market. Hence, it can be argued
that in Turkiye gender inequality is a significant barrier to achieving
social justice especially in politics despite the improvements made since
the establishment of the Republic of Turkiye*.

Human Rights and Social Justice
My argument is that a resolution of human rights issues will
contribute to the social and economic development of a country.

In

other words, the existence of human rights abuses negatively affects
social and economic development because the existence of such human
rights abuses will cause not to use efficiently the human resources of a
country.

By addressing human rights abuses a country can use its

human resources more effectively because people will not be left out of
the system due to their political, religious, racial and sex differences.
Moreover,

many highly qualified people migrate to

democratic

countries because of human rights abuses in their home countries.
Resolution of human rights abuses also contributes to the stability of
political life which, in turn, may attract more foreign investment
because political stability is one of the most important criteria foreign
investors consider before investing in a country.
Despite such arguments, in developing countries economic
development is often given priority over human rights considerations.
Equality before the law regardless of age, religion, race and sex, freedom
of thought and of speech, freedom of ethnic cultures and protection
against ill-treatment by security forces, constitute basic human rights.
* Despite the gender inequality, there has been a number of female politicians, such as Tansu Ciller
who managed to be in top positions. Although the number of female activists is lorn ur ey,
they may be very influential in their profession. However, their appearence in top positions
cannot be inferred as low level of gender inequality, because the number of female activists is very
low.

236
These are often regarded as incompatible with economic development
by governments
governments

in developing countries.

try to justify human

In other words, the

right abuses with economic

development.
In Turkiye human rights abuses continue.

Ill-treatment by

security forces, torture, extrajudicial executions and the abuse of
freedom of expression exist. For example, "at least 13 detainees died in
custody, allegedly as a result of torture in 1992". Such abuses continued
in 1993 with 24 deaths and in 1994 with 29 deaths (Amnesty
International Reports (AIR), 1993, 1994 and 1995). In addition, 4 people
in 1992, 26 in 1993 and 55 in 1994 disappeared in custody.

In the

Amnesty International Report 1993, it was alleged that the number of
extrajudicial executions had increased. More than 260 killings occurred
in mysterious circumstances in south east Turkey, of which many were
blamed on Hizbullah, (a local group with no apparent connection to the
Lebanese group). The main targets of "alleged extrajudicial executions
included members of HEP, (People's Work Party-based on Kurdish
people and banned in 1993) members of the THRA, (Turkish Human
Rights Associations) and journalists". In 1992 10 journalist were killed
in south east Turkiye in what were most likely extrajudicial executions.
In Istanbul and Ankara claims of extrajudicial executions arose when
police launched a series of operations against 'safe houses' used by
Devrimci Sol (Revolutionary Left)" (AIR 1993:291).

There were also

allegations of "ill-treatment in prisons" in Turkiye.
Importantly for political life "scores of prisoners of conscience
were detained briefly and several were sentenced to prison terms

(AIR

1993:289). The Kurdish question can not now be openly discussed in
public.

People who argue that the government should change its

policies to bring a resolution of the Kurdish problem in the East and
South east of Turkiye are charged as separatists or supporters of the
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PKK. It is clear that serious human rights abuses exist in Turkiye which
violate the basic principles of justice.
Despite 14 years of socialist government in Spain, human rights
abuses exist. The Amnesty International Report includes 'allegations of
torture and ill-treatment by security forces'.

In 1992 torture and ill-

treatment was alleged "following the arrest of approximately 50 people
in a major security forces operation in the Basque province..."

Those

arrested were suspected of links with the 'Bizkaia' commando unit of
ETA, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Liberty).

Most

suspects made repeated complaints in court "that they had been
hooded, blindfolded and forced to do exercises". Others claimed they
had been "beaten and kicked and two alleged that they had been given
electric shocks..." Many of those charged "had visible cuts, bruises and
other injuries when they appeared in court" (AIR 1993:264).

Sadly,

similar allegations are included in previous reports. Moreover, officers
who were found guilty of torture did not serve their sentences (AIR
1993-.264)2. Human right abuses thus still exist in Spain which are an
indictment of the Spanish Socialist Party's lengthy period in office.

Social Justice and Nationalities questions
In recent years nationalities issues have become major questions
in both Spain and Turkiye (Mango 1994:31).

Spain, however, is better

placed to resolve such issues, except in the Basque region, due to its
democratic transformation.

Although there have been disputes

between the Autonomous Communities and Madrid, demands for

2 "In October five Civil Guards were found guilty of torturing Joaquin Qlano in 1983.
They were sentenced to between two and seven months imprisonment, p us varying
terms of up to seven years disqualification from holding public office... However, t ey
did not serve their sentences but remained on active service and were par one m
February 1991" (AIR 1993:264).
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independence have reduced in strength, except from the ETA and its
legal wing HB.

Spain presently has 17 Autonomous Communities.

Four of these were granted autonomy by statute through the 1978
constitution process.

The rest had statutory autonomy through the

process

in

determined

the

Constitution.

The

Autonomous

Communities have become stronger. Besides this, the regional political
parties, such as CiU, PNV and Canarian Coalition are effective in
national politics. Their support is now critical if country-wide parties
are to gain an absolute majority in the Cortes.
In Turkiye the overwhelming

nationalities problem is the

Kurdish movement. Although there were some Kurdish rebels in the
early years of the Republic of Turkiye (Mango 1994:40), the movement
gained momentum after the 1980 Coup d'etat. Since 1984 the PKK has
continued its violent uprisings in Turkiye. Despite Kurds residing all
around Anatolia, the guerrilla war has been concentrated in the South
East and East Anatolia, but rarely in metropolitan areas.
The

PKK is regarded as a terrorist

group by successive

governments, not as the legitimate representative of the Kurdish
movement.

Therefore, although some legislative and policy changes

have been made which assist the Kurdish people, military solutions
have become the main means to suppress the Kurdish movement.
However, if recent official statements have any bearing on the matter,
the elite in Turkiye now appears to understand that the Kurdish
problem cannot be resolved through military force.

However, it is

unclear what other alternatives might exist.
What the Kurdish people want is also unclear. Some appear to
want a federal system. It is evident that the current structure of the
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Turkish state* needs to change and the legitimacy of Kurdish identity
recognised in some formal mechanism (Mango 1994:50). A resolution
of the problem is complicated by the position of Kurds in Iran and Iraq.

Islam ist fundam entalism in Turkiye

In

Turkiye,

as

in

other

Muslim

countries,

Islamist

fundamentalism has become a threat in the last decade. As I argued in
the Chapter two, the performance of the pro-Islamist party, R e f ah
Partisi (RP), was such that it took first place in the 1995 general election.
The number and strength of fundamentalist groups3 outside the RP
have also increased. Their main strength is in the shanty towns of
metropolitan areas. Shanty towns now constitute approximately 60 per
cent of the metropolitan areas of cities such as Istanbul, Ankara and
Izmir.

The

strength of the Welfare

Party and Islamist

social

movements has also improved in rural areas, especially in the East of
Turkiye where the Kurdish nationalist movement continues.
The rise of the Islamist movement, as I argued in chapter two, is
partially accounted for by Government funded Islamist schools I ma m
Hatip. This development raises an important issue of human rights in
that there is no clear separation between religion and the state. The
protection of basic civil, political and human

rights requires a

separation of state and religious practice and belief, especially the
protection of rights of freedom of religion, conscience, belief and
expression.

Quranic courses, schools run by the Islamist sects and

propagation of Islam as a 'cement for national unity also contribute to
the rise of the Islamist movement in Turkiye.

Imam

Hatips are

established by the Turkish state; the state buys their equipment and pays
for teachers. These schools then raise fundamentalists (Aksit 1991.151-

* Today's Turkish state presents an authoritarian charecter. The authority of local and
peripheral organisations is very low. The central goverment has contro over oca
government in many ways including budget. The devolution of some aut ority o
e
centre to either local or peripheral organisayions is thus necessary.
3 The fundamentalist groups are organised as Sects. Each sect interprets t e Quran an
Mohammed's behaviour (Sunnet) differently. Competition between sects is very high.
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152).

In other words, the graduates of these schools are completely

against secularism which is one of the most important characteristics of
Turkiye. The number of these schools is around 1,000; one in every ten
students study in these schools.
Quranic courses.

There are also countless numbers of

The ’secular' State raises its own enemies itself in

Turkiye.
In Turkiye, however, there are significant counter forces resisting
the Islamist challenge to secularism.

The commitment of Turkiye to

westernisation goes back to the early eighteenth century (Heper 1994:8
9).

It can be argued that westernisation via economic, social and

political institutions is solidly grounded in Turkiye (Mango 1994:9).
Today the parliamentary system in Turkiye, as I argued in chapter two,
is strongly developed and has functioned well since the 1980 coup d'etat
(Mango 1994:30).

Moreover,

the pressures of globalisation and

unavoidable relations between Turkiye and the European community
are considerable forces against the overthrow of secularism (Ilkin
1993:193; Heper 1993:3).

Turkiye cannot afford the overthrow of

secularism because it may lead to a severing of relationships with
Europe. Another counter force to the Islamists are the followers of the
Alevi4 sect.

Alevis constitute approximately thirty per cent of the

population (Mango 1994:82) and are strongly in favour of a secular state.
The Army has a record of supporting secularism and is probably the
strongest force against the overthrow of the secular characteristics of
Turkiye.

Because of these forces, I would argue that it will be very

difficult for the Islamist fundamentalists to overthrow secularism as
easily as in some other Islamic countries.

4 See dip note 37 in Chapter two (p.158).
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Conclusion
In both countries conditions for women have improved very
rapidly. The proportion of females in the respective labour forces and
in higher education have increased significantly.

Legal processes

granting equality to women have been enacted. However, at the level
of

civil

society

characteristics.

many

practices

In Spain, while

still
the

contain

proportion

discriminatory
of females

in

universities is higher than males, they have a far lower representation
in the active labour market than males. In Turkiye the proportion of
females attending high school and the later stages of education is lower
than males. Women are employed mostly in agriculture which is
and mostly un-recognised work.

unpaid

This is of course not only the result

of sex discrimination, but also the result of women's low level of
education and consequently their lower qualifications.

Low female

participation is evident in politics in Spain as well. The proportion of
women parliamentary representatives in both countries is very low,
especially in Turkiye.
In Turkiye especially, the problems which cast a shadow over
democracy, such as human rights abuses, nationalities questions and
religious fundamentalism, are prevalent and have recently intensified.
Such problems actively hinder the processes of the parliamentary and
party systems.
Turkiye,

The extent of human rights abuses, particularly in

is particularly distressing.

Such

include

ill-treatment,

allegations of extra-judicial executions, death while in custody and
prisoners of thought and conscience.
been another common problem.

The nationalities question has

As I argued in discussing party

systems in chapter two, the nationalities question is more beneficial to
Spanish social democrats than it is a cause of problems.

Social
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democrats have benefited from right wing over reactions. Democracy
in Spain has been strengthened through the resolution of most of its
long standing nationalities issues.
In Turkiye, on the other hand, nationalities issues have become
more

divisive

and potentially destabilising.

While

pro-Islamist

movements at the moment use the parliamentary process, as I have
argued above, it is difficult for Islamists to gain a majority through
the electoral process. The armed forces, the followers of the Alevi sect,
liberal and leftist movements, over two centuries of westernisation in
Turkiye and its economic dependence on the European economy are
other factors/forces against the overthrow of secularism in Turkiye by
pro-Islamist movements.
This chapter has thus examined the main problems which
impede the achievement of a state of social justice in Spain and
Turkiye. It must be stressed that the presence of these problems is an
indication of the imperfection of democracy in both countries, not only
as a failure of the state but also of civil society.

As a result I have

argued that such issues do not simply represent goals for social
democrats but threaten the successful passage of social democratic
policies in the parliamentary system. Social justice issues are therefore
critical to the social democratic project in both Spain and Turkiye not
just for programatic reasons but for the continued existence of the
respective parties. Social justice is not an option for social democracy,
it is an imperative.

C O N C L U S IO N
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CONCLUSION
I have argued in this thesis that social democracy is not obsolete,
but has entered a new era in the 1990s. My study of social democracy
shows that what it stands for and its overall goals have constantly
changed in the course of its history and differ between countries. This is
to be expected, as the Marxist social democrat Bernstein stressed, social
democracy is defined by the movement not by the adoption of a fixed
program.

The movement is motivated by concern over social justice

issues, achieving a broad range of human rights and a democratic style of
work. The social democracy of the 1990s differs from that of the 1960s, as
that of the 1960s differed from that of the 1900s.
The differentiation of the social democratic movement from the
cominunist

movement

began

with

social

democrats

accepting

parliamentary means to achieve socialism. Social democrats insisted on a
parliamentary process to achieve socialism because of their democratic
convictions and, following Bernstein, they conceived socialism as a
movement instead of a goal.

Social democrats rejected plans for

wholesale nationalisation and the replacement of market integration by
bureaucratic planning. They also rejected claims about the "inevitability"
of catastrophic crisis in the capitalist system.
potential in capitalism

They recognised the

for widespread political and social reform

programs based on achieving social justice through

re-distributive

measures.
In the first period, however, it was often difficult to distinguish
social democratic political parties from communist parties and state
socialist parties.

Bernstein was a member of the same party as Rosa

Luxemburg and Karl Kautsky: the German Social Democratic party. And
not only did each consider themselves Marxists they all agreed that
programs had to change in response to changing social structure and
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circumstance.

By the 1950s, on the other hand, the differentiation

between the parties became obvious. Social democratic parties were now
part of the day to day practice of most western political systems
particularly in Europe and Australasia.

Organisationally, communist

parties established the Third International under the leadership of The
USSR, while social democratic political parties were under the Second
International.

The organisational separation was important because

Soviet leadership often became Soviet tutelage and the "orthodoxy" of
Marxism Leninism, read Stalinism, locked many Communist parties into
a "time-warp".
Social democracy, on the other hand, reflected in Crosland's
position, became fully integrated into the capitalist system. The class basis
of social democratic parties widened in this era. In almost all northern
European

countries

social democratic political parties experienced

significant periods in office during the 1960s. In this era social democratic
economic policies based on neo Keynesian economics worked well.
Higher

economic

growth,

the

long

post-war

"boom"

and

low

unemployment could be pursued, while the welfare state was constantly
improved. Hence, these years became known as the golden years of social
democracy in northern Europe.
After the perceived failure of neo Keynesian economics in the mid1970s, however, social democracy went into deep recession.

Neo

Keynesian economics appeared unable to resolve the problems occurring
in

the

economies

of

the

developed

countries.

Inflation

and

unemployment which were thought to be incompatible in neo Keynesian
economic theory, occurred at the same time. The social structure, which
gave rise to social democracy, was also changing. While the traditional
social democratic electorate of blue-collar working class people decreased,
the number of white collar workers increased. The contribution of the
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service sector to total civilian employment became greater than that of
industry.

Changing social structure in turn affected the trade union

movements. Fragmentation in trade union movement began.

Even the

cohesive trade union organisations of the Scandinavian countries were
negatively affected.

These changes brought a new era for social

democracy. The political parties, as a result, loosened their commitments
to the characteristic components of the social democracy of the 1960s: neo
Keynesian economics, full employment and the welfare state. In the new
era, as will be stressed below, the policies of the social democratic parties
became more diffuse. While social democracy retained its goal of social
justice the means to achieve the goal varied.
Social democracy not only varies over time, but also it differs both
between social democrats in the same country as well as between
countries. The social democracy of Crosland differs from that of Stuart
Holland, although the two theorists wrote at each end of the golden years
of social democracy in Britain.

Crosland conceived social democracy as

full employment plus the welfare state plus neo Keynesian economics,
and opposed further nationalisation. A decade later Holland argued for
the selective nationalisation of key profitable major corporations and for
'dirigiste'

planning in Britain in order to empower the state in

successfully managing the economy of late capitalism. And he criticised
Crosland's

basic

understanding

of

social

democracy.

Crosland s

understanding of social democracy reflects the characteristics and concerns
of social democracy in the 1960s.
As the understanding of social democrats differs between theorists,
each country's understanding of social democracy also differs.

While

nationalisation was a key policy for British social democrats until the
1980s, it was not even discussed among Swedish social democrats. Such
differences between the goals of social democratic movements in different
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countries are reflected in other characteristics of social democracy as well.
They include; differing relationships between social democratic political
parties and their respective trade union movements and the extent of
commitment different parties have to full employment and the welfare
state.

The trade union movement

in Scandinavian countries has

historically been a cohesive centralised movement with a very high
union

membership

ratio.

In Britain, on the other hand, central

organisation of the trade unions could not bring about a cohesive
movement and its membership ratio in comparison with Scandinavian
countries was not high.

The changing nature of the goals of social

democracy, expressed as what it regards as progressiveness, can also be
seen by discussing what characteristics define social democracy in the
1990s.
Defining or delineating social democracy has become even more
difficult in the post -industrial and post-fordist (or perhaps even post
modern) era of the 1990s.

Social democracy of the 1990s has been

influenced by issues arising from the two most important social
movements of the last two decades. These issues, arising from new social
movements based on gender and the environment, have become key
components of the programmatic renewal of social democracy in northern
Europe. Because of the wide range of possible responses and approaches
to these issues social democratic approaches and responses also differ.
With the adoption of gender and environmental issues, social democracy
has widened the social basis of its appeal to include the new social
movements.

But relations between social democrats and "Green-

movements have been hampered by the creation of Green parties , which
have risen in some countries to the detriment of social democratic parties.
Hence, social democrats have made stronger overtures to the
politics" of identity particularly in relation to gender issues.

new

In Spain and
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Turkiye the politics of identity has mainly been confined to gender and
nationality issues. Such issues are the main signs of programmatic renewal
in these countries.
The changing goals brought by the nature of a post-industrial and
post-fordist social structure has meant the commitment

of social

democrats to full employment, the welfare state and neo Keynesian
economics is no longer taken for granted. In practice none of the social
democratic parties in office in the 1980s and 1990s (French, Spanish and
Australian) committed themselves

to full employment

development of a universalist welfare state.

or further

Unemployment rates in

these countries have not differed strongly from levels achieved by non
social democratic governments. Despite 14 years of social democratic rule
in Spain it still had the highest unemployment rate reported amongst
OECD countries.
The achievements of social democrats in different countries also
vary. Welfarism as a goal also varies as research on the welfare state
shows there are several kinds of welfare states. Esping-Anderson calls the
Scandinavian welfare state the 'social democratic welfare state, but other
commentators recognise other forms as at least potentially social
democratic (Castles and Mitchell 1990). The social democratic parties in
government in the 1980s and 90s had to find new measures which could
satisfy their new electorate without disenchanting their traditional power
bases. The satisfaction of "new social movement" agendas and old trade
union based alliances meant that compromises and "trade-offs" had to
govern policies.

Social justice was still the goal but it now had to

incorporate issues of life-style and culture along-side the traditional
economic and democratic agenda. Crosland, to his credit, had foreseen the
importance of life-style issues in the early 1950s and later social democrats
had followed his lead. Therefore, while it has become more difficult to
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understand, let alone define social democracy it cannot be argued that social
democracy has ceased to have influence in the 1990s.
Such complications are not unexpected, however,
argued: social democracy is comprised by the movement.

as Bernstein
The "move

ment is everything;" programs are secondary. Social democracy has
again entered a new era.

once

It is a movement which seeks social justice

although justice is no longer merely driven by economics.

Social

democrats have made numerous concessions to the politics of "new social
movements" which have broadened their agenda, while building on their
original concerns. A process such as this almost inevitably leads to some
significant groups becoming disenchanted.

This can be seen as a

consequence of adopting the parliamentary road with all its attendant
compromises and pragmatic considerations. It can be argued, therefore,
that social democracy by recognising issues of identity politics, culture and
the environment has relevance not only for the 1990s but beyond.
The social democracy of the 1990s offers solutions to the existing
problems of the times.

In the new era, as mentioned above, social

democracy addresses gender and environmental issues. The concept of
economic growth has changed to the quality of economic growth.
Conditions for women even in the most developed countries of northern
Europe require improvement.

Nevertheless, conditions for women in

the Scandinavian countries, where social democracy has been dominant
for many decades, are considerably better than those in other similar
developed countries, such as Germany. The relevance of social democracy
to this issue is more obvious in developing countries because of huge
gender inequality, a lesser development of democratic institutions,
human rights abuses and nationalities issues.
The approach of social democracy to human rights is broader than
that of most other ideologies, which either like liberalism privilege civil
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rights or communism privilege social and economic rights with a strong
emphasis on the economic. Civil/political and social/economic rights are
equally important for social democracy. Hence, if we are to consider the
quality of life as a goal of politics, it is the approach of social democracy
that truly contributes to politics in the lesser developed countries.
Therefore, I have argued that social democracy has no less relevance in
the 1990s than in the 1890s or in its "golden years' in the 1960s, but also
that social democracy has relevance beyond the developed post-industrial
countries of north Europe and Australasia. From my discussion of social
democracy it can be seen that it has particular continuing relevance in the
lesser developed countries of Europe, such as Spain and Turkiye.
Despite the changes outlined above social democracy of the 1990s
still contains many of the characteristic components of social democracy of
the 1960s. Although the formal ties between social democratic political
parties and the trade union movement have been broken in many
European countries, the relationship between these two parts of the
labour movement

is still strong; because their interests are still

complementary. Trade unions prefer social democratic governments to
right wing governments. As part of the relationship with trade unions,
full employment and the welfare state are very important objectives for
social democratic parties, although the precise meaning of meeting such
objectives is not always as clear as it was in the 1960s.
Although social democratic political parties loosened many of their
commitments to the characteristic components of programs of the 1960s,
social democratic programs to reduce unemployment are still a major
element of their administrations.

The role of full employment in the

fulfilment of social justice cannot be understood merely by analysing
unemployment

figures,

because

the

method

of

calculating

unemployment for official statistics widely varies between countries. The
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main difference arising from a social democratic approach appears to be
either higher female labour force participation figures or higher overall
adult labour force participation ratios. Social democratic labour policies
and industry policies have also contributed to a marked difference in
conditions of work between social democratic and non social democratic
countries.
As with its approach to full employment, the approach of social
democrats to the welfare state, differs from that of contemporary right
wing and liberal parties. Right wing political parties characteristically try
to change education and health care policies to conform to market models
of service provision which include privatisation, competition and "user
pays" philosophies. Right wing attitudes to welfare usually regard it as a
residual category which should be mainly for the "deserving poor". Sodal
democratic political parties at least defend the existence of a welfare state
on the grounds of inclusiveness, because they regard social welfare as a
right of citizenship. In attempting to find new methods of administration
or ways to improve welfare service provision which will overcome
the

bureaucratism

associated with

Beveridge

style

welfare

states,

contemporary social democracy has often seen welfare provision as part of a
holistic program of measures.

Such measures often include the use of

"public" organisations rather than state based bodies, eg. women's refuges
provided by local women's organisations.
democratic parties and women's

The linkage between social

movements

and organisations is

therefore vital to such projects.
Hence, social democracy has not ceased to have relevance for
politics in the 1990s, but it has entered a new era. The new era is mostly
characterised by the adoption of new goals and methods of achieving
them which are consequences of its search for new bases of political and
social support. The need for change is mostly governed by the changing
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nature of late capitalism as it becomes more globalist in organisation and
as post-industrial and post-fordist economic developments occur.

In this

new era social democracy continues to have relevance, not only for the
developed post-industrial countries of northern Europe, but also for the
lesser developed industrial countries of Europe, such as Spain and,
especially Turkiye.
Spain

and Turkiye have

common

problems, such as their

nationalities questions, significant regional inequalities, a history of
human rights abuses and long experiences with authoritarian regimes.
These problems reflect the low level of democracy in both countries.
Examination of the formation of the nationalities question, or of regional
identity in Spain, shows that the existence of these issues can be traced
back to the Middle-Ages. It can be argued that, despite the presence of the
Basque separatist (ETA) movement, Spain has largely resolved many of the
political aspects of its nationalities problems through the structure of its
political institutions. One of the most important institutional paths to a
resolution was the establishment of the Autonomous Communities and
devolution of considerable political power to these communities.
On the other hand, it appears Turkiye will continue to face
difficulties arising from its nationalities problem, despite the fact that its
approach to the question has changed in recent years. As a response to the
question, the Turkish social democratic parties support decentralisation as
long as it does not affect their fight against inequality between classes and
regions.

I have

argued, however,

that a form

of political and

administrative decentralisation is necessary to resolve most of these
problems in the first place. As a result, Turkish social democrats should
support decentralisation not only to solve the nationalities question, but
also to combat regional and class based inequalities.
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Human rights issues are another problem faced by both Spain and
Turkiye which highlight deficiencies in their democratic development. This
issue also presents an obstacle to the development of social democratic
ideas and practice because of previous bans on communist party activity
in both countries. As a definition of communism remains contentious,
any ban on communism can seriously affect the free expression of socialist
ideas, if authorities so choose. The ban on communist parties continues
in Turkiye.

It is clear that in Turkiye

freedom of thought, as it is

understood in western democracies, does not exist because of the ban of
communist parties and the existence of prisoners of conscience and other
political prisoners.

Although Spain is in a considerably better position,

violations of human rights are still present especially associated with
nationalist separatism.
Islamist fundamentalism in Turkiye is another obstacle to social
democracy, because of the challenge it poses to secularism. Although the
pro-Islamist movement has gained momentum since the 1980s there are
important counter-forces to the overthrow of secularism.

The Army is

the strongest counter-force against Islamist fundamentalism, because the
army is strongly committed to the secular state.

The followers of the

Alevi sect are another force. It is difficult for pro-Islamists to gain support
among Alevis because the pro-Islamist movement is Sunni, while Alevi
is influenced by Shia teaching. There are also strong liberal wings within
the conservative parties, the DYP and ANAP.

An example of this is

shown by the protest against the coalition of the DYP with RP (Welfare
party) when 15 parliamentary members of the DYP resigned from the
party.

While other liberals have not yet resigned from the party, a

significant number strongly oppose anti-secular policies.
Beside these, liberal secularism is one of the mam planks of the centreleft parties (the CHP and DSP).

The Kurdish nationalist movement
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can also be considered as another force against the fundamentalists,
because the movement is socialist and always takes part in all broad Left
movements in Turkiye.

Besides these factors, the westernisation of

Turkiye goes back to the 18th century. By the time of the formation of the
Republic both westernisation and in turn secularism had developed
strong roots in Turkiye.

In other words, the westernisation process of

Turkiye has continued for over a century without interruption. Hence, by
analysing these secular forces, including Turkey's growing relationships
with the European Community, the pro-Islamist movements can only be
considered as a potential threat, but not yet a force that can overthrow
secularism in Turkiye.
The direct or indirect role of the armed forces as a political actor is
another common problem of Spain and Turkiye. Armed forces in these
countries are the prime contributors to the existence of authoritarian
regimes. The power of the army was the result of the under development
of democratic institutions

in both countries, including

inadequate

constitutional safeguards to army involvement in politics.
It is necessary, however, to note that the army took a positive role
in the development of the parliamentary system in Turkiye until the
1970s.

The powers of the armed forces, especially in Spain, have been

eroded after the last attempted coups d'etats.

In both countries the

democratic institutions, such as political parties, interest groups, judicial
system and the mass media have developed further protective shields to
military encroachment.

Such further development of the institutions has

eroded the power of the armed forces as a political actor. In these countries,
it is clear that intervention by the armed forces cannot resolve the problems,
but worsen them.
However, arguing that the armed forces do not play any significant
role in politics is invalid because they may affect the composition and
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behaviour of cabinets, especially through the existence of the MGK in
Turkiye.

In addition, Spain's full and Turkiye's part integration to

the European Community will act against coups d'etats occurring in the
future. As a result, I have argued that the powers of the armed forces
are not obstacles to social democracy's ability to carry out its policies through
the parliamentary system in these countries.

However, despite the

significant ongoing human right violations and the recent experience of
authoritarian regimes

in both

countries the

development

of

their

parliamentary systems is well enough for social democratic parties to work.
The Socialists in Spain, the PSOE, and, the CHP in Turkiye, are the best
examples of this argument.
Spain, and especially Turkiye, are still among the lesser developed
countries of Europe, although the social and political development of
both countries has been rapid in the last two decades. Like Greece and
Portugal they have had recent experience of authoritarian regimes. The
Franco regime lasted until the mid-1970s, while Turkiye experienced three
short periods of army intervention in 1960, 1971 and 1980.

In Turkiye

although there were army interventions on three occasions, in all three
they immediately announced that the aim of their action was to restore
the parliamentary system and, as soon as they could do so, they would
return to their barracks. Despite having such authoritarian regimes iri the
past the political systems of both countries have been stable since the early
1980s. Their parliamentary systems function effectively and changes of
government have taken place in a proper constitutional manner.

Even

when elections have not yielded conclusive results the process of
coalition building has been constitutional and followed parliamentary
conventions.
In both countries political parties are characteristic, of the nature of
their political systems. Duverger argued that by the 1950s Turkiye had
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truly representative political parties.

Since then the party system of

Turkiye has developed further and is now a typical example of a multi
party system. In Spain the roots of the main established parties go back to
the late nineteenth century, especially those of the PSOE and of the IU.
The existence of a competitive political party system is seen in the practice
of regular parliamentary elections.
In both countries1 regular elections have been held according to the
respective regulations since the early 1980s and importantly a regular
change of the party in office has resulted. In Spain after the 1982 general
election results the PSOE took office from a right wing party, which had
followed the Franco regime. In 1996 the PSOE lost office to a moderate
right-wing party, the PP. In Turkiye after the 1980 Coup regime, the
ANAP a conservative party took office in 1983 and ran Turkiye until 1991.
Between 1991 and 1995 another conservative party, the DYP, was in office
in coalition with a centre-Left party, the SHP/CHP. As a result of the 1995
general election, a pro-Islamist party, the Welfare Party, was in office in
coalition with the DYP. As I argued above, a change of office between
parties, which is a crucially important sign of regular process in
parliamentary systems occurs, according to election results.
The existence of independent trade unions like political parties
contributes to the functioning of representative democratic system.

For

social democracy, the existence of trade union movements has been
crucially important.

The Swedish trade union movement represents a

typical example of how trade unions are needed as partners for social
democratic parties.

Trade union movements in Spain and Turkiye,

however, do not conform to this ideal type. The movements in these
countries reflect a Mediterranean type of trade union movement, low
membership, very fragmented and weak central organisations. There are
1 It is important to note that in Turkiye ail elections are held under the complete control of the
Judiciary.
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several central trade union organisations and each one is close to a
different political party. There are three union confederations in each
country: the UGT, CCOO and USO in Spain and the Turk-Is, DISK and
Hak-Is in Turkiye. Unlike their counterparts in northern Europe, social
democratic political parties are not dominant in trade union movements.
Trade union movements in both countries are also financially dependent
on their respective state.
Despite the social democratic parties not having formal or informal
relationships with the trade union movement the parties receive many
votes from the working-class. The class identities of the parties in both
countries, however, are not as clear as those in northern Europe. It is
worthwhile noting that since the early 1980s even in the homelands of
Social Democracy the relationship between the trade union movement
and social democratic parties has been broken. Furthermore, in southern
European countries, such as Spain, Greece, France and Portugal, the social
democratic parties manage to come to office, despite having a weak trade
union movement. Therefore, in the 1990s the relationship between the
trade union

movement

and social democratic

parties cannot be

considered as a necessary condition for the success of Social Democracy.
Hence, it is evident that there is sufficient development of the
political systems of Turkiye and Spain for social democrats to implement
their policies. Moreover, the level of economic and social development is
more than adequate to sustain a redistributive program and welfare state
measures.

This is especially true of Spain.

The contribution of each

economic sector to both total civilian employment and GDP in Spain is
similar to those in the developed countries of northern Europe, such as
Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands. Turkiye, on the other hand, is
a newly industrialised country. The contribution of agriculture to total
civilian employment in 1992 was

still considerably higher than in
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developed European countries. In both countries labour intensive sectors
constitute a major part of the employment structure: textiles and growing
tourism in Turkiye and tourism in Spain.

Unlike the declining blue

collar electorates of post-industrial northern European countries, there j s
a sizeable number of potential blue collar heartlands for social democratic
parties in both countries. Hence, a traditional social democratic support
base exists in Turkiye and Spain. Unlike the left parties in Scandinavian
countries, however, social democrats in Turkiye have been unable to gain
support amongst the agrarian electorate. This mainly due to the effects of
religious affiliation on support for political parties. Therefore, in rural
areas social democratic parties are relatively weak and certainly weaker
than in other European countries. This is one of the major weaknesses of
social democrat parties in Turkiye.
Social democrats in Turkiye have to gain increased support from
religious people2 to win a majority in the TBMM. Religious identity for
many people is more important than their class identity in their selection
of political parties. The poor performance of centre-left parties in central
Anatolia is undoubtedly attributable to this factor. It was the CHP that
brought secularism to Turkiye. All left wing movements, including the
social democratic movements in Turkiye are known to be against religion,
unlike their counterparts in Europe. The success of social democracy in
Turkiye is dependent on its ability to attract support among the Sunni-sect
electorate without destroying their secular image.
In terms of GDP per capita, Spain, and especially Turkiye, are
among the poorer countries in Europe. The amount of GDP per capita,
however, cannot be taken as a determining factor in the success of social
democracy. Success for social democracy is best considered by comparing

2 By religious people I mean people who practise Islam, but not fundamentalist, or who are for the
secular state.
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countries in terms of welfare state provision and social security transfers.
It is clear that with their current level of wealth

Spain and Turkiye

cannot afford the same level of welfare services provided in the
developed countries. However, for the reasons outlined above, a small
GDP is not necessarily an obstacle to social democracy being able to initiate
a welfare program or start redistributing income.

Secondly, social

democracy is not primarily concerned with achieving a fair distribution of
wealth as a static goal, but providing equal opportunity and equal access
for all citizens to the wealth of the country. Hence, social democrats seek
full employment in rewarding jobs, a situation which depends on productive
growth. Finally, today's typical examples of European welfare states were
not achieved in a decade but in several decades. The economies of Spain and
Turkiye are at a similar stage of development as the northern European
countries were in the "golden years of the 1960s.
Social development in Turkiye and Spain, on the other hand, presents
a different picture.

On some measures, such as life-expectancy and the

number of doctors per 1,000 population in Spain or female labour
force participation in Turkiye their performance compares well with the
developed countries. In Turkiye female labour force participation is very
high, higher even than in the Netherlands and wage differentiation
between sexes is lower than in many developed countries. There are no
restrictions on universal suffrage for women in both countries. In Spain
in the 1990s, female students constitute over fifty per cent of all tertiary
students.

.

The HDI rankings of Spain and Turkiye disprove the existence of a
necessary link between GDP per capita and social development.

HDI

rankings are mostly affected by properly conceived and executed public
policies. In 1992 Spain's ranking in the HDI is higher than that of many
developed countries, including Denmark and Germany. Spain s ranking
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for HDI is 9 yet its ranking for GDP per capita is 29, while Germany's HDI
ranking is 15 against its GDP per capita ranking of 12. On the other hand,
the HDI ranking of Turkiye (66) is one ranking lower than its GDP per
capita score.

While social conditions in Turkiye demonstrate that a

link between wealth and human development exists to some degree,
Turkiye's HDI ranking is primarily a product of political decisions. A low
level of economic development does not mean that a political program
cannot be initiated to address serious social issues as the example of Spain
indicates.

The second conclusion is that a prolonged period of social

democratic government such as in Spain can produce welfare services
which compare favourably in their results with a wealthy country like
Germany.
Regional inequality is a common problem to Spain and Turkiye. In
Turkiye, in terms of GDP per capita, there is huge inequality between
regions, especially between Marmara and the East.

The inequality

between regions in Spain is less than that in Turkiye. Inequality

between

regions is the product of the neglect of less developed regions by
successive governments, the geographical position of regions and their
colonisation by other European countries. On the other hand, I argued
that social democrats in Spain have become relatively successful in
reducing inequality between regions.

Social democrats argue that the

reduction of regional inequality cannot be left to the market.

Markets

have not only had little success in reducing regional inequality but have
often been associated with increasing such inequalities.

The approach of

social democrats to regional inequality, therefore, is consistent with their
approach to inequality in general.

They use economic planning, neo

Keynesian policies and a great range of incentives including direct
subsidies for services. The example of wide regional inequalities in Turkiye
demonstrates

that

reducing

inequality between

regions

cannot be
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left to market forces. The state needs to invest either directly or indirectly
to encourage private enterprise to invest in relatively less developed
regions such as those in the east of Turkiye.
The current social, political and economic developmental levels of
Spain and Turkiye are such that social democratic policies are required to
bring them closer to the developed countries of northern Europe.
Although conditions for women have improved, further improvement is
still needed to correct the huge gender inequality in these countries.
Human rights abuses, especially of civil/political rights, are still clearly
evident in these countries, especially in Turkiye.

Social democracy,

because of its broad approach to human rights is best placed to bring about
long term solutions. At its best social democracy treats basic civil/political
rights and broader social, economic . and human rights as equally
important.

With a social democratic approach to human rights, the

probability of resolving nationalities problems becomes greater.

The

development of human rights will also contribute to the development of
democratic institutions as well as to economic development for reasons I
have outlined throughout this thesis.
It might be asked what kind of social democratic policies would
work best in Spain and Turkiye. But it needs to be remembered that I
have argued social democracy is best conceived as a movement for social
justice not as a rigid set of dogmas or as a static program. The success of
social democracy in these countries depends on achievable programs,
which are pragmatic in orientation and design. Such programs certainly
need to address issues of social and economic development as well as
further democratising their political systems.

In these countries,

however, social democrats cannot focus on démocratisation to the neglect
of economic

development

or vice-versa.

Political and economic

development are not necessarily mutually exclusive as both are very
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important parts of a viable social democracy.

Programs for social

development have to be realistic, a worthwhile goal such as achieving the
level of protection afforded by northern European welfare states is not
achievable in a short time period. Northern European countries achieved
their levels of welfare state protection in a process lasting several decades.
Given the current level of wealth in Spain and especially Turkiye social
democratic goals should be based on attempting to achieve a long-term
electoral dominance and bringing about progressive reform over the long
term.
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Appendix

Table-1: Parties Distribution in
Parties
PSOE
CP/PP
PCE/IU
CiU
PNV
HB
CC
uv
EA
ERC
CG/BNG
CDS
PAR
EE
PA

1986
184
105
7
18
6
5
1
1
- 2
-

1989
175
107
17
18
5
4
1
2
1
1

-

Spain
1993
159
141
18
17
5
2
4
1
1
1

1996
141
156
21
16
5
2
4
1

1
19
1
2

14
1
-

-

-

-

2

-

-

2

-

-

.

-

1

-

(Source: Robinson 1987: 121 & Lancaster 1994: 185)

Table-2: General Election 1961-1977: Turkiye
Parties1
AP
RPP
M SP
MHP
DP
CG P
TBP
TIP
CKM P
MP
YTP
Independ
ents

1961
% of
seats
votes

% of
votes

seats

1969
% of
votes
seats

1965

34.8
36.7

158
173

52.9
28.7

240
134

46.5
27.4

256
143

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

3.0

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

3.0
2.2
6.3
3.7
3.2

15
11
31
19
—

6.6
2.8
2.7

15
8
2

—

—

14.0

54

—

—

13.7
6.8

65
—

—

3.2
•2.2
5.6

1

—

6
6
13

1977

1973
% of
votes

seats

% of
votes

30.6
33.5
11.9
3.4
12.5
5.3
1.1

149
185
48
3
45
13
1

36.9
41.6
8.6
6.4
1.8
1.9
0.4

seats
189
213
24
16
1
3
—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

0.6

—

—

—

—

—

—

—

2.8

6

2.5

4

(Source: Dodd 1990:223)

1 Justice Party (AP), National Salvation party (MSP), National Action Party (MHP), Republican People s
Party (RPP), Turkish Workers’ Party (TIP), Turkish Unity Party (TBP), Republican Reliance Party (CGP),
Republican Peasant’s National Party (CKMP), Nation Party (MP), Democratic Party (DP), New Turkey Party
(YTP)
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T a b le -3 : General Elections
1983
45
30.50

Parties
ANAP
SHP/HP/CHP
DYP
RP
DSP
MHP
HADEP
MDP3

—
—
—
—
—

23.00

1 9 8 3 -1 9 9 5 : T u rk iy e
1987
1995
1991
24
36
19.65
10.72
25
2Ó1
27
19
19.19
7.2
16.883
21.31
8.5
10.50
14.66
2.1
8.19
—
4.18
—

—

—

(Source: Finkel 1990; The Keesing’s Record of World Event;
http://www.ce.utk.edu./~basoglu/secim.html)
Table-4: Local El ections 1984-1994: Turkiye
Party
1984
1994
1989
ANAP
41.5
21.9
20.9
DYP
13.2
21.9
RP
4.4
9.8
18.8
MCP/MHP
4.1
8.1
DSP
8.7
9.0
SHP
13.4
28.5
CHP
4.7
SODEP
23.4
HP
8.8
MDP
7.1
(Source: DOD 1990:224 and "?he Economist, April 2 :
—

—
—

—

—

—

Table-5: Average Annual Rates of Growth in Regional GDP, 1983-87: Spain
Growth rate
Región
6.9
Extremadura
6.2
Canarias
5.3
Baleares
5.2
Murcia
4.4
Castilla-La Mancha
4.1
Valencia
4.0
Andalucia
3.3
Spain average
3.2
Galicia
3.1
Aragón
3.1
Castilla Y León
3.1
Navarra
2.7
Madrid
2.6
Cataluña
1.8
Asturias
1.4
La Rioja
1.3
Euskadi
Cantabria
v^aniaui i a _________ ______ 1.1
* •1

(Source: Beltran 1993:227)

2 In alliance with HEP, pro-Kurdish party
3 In alliance with MHP

Primary
11.3
3.2
3.4
7.0
1.5
0.9
4.7
2.3
1.3
3.8
2.7
-1.2
-10.4
-0.4
-2.2
-4.8
-4.9
-2.7

Industry
11.8
8.4
-0.5
4.2
4.0
3.7
0.6
1.4
4.2
1.2
1.9
3.6
1.1
0
1.3
-0.5
-0.9
-2.6

Construction
4.5
13.2
6.3
5.8
4.1
3.0
3.1
4.5
2.8
3.1
6.0
5.5
4.4
5.0
3.5
2.7
1.7
3.7

Services
5.1
5.2
6.1
5.2
5.6
4.8
5.0
4.1
3.3
4.2
3.6
3.2
3.1
4.0
2.4
4.2
3.6
3.1
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T a b le d Evolution of the Inter-Regional Compensation Fund per Inhabitant: Spain
Regions
Andalucía
Aragón
Asturias
Baleares
Canarias
Cantabria
Castilla-La Mancha
Castilla Y León
Cataluña
Extremadura
Galicia
Madrid
Murcia
Navarra
Basque Country
La Rioja
Valencia
Ceuta
Melilla
T o tal

1982
7,682
3,745
4,234
3,018
8,353
2,980
7,414
6,768
2,358
14,194
6,540
2,144
4,091
3,040
2,814
3,073
3,297
5,417
6,676
4,947

1983
8,872
3,899
4,159
3,163
8,822
3,167
8,543
7,364
2,668
15,556
7,981
2,529
4,574
2,696
3,127
2,936
3,301
8,434
9,962
5,491

1984
9,054
4,309
4,024
3,293
7,761
3,376
8,694
7,458
2,944
15,242
7,754
2,431
4,680
2,731
3,140
2,752
3,459
7,053
8,300
5,566

1985
8,804
4,224
3,918
2,662
7,002
3,531
9,433
7,396
2,959
13,800
7,732
2,329
4,651
2,708
3,384
2,700
2,956
9,810
9,889
5,431

1986
8,101
3,841
3,690
2,368
6,495
3,519
8,973
7,125
2,450
15,503
7,395
2,221
4,051
2,681
3,338
2667
3,170
9,449
9,578
5,163

1987
5,446
2,547
2,046
2,074
5,131
2,551
6,381
4,907
1,674
10,516
5,421
1,626
2,771
1,942
3,448
1,834
2,358
7,010
7,070
3,699

(Source: Zaldivar & Castells 1992:342)

Table-7: Public Investment and the East (1984-1989): Turkiye
Years
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1984-1988

Turkiye & the East's
Total public investment
(billion TL)
1,117
2,078
2,886
4,136
5,197
15,414

in the East
Total public investment
(billion TL)
148.6
286.2
460.5
590.0
702.7
2,188.0

(Source: Sonmez 1990:195)

Table-8: Employment: Selected European Countries
(Percentage changes from previous period)

(Source: O EC D Econom ic Outlook June 1995, no: 57)

%
13.3
13.8
15.9
14.3
13.5
14.2

1988
5,529
2,144
3,122
1,524
6,108
2,312
6,489
4,452
2,473
8,680
5,752
1,819
3,309
1,913
4,931
1,784
2,554
5,971
6,037
3,957

1989
7,400
2,509
4,273
2,277
8,096
2,390
9,001
6,241
3,998
11,760
8,060
2,617
5,076
2,822
7,484
2,450
3,626
8,913
8,983
5,600
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T a b le -9 : Total civilian em ploym ent (% ):Selected E u ro p e a n C o u n tries
Changes
Agriculture Forest
since 1980
Fishing
Industry
Services
%
%
%
%
Country
1989
1989
1992
1992
1992
1989
1989
Turkiye
21.4
50.1
22.1
43.9
20.5
34.0
29.5
Spain
6.1
13.0
32.4
10.1
54.0
57.5
32.9
Denmark
6.1
5.7
5.7
27.7
66.6
27.4
66.9
Germany
2.6
3.7
3.1
38.3
56.5
58.6
39.8
Netherlands
22.0
4.7
71.4
4.0
24.6
65.4
31.2

(Source: OECD in Figures, no 170-1991 & 188-1994)

Table-10: Purchasing Power Parity: Selected European Countries
Per Capita Volume Indices-a_______________________________________________
Netherlands
Denmark Germany
Turkiye Spain
P r iv a te F in a l C o n s u m p t io n E x p e n d itu r e
Fo o d B e v erag es an d T o b acco
C lo th in g a n d F o o r w e a r
G ro ss R en t F u el an d P ow er
H o u s e h o ld E q u ip m e n t a n d O p e r a tio n
M e d ic a l a n d H e a l t h C a r e
T r a n s p o r t a n d C o m m u n ic a t io n
R e c r e a tio n , E d u c a t i o n a n d C u ltu r e
M is c e lla n e o u s G o o d s a n d S e r v ic e s
G o v e r n m e n t F in a l C o n s u m p tio n
E x p e n d itu re
C o n s tio n
T o ta l G D P

The U. States

5

46
84
35
27
47
19
26
25
55

57
92
57
97
70
12
43
50
28

69
92
82
71
98
98
45
59
38

62
86
65
70
72
89
31
52
47

100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100

27
21
22

43
42
46

130
71
74

58
79
74

67
54
68

100
100
100

20
66
34
13
41
8
7
7

a=1985 figures the volume indices show the size of each country's per capita for the items listed
relative to that of the United States when converted to US dollars using purchasing power
p arities.
P r ic e L e v e ls -b

P r iv a te F in a l C o n s u m p t io n E x p e n d itu r e
Food B ev erag es an d T o b acco
C lo th in g a n d F o o r w e a r
G ro ss R en t F u el an d P ow er
H o u s e h o ld E q u ip m e n t a n d O p e r a tio n
M e d ic a l a n d H e a lt h C a r e
T r a n s p o r t a n d C o m m u n ic a t io n
R e c r e a tio n , E d u c a t i o n a n d C u ltu r e
M i s c e lla n e o u s G o o d s a n d S e r v ic e s
G o v e r n m e n t F in a l C o n s u m p tio n
E x p e n d itu re
C o n s tio n
T o ta l G D P

Turkiye

Spain

Denmark

Germany

Netherlands

The U. States

36
35
50
36
39
21
32
35
39

55
64
86
27
69
39
91
81
61

101
108
92
75
100
65
146
125
129

87
80
88
82
88
62
117
100
99

76
75
75
66
82
48
104
94
89

100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100

12

46
63
56

73
95
92

79
86
84

70
91
77

100
100
100

28
29

b= 1985 figures, the country of reference for each series is the United States. The price levels are
defined as the ratios of the PPPs for each component of expenditure to exchange rates. The
com parative price levels show the number of US dollars required in each country to buy the same
basket of final goods and services costing $100 in the united States.

(source: O EC D In Figures 1989)
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T a b le -1 1 : Profile o f Unemployment, 1 9 9 4 % : Selected E u ro p e a n C o u n trie s

Country
Turkiye
Spain
Denmark
Germany
Netherlands
EU

All persons
8.3 (1993)
23.8
10.1
6.9
7.2
11.1

Women

Youth

Low skilled
(1992)

15.3
38.3
10.6
5.2
7.8
18.6

5.1
16.0
14.1
8.9
8.0
10.0

6.7
30.9
11.2
6.7
1.7 (1993)
12.6

(Source: OECD Jobs Study, 1950 - 1996, 1995)
Table-12: Human Development Index (HDI), 1990: Selected European Countries
Life expectancy at birth (years)
Adult literacy rate %
M ean year schooling
Educational attainment
Real GDP per capita PPP$
Adjusted real GDP per capita
L iteracy
Schooling
HDI
GDP per capita rank minus HDI
rank

1990
1990
1990
1990
1990
index
index
index

Turkiye
65.10
80.70
3.50
1.82
4,662
4,662
0.770
0.280
0.717

Spain
77.00
97.50
6.80
2.46
11,723
5,006
0.960
0.540
0.923

10

Denmark
75.80
99.00
10.40
2.84
16,781
5,046

Germany
75.20
99.00
11.10
2.90
18,213
5,050

1.000

1.000

1.000

0.900
0.957

0.860
0.970

5

0.840
0.955
-4

-6

N etherlands
77.20
99.00
10.60
2.86
15,695
5,042

8

(Source: Human Development Report 1995)
Table-13: HDI ranking, comparing 1990 with 1992: Selected European Countries

Country
Turkiye
Spain
Denmark
Germany
Netherlands

HDI value
1990
1992
0.717
0.792
0.923
0.930
0.955
0.920
0.957
0.921
0.970
0.936

HDI rank
1990
1992
73
66
23
9
13
16
12
15
9
4

Real
GDP per
capita
(PPP $)
rank
1992
65
29
12
6
20

GNP
rank
1990
83
28
7
8
17

GNP pe;r capita
minus P DI rank
1990
1992
10
-1
5
20
-6
-4
-4
-9
8
16

(Source: Human Development Report 1995)
Table-14: Lower Average Wage for Women: Selected European Countries
women’s non agricultural
wage as % of men’s
Country
84.5
Turkiye
70.0
Spain
82.6
Denmark
75.8
Germany
76.7
Netherlands
(Source: Human Development Report 1995)

269

T a b le -1 5 : Population by Literacy, Education Level and Sex: T u rk iy e

Literate
Literate without diploma
Primary school (6-11 years old)
Junior high school (12-14 years old)
High school (15-18 years old)
Higher education

1970

Male
1980

1990

1970

70.3
24.5
36.1
4.9
3.4
1.3

79.9
18.4
44.2
7.6
6.4
3.3

88.8
16.3
49.1
9.6
9.5
4.2

41.3
16.6
20.7

2.2
1.8
0.6

Female
1980
54.6
14.6
31.4
3.7
3.7

1.2

1990
72.0
15.6
43.1
5.4
6.0
1.8

(Source: OECD Economic Survey on Turkiye, 1994

Table-16: Percentage of Female at all Levels of Education: Selected European Countries
Percentage of Female, at preceding the first level (I), the First level (II), Second level (III),
the Third level, Universities and equivalent institutions (IV)
C o u n tr y

Turkiye

Spain

Denmark

Germany

Netherlands

Y ear

I

II

1980
1985
1991
1980
1985
1991
1980
1985
1990
1980
1985
1991
1980
1985
1990

45
48
47
50
49

45
47
47
49
48
48(1989)
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
49
50

—

49
49
49
49
48
49
49
49

III

IV
26

28
35
46
51
51 (1988)
41
43
44

49
44

43
41

42
43

34
37
43
50
51 (1989)
43
44
51
42
43
42
31
37
41 (1988)

(Source: Statistical Yearbook, United Nations 1992)

T able-17: Income Distribution: Selected European Countries

Country
Turkiye
Spain
Denmark
Germany
Netherlands

Percentage of income received by
.
rie rest
10%
5 %
poorest 20 %
1985-b
mid 1970s-a
1985-b
mid 1970s-a
41.5
32.0
3.5
3.0
24.5
20.0
6.9
6.0
24.0
22.0
4.0
24.0
35.7
6.0
5.0
23.9
22.0
7.1
3.1
S tatistical Abstract of the Workl,
—

(Source: a=
b= The New Book of World Ranking, 1991)

270

Table-18: Income Distribution in Percentage: Turkiye
As a percentage of total monthly income, 1987_________
i
Decile

1

2

4

3

7

6

5

9.4
Percentage
2.1
6.3
7.6
3.4
4.0
5.6
(i- Indicative minimum wage, twice legal minimum wage)

8

9

10

11.7

15.9

34.0

(Source: OECD Economic Survey on Turkiye, 1994)
Table-19: Central Government: Total Revenue : Selected European Countries
Country

1983

1985

1987

1990

Turkiye
Spain
Denmark
Germany
Netherlands

20.02
25.92
36.75
29.42
52.52

17.55
27.19
40.13
30.24
51.05

17.89
30.23
41.65
29.58
50.90

19.43
30.59
39.31
28.82
47.07

(Source: IMF - Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 1994:90-91)
Table-20: Total tax revenue as percentage of GDP: Selected European Countries
Country

1980

1984

1986

1994

Turkiye
Spain
Denmark
Germany
Netherlands

19.02
24.11
45.48
39.00
45.82

14.43
28.39
48.02
37.73
45.54

22.7
30.4
50.6
37.5
45.5

22.2
35.8
51.6
39.3
45.9

OECD in Figures n-158; OECD in Figures n-206)

1990
Budget
balances
(% of GDP)

F in a n cin g
of PSB R
(% of GDP)

(Source:

Public sector
Consolidated budget
State economic enterprises
Local administrations
Social security institutions
Extra- budgetary funds
Central Bank
.
Foreign borrowing, net
Domestic borrowing, net

O. BCD

Economic Surveys

7.8
3.0
4.2
0.0
-0.3

0.8
0.1
0.9
6.5
on Turkiye, 1W 4J

Table-22: Total External Debt ($ million): Turkiye
1985
25,476

1987
40,228

1989
41,751

1991
50,489

1993
67,356

(Source: O EC D Econom ic Survey on Turkiye, 1994)

1993

1991
10.6

1992
11.2

5.3
3.7
0.3
0.1

4.3
4.5

0.8
0.2

0.6
0.6

1.2

1.4

0.5

1.7
0.4
8.3

1.6
1.5
7.6

2.1
0.6

12.5
6.9
3.6

9.5
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Table-23: State Borrowing Requirement: Spain
(Cash basis, pesetas billion)
Borrowing requirement
Short- term debt
Medium and long term debt
Bank of Spain
other

1990

1991

1992

1993

-1,986
1,116
587
-130
413

-2,144
-749
2,038
9
847

-2,608
181
1,119
-114
1,423

-4,638
202
6,298
-2,237
376

(Source: OECD Economic Surveys, Spain 1994)

Table-24: Budget Deficit by Government Levels: Spain
1991
1982
1985
Per cent of
GDP
Share in
total
deficit

Central
Regional
Local
Total
Central
Regional
Local

4.9
0.2
0.5
5.6
88.5
3.2
8.3

6.3
0.4
0.3
7.0
90.7
5.5
3.8

3.4
1.4
0.1
4.9
67.7
29.2
3.0

(Source: OECD Economic Surveys - Spain 1993)

Table-25: Regional Structure of GDP, %: Spain
Industry
Agriculture
1990
1980
1990
1980
Regions
Andalucia
Canary Islands
Catalonia
Valencia
Galicia
Aragon
Asturias
Balearic Islands
Cantabria
'
Castilla - Leon
Castilla - La - Mancha
Extremadura
Madrid
Murcia
La Rioja
Navarra
Basque Country
apain_________________
Spain

11.5
7.6 '
3.3
6.1
12.0
11.0
5.1
3.8
6.8
12.4
17.5
17.5
0.6
8.4
9.5
7.7
2.8
6.9

9.0
4.1
1.9
3.9
8.8
5.6
3.1
1.9
4.3
9.5
12.2
11.3
0.2
9.8
9.9
6.0
1.6
4.7

22.0
18.3
39.0
29.8
25.3
29.9
38.0
12.1
34.4
28.0
27.5
12.6
22.9
31.7
42.4
38.0
48.5
29.9

17.2
11.3
30.7
26.3
22.9
30.6
37.1
9.6
24.8
25.6
22.3
17.6
17.4
22.4
26.7
34.1
39.8
24.3

(Source: OECD Economic Surveys - Spain, 1993)

Construction
1990
1980
10.0
9.1
7.7
8.7
10.3
7.7
8.3
7.8
6.2
8.1
9.9
10.3
7.7
8.7
6.9
7.0
5.0
8.3

10.9
11.6
6.6
8.1
10.0
7.5
6.4
9.2
7.8
10.4
13.6
11.9
6.3
10.7
8.3
7.8
5.3
8.4

Service
1990
1980
56.5
65.0
50.0
55.4
52.5
51.4
48.6
76.4
52.7
51.5
45.1
59.6
68.9
51.3
41.3
47.3
43.7
54.9

63.0
73.0
60.9
61.7
58.4
56.3
53.4
79.3
63.1
54.5
51.9
59.2
76.1
57.1
55.1
52.1
53.3
62.7

272

T a b le -2 6 : Regional structure o f Employment, %: Spain

Regions

Agriculture
1980
1991

Industry
| Construction
1980
1991
1980
1991

Service
1980
1991

Andalucia
Canary Islands
Catalonia
Valencia
Galicia
Aragon
Asturias
Balearic Islands
Cantabria
Castilla - Leon
Castilla - La - Mancha
Extremadura
Madrid
Murcia
La Rioja
Navarra
Basque Country
Spain

24.9
18.7
6.9
14.7
43.3
22.0
27.7
14.1
26.4
32.9
30.9
36.4
1.6
23.3
2.6
14.5
7.1
19.3

16.7
11.5
39.4
34.6
16.9
29.1
28.9
19.9
27.2
20.1
22.4
10.6
26.7
23.6
36.4
36.8
44.0
26.9

48.4
58.4
45.0
42.6
30.1
41.3
36.6
54.3
38.8
37.8
36.0
43.2
62.3
43.6
32.2
40.8
42.4
44.7

14.9
7.6
3.7
8.4
30.2
11.6
15.2
3.7
12.2
18.3
16.3
21.7
1.0
14.4
12.0
7.2
2.9
10.7

15.6
9.4
33.3
27.7
15.6
25.5
22.9
15.9
23.2
19.9
22.7
10.8
19.9
214
32.1
32.2
34.3
22.9

9.9
11.3
8.7
8.0
9.7
7.6
7.2
11.6
7.5
9.0
10.6
9.6
9.3
9.5
7.9
7.9
6.5
9.0

11.4
9.9
9.3
9.6
10.3
9.5
11.0
13.2
9.7
10.4
14.2
14.2
8.8
10.3
8.8
8.9
7.5
10.1

(Source: OECD Economic Surveys - Spain, 1993)
Table-27: Relative Per Capita Income Levels: Spain (Spain = 100)
Real per capita GDP
1990
1985
Regions
Poor Regions

Rich Regions

Others

Extremadura
Andalucia
Galicia
Castilla - La - Mancha
Balearic Islands
Basque Country
Navarra
Madrid
Catalonia
Canary Islands
Valencia
Aragon
Asturias
Cantabria
Castilla - Leon
Murcia
La Rioja

67.9
74.8
80.2
78.5
121.6
121.0
117.6
111.4
110.2
89.9
100.0
109.7
101.3
97.6
96.6
91.7
121.3

(Source: OECD Economic Surveys - Spain, 1993)

69.4
75.1
76.8
88.4
121.9
112.0
122.5
121.3
112.7
101.1
94.5
111.3
93.5
96.5
91.0
98.2
107.3

58.1
73.2
53.8
54.3
43.9
53.3
51.0
67.2
54.8
51.5
46.8
53.3
70.3
53.9
47.0
51.7
55.3
56.3
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Table-28: Number and Average Size of Farm Holding: Turkiye
Size of farm
holdings
(hectares)

Number

Per cent of
total

0.1 - 1.9
1,010,649
28
2.0 - 4.9
1,164,742
33
5.0 - 9.9
21
738,376
1980
10.0 - 19.9
412,523
12
20.0 - 49.9
194,186
5
50.0 +
29,439
1
Total
3,558,815
100
0.1 - 1.9
1,385,129
35
2.0 - 4.9
32
1,274,609
5.0 - 9.9
713,149
18
10.0 - 19.9
1990
383,323
10
173,774
4
20.0 - 49.9
50.0 +
36,838
10
3,966,822
Total
100
(Source: OECD Economic Surveys, Turkey 1994)

Average size of farm
Per cent of
total
agricultural
holdings
(hectares)
area

0.9
3.1
6.6
12.9
27.7
92.9
6.4
0.9
3.0
6.6
12.8
26.7
109.0
5.9

4
16
21
23
24
12
100
6
17
19
21
20
17
100

Table-29: Labour Force Unionised (1989-1990): Various Countries
%
Country
Turkiye
Spain
Denmark
Germany
Netherlands
Norway
Sweden
Australia
Greece
Portugal

20 (estimated)
16
73
34
25
55
85
42
25
30

(Source: Human Development Report 1995)

Map-9
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